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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis develops and contributes to an emerging field of postcolonial critique 
in the mental health field. Colonisation has been described as an issue for the 
Global South through the activities of western disciplines alongside business 
interests like ‘Big Pharma’. I argue that psychiatric practices are also colonising 
processes in the Global North: what I call psycho-colonisation. This thesis be-
gins by outlining a rationale for interdisciplinary engagement with psycho-
colonisation which includes drawing on postcolonial theory and activism, and 
examining colonisation processes through literature. I then review literature in 
two areas: Firstly, I assess the status and use of postcolonial thinking in the 
mental health arena. Secondly, I review (counter) canonical postcolonial think-
ers selected on the basis of their engagement in resistance. In doing so, I es-
tablish a thematic scheme for assessing colonising processes.  Humanities 
have a central role in both the colonisation process and resistance, and so I turn 
to a critical analysis of two writers’ work and what they tell about madness and 
psycho-colonisation. First, I critique Sebastian Faulks’ Human Traces (2005) as 
an exemplar of a traditional psychiatric discourse. I argue that Faulks’ novels 
aim to present a literary, historically authentic picture that inducts the reader into 
psychiatric orthodoxy. Colonisation exists in his writing at the level of producing 
a cultural power/knowledge effect. Secondly, I examine the works of Toni Morri-
son, specifically The Bluest Eye (1970) and God help the Child (2015), as ex-
amples of how madness is written about without recourse to traditional psychia-
try, but with reference to socio-psychological and political contexts. For the most 
part, Morrison avoids psycho-colonisation. I conclude that there is a rationale for 
the use of postcolonial scholarship as a critical discourse in the mental health 
field. In addition, I show how the processes of colonisation through novels can 
be evident in the literatures of the Global North, and argue that the effect is one 
of a subtle induction of readers to psychiatric thinking and practices.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND STRATEGY 
 
1.1. Introduction to the project. 
 
A number of critics in the mental health field and associated areas 
(whom I review below and in chapter 2) have raised concerns that psychiatry 
and affiliated disciplines engage in a form of colonisation in the global propaga-
tion of Western psychiatric thinking1, and within the global north towards the 
‘mad different’ of home populations.  This second area is less developed in the 
critical literature, and will be taken up in this study. While there are some refer-
ences to psychiatric and disciplinary colonisation in the anti-psychiatry move-
ment of the 1960s and 1970s - I will return to Foucault and Szasz in the next 
chapter – colonisation is undeveloped as an idea. Mills (2014a), Fernando 
(2008, 2011), Pilgrim (2005), Keller (2001), Ben-Moshe et al (2014), Ap-
pignanesi (2008),  Barker (2003), Chessler (1972:1997) and Fern (2005), all ei-
ther describe psychiatric practice as either directly colonising or affiliated to im-
perialism. These sources and more are reviewed ahead in sections 2.3 and 2.4.  
As well as colonising madness, there is growing concern within the psychiatric 
field (Kutchens & Kirk, 1997; Rapley et al 2011; Frances, 2013) about the psy-
chiatric colonisation of ordinary life such as the problems of diagnostic inflation 
including the explosion of autism and attention deficit disorders, and more gen-
erally, the medicalising of misery. I share such concerns and suggest that this is 
one of the vectors along which colonisation may occur – the steady slippage of 
psychiatric language (and thus psychiatric reasoning) into the everyday (Rob-
erts, 2015), hence my critical engagement with novels which I describe below.   
I share these same concerns and I expand upon these through my own 
reading of the critical discourse on psychiatry. I expand in the sense that, in my 
view, thus far, many accusations of psychiatric colonisation lack scholarly de-
velopment. As such, this thesis is best understood as contributing to the field of 
work developing critical approaches to the field of mental health. Given the con-
cerns I go on to develop, and the disciplinary mobility I value, this work sits at 
the junction of a number of prior critical accounts. It is likely to appeal mostly to 
critical thinkers and activists who engage with critical and radical psychiatry and 
                                                          
1
 I return later in this chapter and in chapter 2 to the problematization of the World Health Or-
ganisational and other international perspectives on mental health 
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psychology, activist agendas including mad studies, and scholars in the critical 
medical humanities field.  
However, there is, I believe a tension in a range of critical, anti-psychiatry 
and radical opposition to psychiatric science and practice. If as Mignolo & 
Walsh (2018) point out, that  colonisation and modernism are closely interrelat-
ed (even to the extent that they require the other to exist), not only is psychiatry 
implicated as a major modernist discipline, but so are many of the discourses 
aiming to lever psychiatry into a more acceptable set of practices. For instance, 
criticising psychiatry with a view to improving the science of psychiatry is still 
working within science, which is still a modernist trope and so still affiliated to 
colonisation.   
This opening chapter will present the main concerns and questions of my 
research, how it was undertaken and its place within contemporary mental 
health theory and practice. The methods employed here are more familiar to the 
areas of literary practice and cultural theory, although the field of medical hu-
manities has already engaged with the possibilities presented by the humanities 
and literature. This is certainly so in the mad studies field and the area of disa-
bility discourse (as well as feminist/gender, queer and race discourse/activism) 
where scholarly and activist activity draws on a wide range of sources (for in-
stance Fox, 1994, 1999; Goodley, 2001; Goodley & Rapley, 2001; Mills, 2014b). 
I use postcolonial theory as the lens through which I assess, what I will hence-
forth call, psycho-colonisation. I also adopt Szasz’s term psy-science to refer to 
the broad range of psychiatric and psychological responses to madness and 
distress in both clinical and research areas, and also in the broad discourse on 
mental health.  
Neo-Foucauldian Nikolas Rose is one of the key critical figures to reflect 
extensively on the meaning and function of the prefix ‘psy’. His book Inventing 
Ourselves: Psychology, Power, and Personhood (1998) presents a genealogy 
of psychology as a discipline, and in doing so he describes the conditions by 
which psy disciplines generally emerge as a professional, expert discourse. 
Rose is inclusive of psychiatry, but I would take the view that while they have 
mutually compatible concerns around ‘madness’, ‘criminality’ and ‘perversion’, 
their emergence as disciplines is different. Where they have some similarity, by 
way of Rose’s description, is in how they have a certain mutability that means 
 
 
3 
 
these disciplines seem to find their way into a range of stakes, how they mix 
conceptual vagueness with seemingly incisive clarity, and how rhetorical devic-
es are mistaken for rigor. There are four points, however, that I would raise as 
problems in Rose’s otherwise cogent account. Firstly, as mentioned above, his 
conflation at times of different psy sciences – I would argue psychology and 
psychiatry have some resemblance but equally, sufficient difference to warrant 
separate, though connected, genealogies (such as those written by Foucault). I 
am indeed using psy-science in a similar way, and so I have some sympathy for 
Rose’s characterisation. But, I am also being clear here that my primary con-
cern is their coherence around madness, and I also acknowledge the term psy-
science as a less than satisfactory placeholder that allows my larger project on 
psycho-colonialism to be advanced. My second area of concern is how Rose 
claims that a theorisation of resistance as agency is not needed within accounts 
of oppression or subjectification – his account of this remains, for me, difficult to 
fathom. I disagree not least because discourses of resistance as theories of re-
sistance are important to those who are subjectified. He appears to suggest a 
certain equivalence between different stakes which “occupy one more position 
within the field of contestation” (Rose, 1998), p.36) suggestive that a more ethi-
cal, humane and evidenced position is merely another element of the constella-
tion. This leads to my third objection, that is, often his language of subjectifica-
tion is blandly neutral (although he does refer to being colonized (eg. p.79)) – 
that people are inducted, drawn, induced “subjectified, educated, and solicit-
ed”(ibid), which may well describe governmentality for stress management for 
example, but fails to capture the violence, material and epistemic of some psy 
applications. In this respect, Rose is most acutely accurate when describing the 
subtle power effects and processes of psy. And finally, this leads to my fourth 
problem in Rose’s work, that while he acknowledges the problem with identify-
ing the rise of psy in ‘the West’, as a geographic location, he ignores empire 
and imperialism in his extensive coverage of the nineteenth century. This over-
sight leaves a gap in his account of psy — the usual preoccupations, or obses-
sions, of psy — madness, perversion and criminality are accounted for. The 
‘primitive’, as the fourth pillar in human sciences theorising, remains absent. 
This is a telling and crucial oversight especially as, I will show, preoccupations 
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with the ‘nature’ of race and primitive life cut across all the other three areas as 
well as those salient but less described such as gender and class. 
The term psycho-colonisation is a reference to Peter Sedgwick’s text 
Psycho Politics (1982)2 about which there has been a recent resurgence of in-
terest given the socio-political and economic conditions that mental health ser-
vices find themselves in, and the current context for understanding madness 
and distress. While I do not always agree with Sedgwick’s positions (for in-
stance, by the end of Psycho Politics he appears to unquestioningly use the 
term ‘mental illness’), I do agree with his argument that political and intellectual 
engagement should be with reference to the actual practice of helping people in 
distress. 
 
1.2 Aims. 
 
In an effort to critically evaluate the contention that psy-science is a coloniser, 
my project looks through a postcolonial lens at psy-science and addresses the 
following questions: 
 
1. What does comparing the knowledge, practices, structures and processes 
of the mental health field, to perspectives advanced by postcolonial schol-
ars and activists contribute to critical mental health discourse? 
2. What are the implications/possibilities of considering mental health disci-
plines and their activities as colonising?  
3. How do the Humanities offer both methodological and epistemological in-
sights into the mental health field? In answering this question the study will 
assess the value of postcolonial theory for the disability studies and mental 
health fields. 
 
As already mentioned one of my concerns is that accusations of psychiatric col-
onisation in the critical literature have been most-often, poorly developed, but 
have been made within otherwise coherent critiques. I am thus taking the idea 
                                                          
2
 Sedgewick seems to mock the concerns of sociologists who are variably side-lined in the psy-
chiatric field by what he calls “Psychiatric Imperialism”. He goes on to suggest that such con-
cern is misplaced given they have “never actually lived in the territories that the psychiatric col-
onisers have now taken over” (Sedgewick, 1982, p.40). As I develop in the next chapter, wheth-
er or not this is metaphorical, or indeed a literal assessment of colonisation, is unclear, which 
again reflects my point that there is a lack of development around ideas of colonisation. 
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of psycho-colonisation seriously, even if there are limitations to how well devel-
oped ideas around it are, especially regarding colonisation in the global north. 
My thesis therefore accepts the premise and works backward from that to pro-
vide the ‘working out’ of psychocolonisation. In effect I am asking: “if I work to-
wards the assumption that psychiatry is a coloniser what would I see, and 
where might it be seen?” While it might sound like I am undertaking a process 
of discovery, my thesis is actually concerned with argumentation. To answer my 
research questions above, I take the following steps (not the leaps that have, 
previously, undermined what I believe is an important critical contribution to the 
mental health field): 
 
1. I establish an epistemological basis to beginning an investigation of psy-
cho-colonisation. What I mean by this is, articulating the thinking and what as-
sumptions that scaffold the next step: the assessment of psychiatric colonisa-
tion as so far written about, and how best to bridge the gap towards the coher-
ent use of postcolonial theory? This opening chapter begins by setting out the 
broad concerns relating to psycho-colonisation and then summarises the key 
thinkers that underpin the kind of intellectual activity that can answer my re-
search questions. 
2. Having established an intellectual basis for examining psycho-
colonisation, and having reviewed recent and current texts that engage with is-
sues of medical and psychiatric colonisation (the first part of chapter 2), I go on 
to review some of the canonical thinkers of postcolonial activism and scholar-
ship. My aim in this step is to arrive at a thematic schema for assessing the 
presence of colonisation. Without this, there is little basis to be able to assess, 
and explicate, the activities of psycho-colonisation.  I would otherwise be arriv-
ing in the same place as the current critical literature without moving the argu-
ment on. 
3. Having worked out a thematic schema for colonisation I apply the rele-
vant parts to the problem of psycho-colonisation. By following the postcolonial 
thinkers in their evaluation of the important role of socio-cultural tactics in colo-
nisation, I turn to literature as a vector within the colonising process and one 
which is likely to show some, but not all, of the themes arising out of my sche-
 
 
6 
 
ma. Chapter 3 introduces Sebastian Faulks’ novel Human Traces (2005) as a 
text that I argue presents such a psycho-colonising vector.  
4. The next step is to take an opposing view; one that deals with the possi-
bility that while psycho-colonisation is so endemic as to be ubiquitous, madness 
can be worked with literarily without deference to psychiatric thinking. The work 
of Toni Morrison (Chapter 4), specifically The Bluest Eye (1970:1999) and God 
Help the Child (2015) offer alternatives to psycho-colonising writing on mad-
ness. This allows for the possibility that psycho-colonisation is identifiable and 
separable, and open to resistance.  
5. My conclusion is thus advancing psycho-colonisation as a concept and 
term that describes the phenomena of psychiatric colonisation and I argue that I 
have found a route to substantiating it. I have made explicit what, with some 
brief exceptions aside, has otherwise been a mostly untested accusation. 
 
Returning to my research questions: question 1 is addressed initially in 
chapter 2, and  the second part of chapter 2 looks at the themes that emerge 
out of some of the canonical texts of postcolonial movements, especially that of 
African writing and activism. Question 2 is also addressed in chapter 2, and re-
turned to in my concluding chapter. My response to question 3 underpins the 
whole of this thesis which I outline in this introduction, and then show in applica-
tion in chapters 3 and 4, when I look at my selected novels. In these chapters I 
undertake a close textual analysis of novels mentioned above, by Sebastian 
Faulks and Toni Morrison respectively, and apply postcolonial theory to exam-
ine psycho-colonisation in literature. Faulks’ work is taken as an exemplar of the 
colonising of madness through his adoption of traditional, orthodox psychiatric 
historical accounts and models of explanation. Morrison’s work, however, ex-
emplifies how a writer might engage with issues of madness without resorting to 
psychiatric tropes, and, in doing so, provide an alternative to psycho-
colonisation. In addition, the answer to question 3 is supported through the writ-
ing of the postcolonial activists and scholars reviewed in chapter 2 who regular-
ly cite the importance of literature and the arts to both the processes of coloni-
sation and resistance. I discuss in more detail below why I engage with novels 
and novelists as a route to assessing psycho-colonisation. Given the concerns 
of anti-colonial activists and scholars, and those of mental health and mad activ-
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ists, I argue that the study of psycho-colonisation through literature is tied inti-
mately to a material effect on people with mental health problems, the mad and 
the distressed. Such material effects have included deprivations of liberty and 
incarceration, abuses, forced sterilisation, experimentation, torture and, at 
points, eugenically driven genocide, as well as the more common, but nonethe-
less debilitating iatrogenic effects of service delivery (Tummey & Tummey, 
2008). It is no surprise then that I conclude that there is considerable value in 
such interdisciplinary work. Where I lay out my strategy and rationale in sec-
tions 1.3 and 1.4,  I expand on this point, and especially the worth of interdisci-
plinarity. 
In chapter 2, I review the mental health literature on what I have termed 
psycho-colonisation. Almost all of this literature refers to colonisation, not neo-
colonisation: a term most often used in relation to the continued colonial rela-
tionship, and processes that proceed from a period of direct political colonisa-
tion of one state towards another (often a form of occupation). Usually this in-
volves intellectual, economic and cultural domination premised on the assump-
tions of rights (subsequently developed in international law) and superiority held 
in the preceding colonial period. I follow the lead of this literature and engage 
with ideas of colonisation. However, contemporary international mental health 
colonisation takes on the complexion of neo-colonialism. What Hardt & Negri 
(2000) describe as being a global, neo-liberal, capitalist network of domineering 
interests that scaffold neo-colonisation, applies equally to the global facilitation 
of diagnostic and treatment approaches (or as Stewart-Harawira (2005) sug-
gests, the cross over between globalisation and international hegemonic prac-
tices evocative of neo-colonisation). This is evident in the WHO’s outlook on 
equal global access to screening and treatment and the growing presence of 
Big Pharma in otherwise ‘untreated populations’ (Mills, 2014a; Grech, 2015; 
Watters, 2011). Given this, I return briefly to the idea of neo-colonisation in my 
conclusion in relation to how my research might extend. Critical views of con-
temporary psycho-colonisation could, at the level of service interactions, take 
Burstow’s (2014) view that resistance to psychiatric domination looks more like 
a ‘war of attrition’, alongside how Scott (1990) describes small acts of re-
sistance within near totalising systems of domination. Then, moving outwards 
towards a wider context would include Hardt & Negri’s (2000) view of empire as 
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a global system, and Bauman’s (2000:2012; 2007) contention that modernity is 
fluid (with few barriers to separate both domination or resistance). Along with 
Robert’s (2015) concern about psychological bio-politics and Baudrillard’s 
(2010) notion of a ‘tyranny of good’ (good must be done, even if it causes 
harm), these layers add up, in my mind, to a proposition that there will be no 
decolonisation as like those states from the 1950s onwards, but rather, mobile, 
small, almost guerrilla style, anti-psychiatric activism. This position would reflect 
the reality that many psychiatric practitioners have already contributed to resist-
ing and ‘civilising’ psychiatric practice, whether that is Thomas Szasz stridently 
critiquing the whole basis of psychiatry; Newman’s (1991) social therapy (driven 
by Marxist theory to situate distress historically and therefore re-contextualised); 
Bentall (2010) or Moncrieff (2011) arguing for psy-science to own-up to its im-
poverished scientificity which, for them, underpins a host of problematic ‘thera-
peutic’ practices; or Lewis’ (2006) ‘post-psychiatry’ that takes the direction that a 
truly ethical psychiatric system will result in the redundancy of medical hegemo-
ny, to name but a few.  
In my original research proposal there was a research aim about inte-
grating thinking from disability activism/theory into the consideration of psycho-
colonisation as a conceptual framework for mental health, madness and dis-
tress. However, this became less central over the time of the project and was 
taken up in chapter titled ‘Unsettling impairment: mental health and the social 
model of disability’ (Penson, 2015) in the book Distress or Disability? Mental 
Health and the Politics of Disablement (Spandler et al 2015) (see appendix for a 
copy of this chapter). The chapter argues that the social model of disability, as 
preferred by disabled people, is one that is variably applied in mental health set-
tings and relies on the notion of impairment. While debate suggests that im-
pairment is still somewhat mutable in physical and sensory disability, it is mostly 
without evidence in mental health settings. As such, an unconsidered applica-
tion of the social model of disability in mental health settings may well be con-
ferring an underserved higher status on biological psychiatric thinking. I suggest 
an alternative approach which is a ‘double social model’ that understands that 
both impairment, and the social response to impairment, including the surround-
ing context, as being socially constituted. The impairment and the re-
sponse/context are thus both subject to social negotiation. Impairment, there-
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fore, is as constructed as the attitudes and environments in which it interacts (or 
is constituted). The social construction of madness is not such a new idea; 
however, the contribution I make is in recommending caution when considering 
the risks of a thoughtless admission of psychiatric impairment inadvertently 
through the adoption of a social model.   References to disability in this thesis 
therefore acknowledge the growing cross-over with mental health, mad studies 
and disability discourses, especially given that the history of such things as in-
carceration on the basis of disability, are not unlike the same in mental ill-
ness/health and learning disability areas. While it is beyond the scope of this 
thesis to fully develop a synthesis with disability activism and scholarship, and 
its interaction with the mental health/mad/psy fields, I will speculate further on 
the worth of this in my conclusion. 
 
1.3 The use of novels to assess psycho-colonisation. 
 
Before I lay out the ground work for why a postcolonial/cultural studies 
orientation is the most suitable for answering my research questions and ex-
plain my strategy of engagement, I will briefly expand on why the focus of my 
thesis is novels. There are three main reasons for this and the first one is my 
own narrative competence. While I acknowledge that this thesis might well be 
achieved by looking at, for example, film and theatre, my previous training 
equips me best to work with novels. Secondly, I am looking at psycho-
colonisation in terms of its cultural penetration which leads me to examine a 
medium that offers a vector for this. I cannot review here the question of what 
literature is, or indeed what it offers that is different to other forms of writing, I 
am, however, accepting the worth of literary writing. Finally, the choice of fiction 
rather than life writing, autobiography and survivor/service user accounts is 
partly due to point two. If, as I go on to suggest, fiction, especially in the case of 
a writer like Toni Morrison, is not simply ‘making stuff up’, then her emphasis on 
re-memorialising means she is in fact writing accounts of madness from the 
community experience. 
One of the problems with making such selections is the way in which a 
novel comes to be known as one about mental health or madness. While I 
made the choice of working with Faulks and Morrison, there would be worth in 
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returning to the work I undertook in previous study looking at Rushdie’s The Sa-
tanic Verses (1988), Lessing’s The Fifth Child (1988) and Ben in the World 
(2001), as well as her novels Briefing for a Descent into Hell (). Also Le Guin’s 
The Lathe of Heaven (1971), Rhys’ Wide Sargasso Sea (1966), Woolf’s Mrs. 
Dalloway (2004), Palahniuk’s Fight Club (1996), Fagan’s The Panopticon 
(2012), and Drabble’s Pure Gold Baby (2013).    All the those listed deal with 
madness, and variably its relationship to trauma, capitalism, the provision of 
services, the escape from psychiatry and its problems. 
Above, I avoid the word “methodology” in favour of strategy, because it is 
out of character with the theoretical orientations I have selected. Chapter 2 pro-
vides a review of the theoretical and activist-based findings of the postcolonial 
and anti-colonial movements, which are the most pertinent in answering ques-
tions about colonisation and imperialism.  
Postcolonial writers describe how force and direct violence were/are 
used in ensuring domination and subjugation in the process of colonisation. 
This makes a given population more malleable and accepting of domination. 
But, beyond violence the coloniser has relied on further methods. This is espe-
cially so in neo-colonial relationships that follows apparent decolonisation. Col-
onisation transformed into neo-colonisation, and this, arguably, remains very 
much the contemporary state-of-play. Less direct forms of invasion, such as; 
creating socio-economic dependency and the aggressive propagation of ‘West 
is best’, become more the mode of operation. Most often this has been enacted 
through what is referred to as ‘epistemic violence’3 (Spivak, 2001, 2006) and 
cultural erasure. The colonised are shaped in line with the demands of certain 
Euro-American forms towards an approximation of the Euro-American ideal 
through the means of such things as; re-education, worship, unequal trade ar-
rangements, debt and aggressive marketing. While the shift to more indirect 
methods typifies neo-colonisation, epistemic violence is seen in both colonisa-
tion and neo-colonisation.  From this follows the idea that “[w]hat could be 
called “cultural violence” is even more efficacious than physical violence […] 
                                                          
3
 In a footnote Spivak (2001) defines epistemic violence to mean “the forcible replacement of 
one structure of beliefs with another” (p. 2197) a term she draws from Foucault’s work. This 
term is applied both at the socio-political level of analysis and at the level of the individual lived 
subjectivity. Epistemic violence could be evident in many processes where a person’s sense of 
self or culture forcibly underwritten such as the misapplication of psychological approaches to 
distress and madness.  
 
 
11 
 
that sudden changes, however innocent and even useful they may seem, are 
devastating” (Lindqvist, 1998, p.143).  
The effects of epistemic and cultural violence are explained in the post-
colonial literature in terms reminiscent of theories of subject formation. This is 
not a surprise given the Marxist and psychoanalytic leanings of some of the 
writers. A number of the postcolonial accounts I look at in chapter 2 outline the 
effects of colonisation on self-alienation. While this thesis does not explore the-
ories of subjectivity and subject formation, ideas of how we come to know our-
selves, as an effect of our interaction with culture (Kelly,2013), are significant to 
how people come to know themselves as mentally ill or mad, as well as, inferior 
and black. The critics concerned about psycho-colonisation are concerned 
about the actual and implied violence of some psychiatric methods and aims, as 
well as the ways in which cultural shaping occurs around the experience of 
madness, difference and otherness. Further to that, I am concerned with the 
ways that psycho-colonisation in the Global South bears a resemblance to the 
colonisation of madness in the Global North. I will question the assumption that 
psychiatry is only colonising outside of Western contexts because it has a dif-
ferent historical timeline (sections 1.4, 1.5 and in chapter 2). It is possible that 
the very colonising processes that are objectionable in the Global South are al-
so applied in the Global North, but camouflaged in cultural/historical naturalisa-
tion. That is not to say that psy-science is not problematized in the Global North, 
which is the case, but that it is not problematized on the grounds of colonisation. 
It is this that remains less developed in the critical literature. Certainly writers 
such as Foucault (2003; 2004) McClintock (1995) and Showalter (1987) see 
psychiatrization and cultural dominance as being at an intersection of madness, 
gender, class and sexuality. Non-normativity, psychological alterity, madness 
and deviance are ways of being and experiencing that are constituted within 
psy-science as illness to be treated and a disease burden to be calculated. This 
in turn provides the rationale for intervening - issuing an emotional cordon sani-
taire, which in turn becomes the means by which poor mental health can be 
domesticated into psychiatry and also a way by which good mental health can 
be constituted as something again to be assessed, preserved and enhanced. 
Increasingly, disease burden, early detection and treatment and the application 
of stress-vulnerability models have enabled ‘mission creep’ and the inculcation 
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of the mostly not mad but rather ‘watch and wait’ cases into the psychiatric do-
main. Processes such as the ones outlined above, resemble the epistemic vio-
lence of colonisation, which I describe in detail in chapter 2. Psychiatrization 
and the medicalisation of madness can then be re-conceptualised as psycho-
colonisation. While psychiatrization and medicalisation overlap somewhat, I in-
clude both because this is inclusive of the possibility of both working a little sep-
arately too, both across locations and historically. For instance, the medicalisa-
tion of epilepsy in some countries, for example Zambia, is also the psychiatriza-
tion of epilepsy. Elsewhere, it is seen as a neurological condition treated outside 
of psychiatry. Likewise, dementia is variably seen as a medical and psychiatric 
disease (the risk factors are socio-medico – smoking, obesity, alcohol use – not 
psychiatric). Treatments for epilepsy in neurology become treatments for mood 
disorders in psychiatry.  Such interplay may well have begun with the social 
control of deviance but it is now diffused throughout the area of normality – a 
Foucauldian interpellation to self-care: stress reduction, coaching, resilience, 
mood monitoring, emotional intelligence and the clinical application of mindful-
ness. 
It follows, then, that postcolonial theory and cultural studies provide a 
suitable disciplinary basis for interrogating the concerns of psycho-colonisation 
further. To assess cultural domination and epistemic violence, the method here 
involves examining cultural products that are implicated in the socio-cultural dif-
fusion of psy-science, which in this case, are novels. But equally this could have 
been achieved through analysis of photography, film or popular media (in a way 
similar to the work of Bolaki, 2016). Indeed, intertextual studies draw connec-
tions not just within a medium or genre but between them, to see the rich build-
ing of relationships as a bricolage. In the same way that nineteenth century 
travelogues shaped the view of the colonies for literate Europeans back in Eu-
rope - a distinctly partial window - we might see a similar effect when authors 
choose to represent madness, alterity and psy-science for their readers in the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 
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1.4 Medical humanities and the psycho-colonial critique. 
 
I want to briefly explore medical humanities before moving forward given 
that a project such as mine is most likely to be located (by others) in such a dis-
ciplinary niche. Medical humanities tend to be most associated with the crosso-
ver between such things as human sciences and literature. But the term itself 
communicates the order of importance (Crawford et al 2010). However, the re-
lationship between the medical and humanities disciplines can be characterised 
in a number of different ways. In this range of possibilities for engaging with the 
arts, the more traditionally orientated medical humanities view supports the pri-
macy of medicine within the relationship, and so, humanities become an adjunc-
tive knowledge. Others however use humanities sources and thinking as a 
means to question and challenge medical patriarchy. Adjunctive relationships 
edge towards a more critical standpoint with scholars using terms like ‘additive’, 
‘integrative’ (Crawford et al,2010), or as being a ‘service’ as opposed to ‘disrup-
tive teenager’ (Viney et al 2015), towards the aim of a critical medical humani-
ties (Atkinson et al, 2015). Critical medical humanities activism may intentionally 
be “even obstructive to, health and health care” (Pattison, 2003, p.33).  To ex-
plore this further I will take Oyebode (2009) which typifies the former in this rela-
tionship and through which a power relationship emerges. On the one hand the 
value of literature to psychiatry is acknowledged, and on the other the firm 
maintenance of literature and arts as an adjunctive knowledge.  Oyebode sug-
gests that “the arts or humanities can facilitate the re-engagement of the practi-
tioner with the subjective world of the patient” (ibid p.vii). The implication is that 
the practitioner has an objective, neutral position that looks upon the patient’s 
story as a tale to be variably doubted and reworked within a psychiatric frame. 
Oyebode goes on to suggest that:  
 
[…] we as psychiatrists can deepen our own understanding of the nature of the-
se conditions [mental illnesses] and acquire a more felicitous language both to 
engage patients with and to assimilate the subjective reality of their conditions. 
Like every other skill, our moral imagination, that is, our empathy, needs to be 
exercised and tested and literature provides a safe way of doing this. (Oyebode, 
2009, p.viii). 
 
Here is evidence that the direction of knowledge acquisition is towards the prac-
titioner in a clearly defined clinician/patient power relationship. This is seen in 
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articles looking at humanities as training options to humanise medical pedagogy 
(Shapiro et al, 2009), or to find frameworks for assessing impact (Dennhardt et 
al 2016). As the next chapter will suggest, the notion of assimilation of the pa-
tient’s experience speaks to the cultural strategies of some forms of colonisa-
tion. Woods (2012) explores how ‘patient testimony’ has been presented in the 
Schizophrenia Bulletin and finds that while there are some merits, the impact of 
such articles, as well as the tendency for clinical writers and ideas to shape the 
accounts, may suggest they are not entirely written on the patient’s own terms.  
For Oyebode, the patient is typified as subjective in the sense that their story is 
too invested with their own partiality (“[w]hilst precise causal relationships be-
tween expressive therapies and clinical improvement are sometimes elusive, 
the subjective value ascribed to these initiative by users in considerable”, Craw-
ford et al 2010, p.7). The psychiatrist may use literary interpretation in the act of 
psychiatrizing; here to reform the ‘patient’s’ material into the clinical world 
through a ‘clinical gaze’. Masculinisation is evoked in the way empathy is to be 
exercised and tested and the idea that empathy is a form of moral imagination 
seems distant from its common understanding as a person-centred effort to un-
derstand a person (patient) within their own frame of reference. Finally, when 
one looks at the role literature has, and plays, in anti-colonial resistance, and 
what is covered in chapter 4 on the work of Toni Morrison; literature is anything 
but safe. Certainly, in chapter 3, when dealing with the work of Sebastian 
Faulks, the sense of Oyebode’s wish to domesticate, contain and operationalize 
literature to increase medical prowess is writ large.  
Oyebode goes on to reiterate the value of literature being one that has 
had a long association with medicine; that patients’ stories might be viewed in 
light of the ‘unreliable narrator’, and that literary skills might be applied to mining 
patient narratives. Later in the text, Oyebode is more questioning of psychiatric 
thinking, but this is not sustained and the return to clinical orientations and liter-
ature as a safe adjunct is the role most often entertained. Literature that chal-
lenges the psychiatric status quo too much is side-lined. For instance, literature 
that gives an account of psychosis fails in Oyebode’s eyes because a key fea-
ture of psychosis is ‘un-understandibility’, and so where psychosis is presented 
as having meaning and relevance it “is because of the need for fictional narra-
tive to be comprehensible and coherent” (Oyebode, 2009, p.46). Such a view is 
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at odds with progressive psychological thinking around psychosis, which, since 
the early 1990s, has been looking at how psychosis is a meaningful response to 
crazy circumstances4. 
 Rachman (1998) takes a more equivalent position with literary methods 
and thinking but still suffers to an extent from the adjunctive view of literature, 
that is “to locate literature in medicine”, towards “the function of literature in 
medicine” (p.123) and the “cultural recognition that literature has always resided 
in medicine” (p.124). Salinsky (2002) writes a field guide to doctors interested in 
literature which is based in the enjoyment of his own reading habits and so ex-
plicitly engages with ‘the classics’. Each chapter takes a classic from Europe-
an/US canon and provides a synopsis followed by thoughts for the relevance of 
the novel to medical practice. The tone of Salinsky’s text though is often more 
along the lines of a set of learner notes that guide the busy but culturally en-
gaged medical practitioner. Keen (2010) moves closer again to a more equal 
relationship between clinical studies and literature in evaluating the contribution 
that novels may make in the development and enhancement of empathic skills 
in clinicians. 
 Despite the engagement outlined above, this feels unsatisfactory given 
the critical stake that the possibility of psycho-colonisation raises. I situate my 
project among the more taxing works that employ cultural studies, philosophical 
and literary approaches to interrogating health practices. A few of the best ex-
amples of medical humanities works that engage more fully with the humanities 
side of the relationship as a more equal partner include the work of Fox (1994, 
1999) who makes use of Deleuzian theory to interrogate the stories and dis-
course of health practice; Pichot (2009) who writes one of the rare thorough his-
tories of medical science and eugenics; Livingston (2006) who takes on the task 
of working with the notion of autopoetics (a Deleuzian-informed exploration of 
                                                          
4
 Cooke’s (2014) review of the research on psychosis bears this out. The review on behalf of the 
British Psychological Society: Clinical Psychology Division is clear about the extent to which 
psychosis can be understood and how often psychosis holds a ‘truth’ for the person within the 
context of their lives. There are a number of novels that show such mad experience and offer it 
as understandable. Or, as Rachel Perkins puts it: “Different models of madness derive from dif-
ferent constructions of the world and events within it, but none is ‘true’ in any absolute sense.  
There is nothing ‘truer’ about assorted neurotransmitters than there is about intrapsychic pro-
cesses, inner child or various deities” (Perkins (1999, p23) cited in Repper & Perkins (2003). 
Birchwood & Tarrier (1992) and Kingdon & Turkington (1994), for instance, are two texts on 
psychological work with psychosis that follow what comes to be known as a normalising ra-
tionale – understanding psychosis within the context of a person’s life and experience.. 
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science as a ‘self-making system’) and Lewis’s (2006) text on post-psychiatry. 
What typifies these works is the way they retain a critical voice which is often 
challenging the power relations within the clinical encounter and disciplinary 
arenas. They are not necessarily anti-medicine but are less accepting of com-
mon notions of medical practice as a simplistic ‘force for good’. So, while medi-
cal humanities offer an initial, broad location for researching psycho-
colonisation this is an uneasy placement. The area of medical humanities is as 
fraught with interests as the psy-science disciplines generally, and at their most 
traditional, they metonymically indicate a wider relationship between psy-
science and madness that relegates other knowledges to the side-lines.  
A recent welcome addition to the medical and health humanities field is 
Whitehead et al (2016) The Edinburgh Companion to the Critical Medical Hu-
manities, which addresses at least in part, my concerns about the placement of 
humanities in relation to medicine. Fitzgerald & Callard, in the same volume of-
fer some perspective on how to conceptualise this relationship by drawing on 
quantum theory – itself a work of interdiciplinarity. Much in keeping with poly-
vocal and intersectional thought outlined in chapter 1, quantum entanglement 
offers the possibility that there is no divide between humanities and medicine, 
rather they are mutually entangled. The purification between disciplines, sug-
gested by Latour, is neither apparent nor achievable. Fitzerald & Callard sug-
gest that whether such purification is attempted, and whatever the various dis-
ciplinary stakes might claim, entanglement is the state of play. Where I continue 
to object is not so much in this theorisation, but in the acceptance of psychiatry 
and psy-science as medicine. Refusing to accept the premise of psy-science as 
medicine, I believe, reinvigorates the entanglement to support critical perspec-
tives. This is echoed in Waugh’s (2016) chapter in how radically new epistemic 
objects might be formed through, like Feyerabend’s work, a flattening of epis-
temic hierarchies. Medical humanities engaged in this way become increasingly 
disruptive, contesting and contrary and the disciplinary areas increasingly 
‘fuzzy’ and ‘vague’. To manage this contestation and entanglement, and to 
avoid slippage into the aggregation of stories into well-established moulds (the 
domestication of narratives towards disciplinary ends), and to support to the 
vista of possible stories, mediums and relationships, remains a challenge for the 
medical humanities (Hurwitz & Bates, 2016). 
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Where I place my project has similar tensions to the ones I discuss 
above – that is, as long as the humanities approaches rely on psychiatry as an 
intermediary (whether that is in academic schools, curricula, the scholars them-
selves and clinicians), the ‘critical’ will play ‘second fiddle’ and not be emancipa-
tory. That is a tension I will evidence in the decolonisation movements also in 
the next chapter. Rather, I wish to see opened up the possibility that a direct re-
lationship between the humanities and madness can be fostered that is equiva-
lent to that of psy-science without the need to invoke it. Whether or not this is 
possible remains to be seen. 
 
1.5 Building a study of psycho-colonisation. 
 
American critical studies theorist Julian Carter’s (2006) study of white-
ness closely evokes what I wish to achieve with the investigation of psycho-
colonisation. Carter’s study problematizes whiteness as culturally constructed 
normality which acts as a backdrop to race politics. A couple of short quotes 
from Carter’s text exemplify the strategy I employ. Firstly,  
 
Other archives, if investigated with a similar eye to the elision of white racial 
specificity in the early twentieth century, no doubt would illuminate different dis-
cursive strategies and effects: precisely because normality acquired a tremen-
dously broad cultural reach, it can be investigated in many forms and from 
many perspectives (Carter, 2006, p.17) 
 
Instead of ‘whiteness’, read ‘sanity’, and, I suggest, the same is true of the way 
in which madness might be investigated. Carter suggests that socially constitut-
ed categories of normality/abnormality have conditions of existence which are 
amenable to various forms of investigation which are equally legitimate. Addi-
tionally, there is the idea that certain constructs (whiteness) become a natural-
ised and neutral backdrop against which otherness (in this case race/blackness) 
becomes constituted. The nature of the backdrop becomes one of an unobtru-
sive canvas for the otherness that follows. This echoes the reciprocity that both 
Fanon (on race) and Foucault (on sexuality, criminality and madness) note in 
their accounts of subjectivisation and alienation.  Carter goes on to suggest that 
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Furthermore, the scholarly consensus seems to be that comparative, dialectical, 
or deconstructive studies are to be preferred to more univocal ones, because 
their emphasis on the relational character of identity classifications makes it 
harder to evade their political implications. Such approaches have the additional 
appeal of testifying to their authors’ political consciousness, while less dialogical 
strategies risk appearing naïve at best, perniciously ideological at worst. 
(Carter, 2006, p.17-18). 
 
In effect such critical studies legitimately follow flexible, discursive and argu-
mentative trends, often informed by postmodern thinkers (I outline my own in-
fluences for my engagement below), that favours a Bhaktinian polyphony, and 
value plausibility over generalisability. What I mean by this is that such a study 
needs consideration on its own terms, and the conclusions or issues raised may 
be plausible without necessarily being replicable or subject to ‘truth tests’ be-
yond that which are immanent to the study. Such an outlook parallels the objec-
tions that mad, and other, activism makes against Universalist typologies and 
meta-theories of humanity. As Clarke (2016) puts it, interdisciplinary study can 
show and use a;  
 
[…] spectrum of hearing-voices, plurality-of-identity phenomena and inner poly-
culture together, beyond narratives of pathology in which they are situated by 
bio-psychiatric convention. Experiences and utterances of inner plurality – in-
cluding those of voice hearers, plurals, in(ter) and transdiciplinarians at the 
margins – though not the same do share some common ground. These experi-
ences are rich in creative potential and need not be seen as symptoms to be 
treated nor relegated to social, academic, or artistic obscurity. What might hap-
pen if, instead, there were more spaces in which people and multiple voices 
could be witnessed in complexity? (Clarke, 2016, p.1) 
 
Such an outlook remains invaluable in a study such as mine, where the psy-
sciences are brought under scrutiny, and with them their methods. As such, my 
conclusions should not be tested against a social scientific metric that does not 
apply and such tests may even be a constituent part of the problem of psycho-
colonisation. What Carter (2006) outlines in his study goes a step further again 
by making explicit his interests and stakes; they are plain to see and there is no 
sanitising of the methodology to be suggestive of a dispassionate distance. 
And, most crucially, Carter notes “Such mass-cultural publications [here novels] 
offer access to some of the most authoritative and least controversial forms of 
knowledge […]” and that “These sources not only described normality, they per-
form it” (Carter, 2006, p.18). What Carter is suggesting is that texts are not pas-
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sive objects, but rather, objects that are formed and shaped within active cultur-
al contexts, which also form the basis of active interaction with the reader.  I 
suggest that this applies both to the content of novels (how a novel presents 
madness and psy-science) and also to the ubiquity of the novel in Western life. 
Novels are perhaps so commonplace that, for some, it is hard to imagine that 
they might play a potent role in processes of cultural colonisation and epistemic 
violence. Furthermore, what Clarke (2016) argues for is the retention of plurali-
ty, both for the researcher and the researched. 
Plurality, flexibility and multiplicity in thinking bring with them anxieties 
too, especially where they favour negotiation that bring into question authorita-
tive positions. Given that (psycho-)colonisation is affiliated to neo-liberalism and 
capitalism, such anxiety is difficult to tolerate.  Psy-science is trying to manage 
the implications of uncertainty that are undermining its disciplinary position. This 
perhaps exposes psy-science as a politically manoeuvring discipline rather than 
one which is apolitical and neutral in its knowledge production5 – I go on to give 
a taste of this below. Feyerabend (1975:2010) accounts for politicking when he 
argues that disciplinary influence is the result of the pre-eminence of tradition in 
scholarly thought that favours what he calls material effect, that is, the force of 
the authority of an established position or argument, over the logical force, that 
being the reasoning of the argument which includes viable alternatives. The 
obedience demanded by material effect, or orthodoxy, is “nothing but a political 
manoeuvre” (Feyerabend, 1975;2010, p.9). For instance, Boyle (1990), Bentall 
(2003, 2010), the British Psychological Society (2013) and Cooke (2014, 2017) 
all provide scientifically cogent accounts of the problems with the validity of the 
schizophrenia illness construct.  Likewise, Insel (2013) (the director of the US 
National Institute of Mental Health), blogged about how he thinks it is worth not 
using DSM5 due to validity problems. However, psychiatry, as a discipline does 
not seek to re-examine fundamentally this problematic construct (diagnosis 
broadly, and schizophrenia specifically) and thus the material effect becomes 
plainly evident. 
                                                          
5
 Bhugra et al (2017) in the “Lancet Psychiatry Commission on the Future of Psychiatry” argue 
for a preeminent role in the drawing up of mental health legislation, amongst taking a rights ad-
vocacy role and political involvement: “To achieve these changes [various changes discussed], 
appropriate stewardship of mental health and psychiatric care in governments is required” 
(Bhugra, et al, 2017, p.786), which is argued as appropriate to the vision of modern.  
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Allen Frances’s (2013) Saving Normal further exemplifies this. He offers 
some of the same rhetoric over the importance of psychiatry to which I return in 
chapter 3. He suggests that “Psychiatry is a noble and essential profession” 
(p.xix) and goes on to suggest that “saving normal” and “saving psychiatry” are 
really two sides of the same coin” (p.xx) without apparent concern that this 
sounds like the terms of a eugenic manifesto. That is, that negative eugenics is 
concerned with the preservation of a desirable norm from genetic and other 
dangers and positive eugenics are concerned with achieving the greatest 
breeding potentials. Frances’ argument is that there is ‘mission creep’ in psy-
chiatry and that diagnostic inflation, alongside vested Big Pharma interests in 
DSM5, has lost much of the progress (made under his own steerage) in the 
previous edition; DSMIV-R. He is suggesting that his version of the DSM has a 
balanced, fair picture of mental illness that avoid diagnostic inflation. In addition, 
Frances presents conflicting ideas about the relationship psychiatry has to med-
icine broadly, due to its existential duties towards people in distress, and also 
that psychiatry is a form of supra-medicine, given that it deals with the seat of 
our humanity in the brain. Furthermore, he is quite certain of the existence of 
mental illness - diagnosable and treatable - but is conversely cognisant of the 
complexity of the brain and the limits of our knowledge of it. Frances provides a 
historical and cultural account of psychiatry, and suggests that psychiatry has 
an enduring role in human lives by making the argument that shamanic culture 
(if assimilated culturally) was the earliest psychiatry. He suggests that the ori-
gins of psy-science can be found in Islamic culture. Unfortunately, his own 
sourcing for this section is a Wikipedia page on Islamic medicine. Saving Nor-
mal won a science writing prize in 2013, was on a top ten list of recommended 
science books and was recommended by a reviewer quoted on the book 
sleeve, as one of the ten books all social workers should read. Much of the revi-
sionism and poor historical accounting in Frances’ book constitutes what Pichot 
(2009) refers to as an ‘anthropological fable’ – that is, the ways in which stories 
are crafted to fill the gaps, make the links and evoke progress, that on scrutiny, 
lack rigour and evidence. Furthermore, examining anthropological fables can 
expose the contamination of contemporary thinking in the process of ordering 
an unsubstantiated past.  
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Among the problems presented by Frances’ account are the suggestive 
references to rigorous scientificity around the demarcation of clinical thresholds, 
in which he favours his own version of DSM. However, little by way of evidence 
of this preferred predecessor is supplied beyond his own view that psychiatry is 
currently over-reaching and over-diagnosing. As a result, there is a sense of a 
‘rose-tinted’ reflection on the days of psy-science that had better outcomes and 
was more ethical than that of the DSM5. He suggests equivalence, without any 
evidence, to the role of psychiatry as the modern equivalent of shamanic prac-
tices, but now a practice with the added advantage of modern science. This is a 
dubious historical manoeuvre that is suggestive of a long and illustrious past 
that is actually revisionist. In postcolonial terms this is, in effect, looking towards 
the ‘primitive’ practices of pre-industrial societies to see how we used to live in 
our undeveloped past – a Human Zoo approach to historical rigor. Clearly, the 
sourcing of Wikipedia for such an essential part of the revisionist history is prob-
lematic. The idea that saving normal is something that everyone would aspire 
to, neglects the strident objections that activists on the wrong side of normal, 
including disability activism, have lodged. Frances is not unusual, and the con-
sistency within the field is variable. For instance, Metzl (2009) tracked changes 
in the use of the schizophrenia diagnosis form the 1950s to the 1970s, and 
found a demographic shift that indicates racist diagnostic practice. But, his con-
clusion is that psychiatry is at heart an unproblematic discipline and practice. In 
a similar way, Akyeampong (2015) boldly states that “[m]ental illness [not mad-
ness] is a phenomenon in all societies” (p. 24) in a review of the history of psy-
chiatry in Africa, before going on to critique the ways in which Western ways of 
viewing madness are problematic. 
One reading of the problem exemplified by Frances is that psy-science 
writing is woefully poor - and indeed there is some evidence that this is the 
case. However, the interpretation I take here, given that my concern is the ma-
terial effect of disciplinary customs and knowledge, is that there may well be a 
strategic effect of such writing. Such an effect becomes clearer as I move on to 
describe the processes that may underpin psycho-colonisation in the next chap-
ter. And such a material effect aims to remain authoritative yet mobile, convinc-
ing in its earnestness and apparently well-informed. At the very least there 
seems to be reluctance on the part of psychiatry to dwell on the implications 
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from the critiques about the psy discipline. There is a sense of heading off criti-
cism and a move to redeem psy-science even before the problem is allowed to 
be articulated. In the historical accounts examined alongside Faulks’ work in 
chapter 3, there is a strong motif of discounting elements of psy-history that are 
unpalatable or controversial. As such, the effect of such discourse is rhetorical 
as much as it is educational. I suggest that the following quotation makes 
Frances’ lapses less of a one-off: 
 
Schizophrenia is one of the terms used to describe a major psychiatric disorder 
(or cluster of disorders) that alters an individual’s perception, thoughts, affect 
and behaviour. Individuals who develop schizophrenia will each have their own 
unique combination of symptoms and experiences, the precise pattern of which 
will be influenced by their particular circumstances (National Collaboration Cen-
tre for Mental Health, 2009, ‘Schizophrenia Core interventions in the treatment 
and management of schizophrenia in primary and secondary care (update)’, 
p17; my emphasis). 
 
This definition of schizophrenia from the UK’s National Collaboration Centre for 
Mental Health and National Institute for Clinical Excellence evokes a sense of 
authority and scientific knowledge but on closer inspection this is less certain. 
As it claims; schizophrenia is a major disorder or cluster that alters perception, 
cognition, affect and behaviour (as do alcohol and caffeine). And, although it is 
diagnosable, it presents in a highly idiosyncratic manner influenced by specific 
context. The stress-vulnerability model is often presented alongside such 
statements, that is, the idea that a genetic predisposition to schizophrenia inter-
acts with environmental pressures to produce psychosis.  But that is true of any 
part of our experience and there is no definitive evidence of a genetic basis of 
psychiatric ‘disorders’, nor a clear indication of what the mechanism of interac-
tion is with the environment, or where thresholds or types of events might inter-
act.  This definition of schizophrenia has a material effect; it is authoritative, but 
over inclusive and vague while sounding specific and highly informed. Such 
statements work their ways into fiction as can be seen in some of Faulks’ work 
discussed in chapter 3. 
 So, my research assumes that psycho-colonisation is evident through the 
stories that psy-science tells about itself, such as those that are found in the of-
ficial documents of psy-disciplines. Given the parallels I draw between colonisa-
tion and psy-science practice, it becomes possible that these documents rely on 
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a material force of tradition and anthropological fables to maintain the meta-
narrative of progress and scientificity. This is in the same way that a range of 
documents implicated in colonisation, including those that constructed ‘race’ as 
a scientific category (Wolfe 2016), have the appearances of science, and the 
authority, but without rigour. Hence, human science research becomes political-
ly implicated at such points. One outcome (or even necessity) of the material 
effect is the subjugation of the stories of the mad, distressed and psychological-
ly different for certain disciplinary ends (and indeed the experiences and identi-
ties that emerge from those stories). However, Carter, above, and the postcolo-
nial writers covered in the next chapter, also note the ways in which colonisation 
uses canonical and popular forms such as educational material and entertain-
ment. What this means for my study is the possibility that authors act on behalf 
of psy-science and their literature can supply a fictional, but authoritative proxy 
for the orthodox psychiatric models and texts within the psy-discipline.   
It would not be so revealing to examine orthodox psychiatric texts in and 
of themselves when thinking about diffusion of psy-science and its pervasive-
ness, although elements of such writing reveals the ways in which psy-science 
would like, and hope, to involve itself in all aspects of modern life. Equally, per-
haps as revealing, are the ways in which notions of madness, alterity and psy-
science travel through popular mediums such as the novel. Clinical documents 
are most often thought of as the ‘natural’ territory of psy-science, but the novel, 
among other cultural mediums, is a medium by which psy-science is made cul-
turally available. The doctors and clinicians involved in medical humanities dis-
cussed earlier, agree with the significance, albeit mostly adjunctive, of the rela-
tionship between medicine and literature. I consider the possibility, therefore, 
that in psycho-colonisation, the effect is one of promulgating psychiatric ortho-
doxy and perpetuating medical perspectives of madness. This is a process by 
which psy-science writes its own teleological discourse, which, in turn, is the 
cause and effect of psycho-colonialism. 
 
1.6 Conceptualising madness in this project. 
 
One of the tensions within this project is how to discuss madness when I simul-
taneously suggesting madness defies definition. To blandly define madness as 
 
 
24 
 
something ‘every day’ and almost banal undermines the experience of madness 
and the investment I suggest psi-science has in psycho-colonisation. Likewise, 
to reify madness in fixed diagnostic terms, even for the purpose of discussion, is 
to accept the terms of colonisation. Instead, I will adopt a suitably mobile ap-
proach to conceptualising madness that is neither fixed nor banal, but one open 
to redefinition, transaction and dialogue. Khair (2015) suggests that “[p]erhaps 
one needs to stand somewhere on the margins of power before one can begin 
to see the working of power as determinate, lopsided and oppressive (as well 
as constructive)” (p.79), By accepting this proposition, that is, by locating this 
project on the side of madness in this lopsided relationship with psy-science, 
the way in which power is exercised around the mad may be revealed further. 
The focus thus shifts from defining madness to demarcating those activities and 
people whose role it is to define madness. In some respects, where psycho-
colonisation is concerned, what madness is, is less important than what invest-
ed professions and discourses say it is. Foucault’s opus History of Madness 
(2006)6 argues, that each age formulates its own idea of what madness is; then 
defining madness is perilous and is somewhat at odds with both the thinking 
and argumentation of this project. When the mobility of thought recommended 
by Carter above, is embraced, madness becomes a negotiation to be encoun-
tered within a polyphonic, poly-cultural space. Turning to one of the appendices 
of Foucault’s History of Madness (2006), he suggests 
 
Medical progress might one day cause mental illness to disappear […] but one 
last thing will remain, which is the relationship between man and his fantasies, 
his impossible, his non-corporeal pain, his carcass of night; that once the patho-
logical is nullified, the obscure belonging of man to madness will be the ageless 
memory of an ill whose form of sickness has been effaced, but which lives on 
obstinately as unhappiness (Foucault, 2006, p.542) 
 
Foucault is suggesting that despite treatment and containment, the substance 
of madness – fantasy, emotional pain, darkness and unhappiness – remain. He 
may also be making the point, ironically, that in fact madness will never be 
cured, that removing mental illness will be a linguistic change, not one that real-
ly removes the substrates of madness.  
                                                          
6
 This is the first full and unabridged English translation of the 1961 French Folie et Déraison: 
Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique  which includes a range of previously uncollected appen-
dices. 
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So, power can be exposed more readily when viewed from the margins 
of its exercise and as Ben-Moshe et al (2014) show there are few more margin-
al than the mad, disabled or the intersection between madness, disability and 
colour.  As Littlewood & Lipsedge (1982) put it, “[t]wo types of ‘outsiders – the 
mentally ill and non-Europeans – have been referred to as aliens – people set 
aside by various theories as being basically different” (p.37, emphasis in origi-
nal), and the difference is one of ‘deficiency’. Part of this process of marginality 
is the application of psy-science to sections of populations, to demarcate them 
as mad, and as Foucault suggests, this may be a power effect or strategy, but it 
is not grasping anything essential to the nature of madness. Curiously this is 
captured in a quotation from C.L.R. James’7 The Black Jacobins (1938:2001). 
James means to describe the experience of the San Domingo slaves who re-
volted against the French (and English) when he writes “[w]here imperialists do 
not find disorder they create it deliberately” (James, 1938:2001, p.232). Howev-
er, it fits well within the context of this study on psycho-colonialism, and cap-
tures, perhaps, the sentiment of those people concerned about psy-science. 
Before Foucault conceptualised the productive use of power, James suggests 
that imperialists create disorder; and the imperialists (psycho-colonisers) are 
exercising a power, colonising madness and the mad, which are otherwise (or 
intentionally) kept to the margins. This is not to say that madness (indeed, inter-
sections of gender, sexuality, disability and race) is not important, but, madness 
rarely gets to speak on its own terms, without the lens of psy-science to reform 
it, in particular ways, and to certain ends. 
 
1.7 The scope of the project: starting to locate psycho-colonisation. 
 
Before I provide an account of my strategy in section 1.8, I want to de-
velop an initial scope for this project. The scope, an initial gathering of what 
psycho-colonisation might mean and to whom, will make sense of the strategy 
and the intellectual debt I have to certain thinkers. This section aims outlines 
                                                          
7
 C.L.R.  James, a black Marxist , wrote The Black Jacobins in 1938, which is credited as being 
the first text written from the point of view of the history of the enslaved and colonised and with 
their emancipation and victory clearly accounted for. In many respects this highlighted how or-
thodox, dominant British and French histories of the colony were partial and politically motivat-
ed. 
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who is included in my concerns of psycho-colonisation, especially when coloni-
sation broadly has tended to be understood geographically and geopolitically. 
  The broader research area concerned with colonisation in psy-science tends 
to emphasise psycho-colonisation as something undertaken in the Global South 
by European and U.S. interests. This risks overlooking the possibility that colo-
nisation is something that can be undertaken in the Global North with regard to 
mad/disabled people, indigenous people and those removed and displaced to 
the north. Assumptions that geopolitical concerns are static along the lines of 
established nation states, potentially obscures how the constitution of ‘peoples’ 
is imposed (Barnett, 1997).  
There is an issue, therefore, around the geography of colonisation. 
Commonly colonisation is presented as a process occurring elsewhere, in an-
other nation state, and is the outcome of imperialising tendencies.  However, 
the geopolitical map of colonisation is also the effect of colonisation and not 
simply a description of a change in government in what was before, and then 
after, invasion. Barnett (1997) argues that the formation and practices of nation 
states is a European construction arising out of a range of social, political, mili-
tary and economic contingencies from the fourteenth century onwards, forming 
most clearly in the sixteenth century. When European nations invaded other 
parts of the world with the intention of colonisation, this was not simply one na-
tion state invading another, similarly organised, country. Barnett (1997) goes on 
to suggest that in Africa and Asia “the state first appeared […] dressed in the 
garb of a civilising mission in the colonial period” (Barnett, 1997, p. 33). Prior to 
that, social organisation did not form along the lines of European style nation-
hood. Colonisation imposed a geographical fixing of otherwise disparate popu-
lations that had formerly interrelated on a different schema. As a result, such 
territorialisation pre-empts the decolonising period of the mid-twentieth century 
and sets the move towards self-governance along the often straight co-terminal 
lines of former European interests. The implication for my study is in the need to 
be cautious about the geographical necessity of colonisation being that of one 
state invading another. The coloniser instituted the model of a certain form of 
nation, and on behalf of an international ‘community’, the requirement of a cer-
tain kind of statehood, with which comes the designation of ‘developing’ or ‘third 
world’. Prior to this point, at the moment of colonisation, national identity, in the 
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way it comes to be known latterly, does not necessarily apply. As such the 
modern nation state can be construed as a European, colonial, capitalist effect.  
Thus, the geography of colonisation can be an effect of colonisation itself rather 
than a ‘natural’ arrangement. That is why McClintock (1995) and Foucault 
(2003, 2008) find it noteworthy that colonial practices occur across boundary 
points such as class and madness within England and France respectively. Ad-
ditionally, the imperialist arrangement of nations may also be replicated at a 
highly local level within populations8, an ‘internal colony’ (San Juan, 1998). This 
is consistent with Foucault’s (2003) notion of a psy-science that operates its 
own form of racism, one which becomes predicated on eugenic ideologies and 
notions of biological inferiority (Foucault, 2004). Likewise, this is found in cri-
tiques of the emerging nineteenth century disciplines of population statistics and 
sociology (Snyder & Mitchell, 2006) as well as more recent public health popu-
lation control on racist grounds (Bashford, 2014). There is recognition of the 
domination and subjugation of black (Alexander, 2011) and mad/disabled popu-
lations (Ben-Moshe et al, 2014) in the global north, even though this may not be 
previously discussed in terms of colonisation. Such subjugation is often seen 
through the imposition of incarceration, forced labour, and the industri-
al/therapeutic/prison complex which are features of colonisation or neo-
colonisation. 
  It follows, therefore, that there is no inherent need for a psy/mad popula-
tion to identify with any fixed geographical community other than the ones im-
posed upon them. The geography of colonisation is already dispersed with ide-
as of diaspora. Over two hundred years of institutional practices, and the link 
between socio-economics and mental ill-health (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010) 
seem to at least offer a rudimentary geography to madness following the lines 
of poverty. In addition, the psycho-geography of madness includes large scale 
psychiatric incarceration, which referred to institutions as ‘colonies’ (Whitaker, 
2002). Psycho-colonisation draws upon a mix of actual, material strategies (act-
ing upon bodies, advising on populations, affiliations with Big Pharma), and 
metaphorically in the social meanings that psy-science shapes for madness. 
These two seemingly disparate modes of operation are not distinct but are me-
                                                          
8
 Certainly Foucault (1975:1991) argues that the way subjects are deployed geographically and 
spatially is with an intended power effect, that is, one of domination. McClintock (1995) de-
scribes the ways that the tropes of colonisation were put to use in describing forays between 
classes – usually upper class voyeurism of lower and working classes. 
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diated by such things as popular media and, in this case, novels. Hence the 
earlier point that texts ‘perform’. This thesis is occupied with the zone wherein 
‘actual’ madness, and ‘real’ treatment, is represented textually, and works to in-
fluence the social practices that surround madness.  Likewise, worldly practices 
and conventions around madness shape the representation (construction) of 
madness in texts, not unlike the power/knowledge relationship that Foucault 
theorised. Such a zone is also where resistance to domination is to be found, as 
becomes evident in section 2.6 where I review postcolonial writing. Zelig (2016) 
notes that anti-imperialist writers and activists, including Fanon who I return to 
in chapter 2, suggest that the effect of colonisation is also felt in the colonising 
homeland. This is one of the reasons that some anti-imperialist movements 
have aspired to form alliances with working class and proletarian activists in Eu-
ropean countries. While the presentation is different, the principle and practice 
of domination is discernible both in the colonised country and at home in the 
imperial centre. Here, psycho-colonisation is felt in the global south and the 
‘mad’ population, and also in the global north and the ‘normal’ population.  
The World Health Organisation, for instance, makes detection, diagnosis 
and the treatment of madness a cross border issue. Thornicroft & Vortruba 
(2015) advocate: 
 
A stronger emphasis on mental health, and integration of attention to mental 
health in all relevant development programs, will strengthen the general devel-
opment effort as well as ensuring, for the first time, sustained attention to and 
investment in the major global contributor to GBD and lost productivity. As the 
burden of disease from infectious and maternal child health issues declines, the 
burden of non-communicable diseases and mental health is now rising in im-
portance. The time is now for us to set a path for bringing needed attention to 
these common and disabling conditions. (Thornicroft & Votruba, 2015, p.1) 
 
Kiev (1972) puts it more bluntly when making recommendations on psychiatric 
epidemiology; that psychiatry “must also determine ways in which to introduce 
programmes to overcome specific cultural resistance in particular societies” 
(p.185).   While note needs to be taken of cross cultural concerns, often these 
are simplistically linked to geography which is explored more in chapter 2, es-
pecially when looking at the work of Edward Said and (his term) orientalisation.  
The quotation above outlines in strong terms the necessity and scope of the 
contemporary, psy-science mission, and the integration of madness into the 
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category of ‘noncommunicable disease’ – there is nowhere to be left without ac-
cess to psy-science. What Baudrillard (2010) suggests is that “[w]e are not suc-
cumbing to oppression or exploitation, but to profusion and unconditional care – 
to the power of those who make sovereign decisions about our well-being […] 
the Empire of Good” (p.88). The global reach of psy-science in the Empire of 
Good fails to account for the common practices that a United Nation report 
found on the treatment of disabled and psycho-socially disabled. That is, that 
the practices of non-consensual treatment, and loss of liberty for treatment pur-
poses, not-withstanding therapeutic intent, meet international criteria for torture 
(Mendez, 2013). 
 For this project my scope is inclusive of psycho-colonisation broadly giv-
en that psy-science has global aspirations. Likewise, in the ways that anti-
colonial resistance is seen to have affiliations across national boundaries on the 
basis of race and class, I see affiliations between the mad and mad activism 
across boundaries. This is about advancing mutuality rather than homogeneity. 
However, my primary concern, given its relative absence in the psycho-
colonisation literature, is how psycho-colonisation operates through cultural vec-
tors in the global north. 
 
1.8 Intellectual positionality and a strategy of engagement. 
  
In this section I present an account of the thinking that underpins my out-
look in this thesis including a synopsis of thinkers and work important to my po-
sitionality. This section follows on, then, from the idea that a project such as this 
needs to engage with complexity rather than aiming to simplify matters, and that 
with complexity comes tension. Onwards, the effect of some of these thinkers is 
felt, noticeable rather than applied in strict methodological ways.  Intellectual 
debt and tensions also occur in the activist margins, although I prefer to see this 
as a wish to avoid simplistic, subjugating accounts, rather than insurmountable 
fractures. For instance, it is recognised that the intersection of disability dis-
course, psy-science and postcolonial theory is fraught with tensions; for exam-
ple, in the extent to which activist models of disability apply in mental health 
contexts (Penson, 2015). As such, it is unlikely that this, or other research, can 
arrive at a final evaluation of madness, psy-science and colonisation. In addi-
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tion, this arena is dynamic, given that where colonisation may be present, there 
will also be resistance and subversion (Scott, 1990; Caygill, 2013). Noting (and 
mobilising) resistance and subversion are characteristics of a nomadic orienta-
tion broadly (Fox, 1999), as well as within postcolonial studies. By looking at in-
tertextual relationships across the concerns of psycho-colonialism, affiliations 
and oppositions are understood, not only of the physical origin of the authors, 
but equally on what a given novel expresses or works upon.   
This is consistent with postcolonial scholarship that suggests that cultural 
products such as novels and the arts become one way in which colonisers per-
petrate epistemic violence (that is, the shattering of local, native ways of think-
ing, feeling, knowing and being), with the aim of subjugation through imposing 
the coloniser’s own epistemic frame and cultural products (Cesaire, 1972:2000; 
Ngũgĩ, 1986). The writers I chose to review in section 2.6 are selected mostly 
on the basis of their proximity to decolonising activism. Others are included be-
cause of their attention to intersectional issues and madness. These writers are 
not the final word on postcolonial thinking, but my emphasis does address the 
concerns that Ahmad (1992) and Sardar (1998)9 raise. They suggest that latter-
ly, postcolonial thinking has been a product of the Academy more than activism, 
and so reflects a class structuring in danger of losing contact with the interests it 
purports to represent. Zelig (2016) shows how this is not entirely new and that 
the movement to free Algeria from French colonialism, for example, had to con-
tend with a left-wing, intellectual reticence over the need for militant action. Un-
fortunately, while gaining access to thought with a closer proximity to decoloni-
sation and activism, the sources I review often fail to represent other interests 
not evident in the literature of the time. Jayawardena (2016), for instance, re-
views the essential role of women in a range of anti-colonial and women’s rights 
movements in the Global South, which are otherwise left out of a male dominat-
ed canon. Feminist, queer and disabled constituents are not represented in this 
mostly male, heteronormative selection of writers. However, the themes that 
emerge do speak to a range of marginal(ised) interests and experiences that 
most likely reflects the late Victorian, early twentieth century European preoc-
                                                          
9
 Both writers are also fairly damning of postmodern/post-structural thought as a trend that leads 
to a politics of nothingness and despair. If all is socially constructed and purely discourse, then 
nothing is real. As a ‘thought exercise’, I understand their concern, however, this negates the 
ways in which such thinkers have contributed enormously to feminist, queer and disabled activ-
ism, as well as overlooking the personal involvement a number of said thinkers took in activism 
and political action groups. 
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cupation with taxonomy, and the ‘mastering’ of nature as well as broadly male 
heteronormative, white European agendas. While I am not offering a grand the-
ory or meta-narrative of subjugation, there are striking resemblances between, 
say, the experience of the mad, disabled and the colonised. So, I take every 
opportunity to maintain this proximity to activism, while synthesising the thinking 
I present, within a wider and more inclusive literature.  
In the context of this study, I see novels as providing the following func-
tions: 
 novels mediate, construct and express, within a cultural frame, the mean-
ing(s) of madness, mental health and psy-science 
 and, therefore, literary sources variably fulfil the needs of dominant and 
resistant discourses on madness 
 that, in the absence of a recorded and widely valued history for subjugat-
ed groups, novels fulfil ‘rememorialisation’ (Morrison, 1970:1999): that is, 
the passing of personal histories into fictions that house cultural and so-
cial ‘truths’ 
 novels are intertextual and so, while they may be taken singly, novels are 
also affiliated in a range of ways to other texts and forms (Orr, 2003). 
The meaning and effects of one text are therefore to be understood with-
in a dense textual network, which at its most inclusive entertains almost 
anything as a text (the body, space, clinical documents, film, etc.) (Fox, 
1999). 
 
I suggest that this project is best considered as one that broadly fits into 
Deuleuze and Guattari’s (1988:2013) scheme of ‘nomadic thought’, which opti-
mises mobility, plasticity and interconnectivity; that is, “to unfix and mobilize cul-
tural dynamism [that] blurs boundaries, making transitions between categories, 
states and levels of experience” (Andermahr et al 2000, p.184). Nomadic think-
ing has underpinned, and been used to research and produce counter-
narratives of health, illness, disability, within descriptions of domination and re-
sistance (Fox, 1999). The intended effect here is to eschew a centre to theory 
and critique, or indeed, to some centralising force that locates and fixes mean-
ing and implication in a single place. As a result, my thesis moves between dis-
cipline areas: psychology, psychiatry, cultural studies, postcolonial theory, poli-
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tics, history, poststructuralism and literary theory. The advantage of this mobility 
is that it permits an engagement with subjectivities, various subject/object rela-
tions, the politics of domination, and also the very methods by which such con-
cerns might be uncovered. As already suggested, to cast suspicion over the 
outcomes of psy-science, and its affiliates, is to cast doubt over its epistemolog-
ical and ontological stance and its methodologies.  
It follows that the method here is that of close reading with a frame of 
reference influenced by Derridean deconstruction and within a broader frame 
that contends that knowledges10 are arranged along the lines of modernist dis-
ciplinary practices artificially separating science/nature from culture/society 
(Latour, 1993), and which in turn are arranged and hierarchized through disci-
plinary efforts (Foucault, 2004), that are reinforced through tradition and custom 
even at the cost of innovation (Feyerabend, 1975; 2010). This in turn reflects 
the deeply held Western preoccupation (and argued as problematic concern) 
with logos11 (Derrida, 1967:1978). Accepting the collective positioning of these 
arguments, I share the view characterised in the quote below; 
My own view is that events, relations, structures do have conditions of exist-
ence and real effects, outside of the sphere of the discursive; but it is only within 
the discursive, and subject to specific conditions, limits and modalities, do they 
have or can be constructed within meaning. Thus while not wanting to expand 
the territorial claims of the discursive infinitely, how things are represented and 
the ‘machineries’ and regimes of representation in a culture do play a constitu-
tive part, and not merely a reflexive, after-the-event role. (Hall, 1989, p.443) 
Stuart Hall was credited with being the father of cultural studies in his activism 
and scholarship in Birmingham UK. With Hall’s position in mind I apply the fol-
lowing four orientations to my reading of the selected novels, and in developing 
my thought and assessment of psycho-colonialism. The purpose of this next 
section is to make explicit the influences that have shaped my epistemological 
stance. 
                                                          
10
 Foucault and other postmodernists use this term to designate the presence of a plurality of 
knowledge which is not so much an argument for relativism as much as an acknowledgement of 
the conditions or possibilities for knowing that may arrive at a different knowledge, depending 
on a range of stakes and contingencies. 
11
   Thiher (2004) suggests that logos, an Ancient Greek idea, has been linked to a variety of 
meanings, including that of “language, reason, harmony, proportion” (p.14). Such meanings be-
come, Thiher argues, essential to Western thinking on the self, and, by extension, alterity, which 
influences all ontological concerns that follow. The closest possibilities of departure from logos 
in contemporary thinking are those presented outside of Western contexts and within the post-
modern movements. 
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1.9 Positionality and intellectual debt 
This section outlines in sequence the thinking that ‘permits’ arriving at my 
thesis and thus provides the intellectual underpinnings. Without this ‘debt’ being 
acknowledged, I argue, that I would be leaving a significant element of my pro-
ject foundations absent. Each ‘thinker’s’ contribution to my thinking is prefaced 
by an italicised heading, beginning with Bruno Latour. 
Postmodern thought offers a response to concurrent modernism. 
Latour’s (1993) work challenges the periodization of modernism and 
postmodernism in a way that is destabilising for both. He does this by question-
ing whether or not modernism was actually achieved, which becomes significant 
to whether or not there is a post, and so there is the possibility that modernism 
is still in play. This addresses some objections to postmodernist thinking, such 
as that of Sardar (1998), who, I think, confuses the two by accepting the given 
periodization. That is not to say that postmodernism is unproblematic and cer-
tainly, there is a way that imperialist agendas have been able to use postmod-
ernism cynically in what have been called recently, for example, ‘post-truth poli-
tics’. Sardar’s concerns overlook the ethical efforts that many postmodern 
scholars and activists made, especially in counteracting imperialism and mono-
lithic Western meta-narratives. Latour suggests, therefore, that while modernist 
imperialistic intentions were to ‘purify’ disciplines and arrive at clear taxonomies 
of knowledge, in fact, all is hybrid.  
Latour develops this proposition in We have Never Been Modern (1993), 
when he considers the poles of Nature and Society as symmetries that organise 
Modernist epistemology, which still very much influence intellectual organisation 
today. These poles represent and organise a form of essentialism (in that to 
have irreducible structures and qualities, Nature and Society are exclusive of 
each other) that orders the world either towards Nature (‘unique, external and 
universal’, Latour,1993, p.96) or to Society (of human activity and interpreta-
tion), and they do so by crossing two further poles of Human and Non-Human. 
Latour argues, however, that the effect of arranging epistemologies in this way 
actually brings into being the hybrid, something that may occupy a position in-
between these poles. Latour argues that whilst Modernist thought separates 
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knowledge out at these poles, it is this very act of purification that results in 
nothing but hybrids.  
If the periodisation of modern/post-modern are disrupted then it is possi-
ble that imperialising and colonising modernist agendas are still in play, that 
postmodernism is a reaction to modernism and not the subsequent phase. With 
this comes the likelihood that knowledge production is inherently hybrid12, even 
though such disciplines as the social sciences sanitise this through how it re-
ports knowledge. This is significant to my project in identifying psycho-
colonisation especially given that modernism/post-modernism, colonisation/neo-
colonisation are no longer co-terminal but run, to greater and lesser extents, 
concurrently. Latour’s argument also speaks to the regularity of 
trans/interdisciplinarian study, in the sense that disciplinary purification is 
unachievable. A project such as mine becomes legitimate and valuable as one 
that is hybridised between disciplines. 
 
A shift to the text and deconstructive reading strategies. 
Derridean thinking allows for two strategies to be engaged. One is the 
placement of texts, and the other an approach to reading. Derrida (1967) chal-
lenges what he calls logocentric thinking that underpins western thought. Logo-
centrism relegates texts as being further from a spoken truth and so are sec-
ondary in their truth claims. Derrida reinstates the text as an equivalent source 
of knowledge. Having done so, he then mobilises reading strategies that permit 
the deconstruction of a text. Norris (1987) provides one account of such decon-
structive practice: 
[…] the dismantling of conceptual oppositions, the taking apart of hierarchical 
systems of thought which can then be reinscribed within a different order of tex-
tual significance […] deconstruction is the vigilant seeking-out of those ‘aporias’, 
blindspots or moments of self-contradiction where a text involuntarily betrays 
the tension between rhetoric and logic, between what it manifestly means to say 
and what it is nonetheless constrained to mean. To ‘deconstruct’ a piece of writ-
ing is therefore to operate a kind of strategic reversal, seizing on precisely those 
unregarded details (casual metaphors, footnotes, incidental turns of argument) 
which are always, and necessarily, passed over by interpreters of a more or-
                                                          
12
 In the review of postcolonial works in chapter 2 the term hybrid is used extensively. The us-
age between authors appears broadly consistent in that hybridity arises out of a power differen-
tial that paradoxically, and often, attempts to avoid slippage and hybridity by stating and fixing 
‘truths’. Post-colonial writers often typify this as being an unavoidable, lopsided cultural output 
and effect, whereas Latour is focussing in ‘knowledge production’ more widely. 
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thodox persuasion. For it is here, in the margins of the text — the ‘margins’, that 
is, as defined by a powerful normative consensus — that deconstruction dis-
covers those same unsettling forces at work. (Norris, 1987, p.19) 
By purposefully reading beyond what is accepted as the intended mean-
ing of a text, and by engaging the range of possibilities of interpretation, the un-
settling of a given meaning becomes possible. This is true for how I approach 
both Faulks’ and Morrison’s work – with the former I bring into question the 
readings of his novels as representational of psychiatric orthodoxy, and reposi-
tion them as books facilitating psycho-colonisation. With Morrison, however, I 
extend the current critical readership of trauma in her work, to include madness 
as a way of being, and her novels as ways of writing about madness without re-
course to psycho-colonisation.  
In the quotation above Norris suggests that different readings of a text 
are located within hierarchical systems of thought, which locate the texts them-
selves, the methods of interpretation employed and so the interpretations them-
selves. This hierarchy includes the sites at which the interpretation is communi-
cated, at varying degrees of advantage and privilege, hence the notions of can-
on, the authoritative interpretation of texts and the Academy. Norris also hints at 
the complex intertextual relationship of hierarchical relations because, for a text 
to be read in an orthodox way requires the orthodoxy to be available to the 
reader in some form; a specialised narrative competence. 
 In accepting Norris’ view, I make use of Derrida’s contribution in two are-
as. Firstly, I accept the proposition that novels have relationships to other texts 
and may be used to question canonical thinking. Initially, that a novel may be 
used to understand and challenge psy-science and views of madness, that is, 
the novel’s form is, in itself, counter-canonical in psy-science. In other words, 
the notion that novels might shed as good a light on madness as what psy-
science does is challenging.  Such a position also engages with literary content 
in that novels and cultural products are examples of Latour’s hybrids; something 
that informs us of the experience of madness, but resists the supposed necessi-
ty of being located at either the pole of culture or science, rather to sit between. 
The second use is in how deconstructive reading permits a shift from an initially 
faithful, canonical reading of a given text, to then read ‘between the lines’ in the 
way that Norris suggests. Such a reading strategy becomes an essential part of 
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anti-colonial resistance and thus may be considered so in the resistance to psy-
cho-colonialism.  
 
Discourse and the archaeology of madness 
Foucault’s critical accounts of madness, and the disciplines that arise out 
of conceptions of madness, have become central to the field of studies that cri-
tique psy-science. His view is that the reciprocal role of power and knowledge 
construct the ways in which madness comes to be understood, which in turn 
bolster and authenticate the psy-discipline areas that are making authoritative 
statements about madness. Discourse becomes, therefore, key to the situating 
of texts in a broader relationship and flow. While Derrida offers a way to read a 
text ‘against the grain’, Foucault offers a means towards placing it within sys-
tems of thought. Additionally, Foucault, in a number of his texts and lectures re-
fers to psychiatry as a coloniser even though this idea is not particularly devel-
oped – a complaint I follow up in the next chapter in relation to writers critical of 
psy-science.  
Foucault’s archaeological writing approaches periodization by looking at 
the episteme, epoch and discourse and the historical constitution of ‘truth rules’ 
(O’Farrel, 2005). The discourse on madness is one of a shift towards the medi-
calisation of madness, distress and deviance from the late eighteenth century 
onwards. Such a periodization might result in less of a break between contem-
porary psy-science and nineteenth century alienism, but rather sees common 
themes continuing across into the twentieth and twenty first centuries. A further 
implication of Foucault’s archaeology of madness is that contemporary novels, 
even those that claim a historical focus, are actually novels of the present. I take 
such a position in chapter 3 when looking at Human Traces, which on the sur-
face looks to be a novel that gives a fictional but historically sourced account of 
late nineteenth century psychiatry. I argue that the effect of such a novel is to 
write a history of the then in the now. For a reader, the effect of the novel is to 
orientate or induct them into a current and live, received history of psychiatry. 
Such induction influences the reader in the present day and constructs a certain 
kind of narrative of psy-science for them. For example, I present in chapter 3 
how a number of writers offer a plausible but teleological account of psy-science 
progress, which is presented as scientifically developing, but ‘unfortunately’ in-
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terrupted by psychoanalysis. Such an account minimises or discounts the ex-
tent to which problematic eugenic practices and incarceration are evocative of 
the larger psy project. So, Foucault’s work allows for the possibility of novels 
being located within discourse and is a way of relating to them as historical 
events, within an episteme, that are both symptomatic and constructive of that 
episteme. This follows with his own methodology of close, documentary exami-
nation and interpretation. 
By locating texts within discourses and discourses within epistemes, us-
ing Latour’s and Derrida’s thinking, I arrive at a kind of deconstructive non-
modernity. Thus, reading generates a multiplicity of hybrids, within even just 
one text which are also in relation to other texts. If Modernity itself can be 
brought into question, the authoritative positions that arose through a ‘mythical 
Modernity’, can now, also, be placed in question. Non-modernity places in doubt 
poles of Nature/Society, Human/Non-human and the efforts of purification that 
are made to assert them. Resultantly, fields of hybrids are arrayed across and 
between them, and what is to be classed as non-human/human, social and of 
nature can have a mobility and simultaneity. The effect of this line of argument 
is that the psy-sciences and mental health field no longer reflect a science dis-
covering a disease, nor social causation leading to sadness, or an illness, or a 
life position. Nor does it reflect a human condition best described clinically or 
poetically. Rather it reflects all those things and more, mostly hybrids, which 
may, or may not, be closer to one pole or another, but arriving at neither. When 
traditional bio-medical psychiatric models are dominant, and the subsequent 
efforts are made towards stabilising purification at the science pole, such efforts 
reflect a material force. 
 
Thick description as a manner of dwelling on a text. 
Geertz’s (1975) ‘thick description’ evokes a sense of dwelling on the ob-
ject of study, in this case documents, theory and literary texts, and advancing 
increasing layers of complex and nuanced localised description.  Alongside the 
strategies outlined above, and Foucault’s warning about the dangers and prob-
lems of general theories, thick description focuses on the usefully parochial. 
Meaning, significance and relevance thus become something understood within 
the context of the treatment of the text. I, for instance, appropriate two of Toni 
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Morrison’s novels in chapter 4 into the critical discourse on madness. While 
Morrison’s work is most often located within post-colonial, anti-imperialist and 
anti-racist discourse, my reading towards a ‘thick description’ makes her novels 
relevant to how madness can be written, in her words, rememorialised within 
discourse that might otherwise psychiatrize and psychologise the mad experi-
ence. Geertz’s work was originally in anthropology and ethnology and thick de-
scription makes sense when it is applied and generated in a highly localised 
context. In taking heed of Foucault’s caution on general theory, I honour the no-
tion of a polyphonic/poly-cultural perspective on madness and in doing so, I en-
gage with what is resultantly contested in psy-science. The danger of a general 
meta-theory is that it homogenises ideas about madness, and has real, material 
effects on the lives of people in the way Stuart Hall points out above.  
Clearly, there is already an established critical literature within the mental 
health field. By following the rationale presented in this chapter, there is an un-
masking (Hacking, 2000) which means that the field is not simply critiqued with-
in its own rules and customs (such as questioning whether a mental illness is an 
illness), but is simultaneously critiqued within a broader frame. Thus, epistemol-
ogies can be unmoored from their usual affiliations (the resolution provided by a 
deconstructive non-modernity that questions a range of givens). In other words, 
a social science becomes amenable to criticism and appraisal through terms 
that are not in themselves derived by social science – along the lines that 
Feyerabend may have been thinking about truly interdisciplinary work, or 
Deleuze’s invitation to nomadism. Mannheim (1952) coined the term unmasking 
in this context, a notion significant to this rationale and strategy, claiming that 
engaging with critical positions, such as those represented above, could lead to 
an orientation “[…] which does not seek to refute, negate, or call into doubt cer-
tain ideas, but rather to disintegrate them, in such a way that the whole world 
outlook of a social stratum becomes disintegrated at the same time” (Mann-
heim, 1952, p.140). And of most importance Mannheim goes on to explain that 
“in unmasking ideologies, we seek to bring to light an unconscious process, not 
in order to annihilate the moral existence of persons making certain statements, 
but in order to destroy the social efficacy of certain ideas by unmasking the 
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function they serve” (Mannheim, 1952, p.141)13 . To be able to unmask the 
mental health field and psy-science without arriving at an established relativist 
position14, hinges on Derrida and Latour’s work and the movement they bring. 
 
1.10 Chapter synopsis 
Below I give a brief synopsis of each of the chapters to follow: 
Chapter 2: Review of the postcolonial account/theory of colonisation. 
By reviewing canonical texts within the postcolonial field it becomes pos-
sible to begin to describe the conditions and typology of colonisation. This in 
turn provides a means of structuring a postcolonial critique of psy-science. I dis-
cuss the limits of such a schema, but within the context of the point made 
above, that is, that previous critics of psy-science as a coloniser have often ne-
glected to substantiate their critiques. I initially review the ways in which the 
idea of colonisation has thus far been used in psy-science, before looking at the 
works, mainly African male activists and writers. The latter part of the chapter 
engages with Frantz Fanon and Michel Foucault’s work, which both refer to col-
onisation and madness. As mentioned above, I draw on a wider scholarship to 
question heteronormative, patriarchal tensions within this writing. I close the re-
view by drawing themes from the writers reviewed that I present as regularities 
within the act of colonisation. 
Chapter 3: Sebastian Faulks and madness 
Faulks is a critically acclaimed British author who has written extensively in his 
fiction about madness and psy-science. But this is most often from within a 
                                                          
13
   Mannheim (1952) is discussing unmasking within an essay titled ‘The Problem of a Sociolo-
gy of Knowledge’ wherein he established that a sociological account of epistemology requires 
an understanding of the temporal constellation, which he defines in such a way that it resembles 
early notions of discourse, and which in turn relies on a structural analysis of knowledge as 
concurrent and contingent. The irony is that Mannheim’s unmasking is here referred to as a 
product of early, post-enlightenment humanism reacting to theocratic and monarchic epistemol-
ogies, when later the same unmasking is applied to rational, positivist orientations. 
14
   Within the context of this discussion, I believe that a relativist premise accepts the possibility 
of positions that are true and right in a fashion, even if these positions are multiple, and so ulti-
mately relativism panders to the Modernist Constitution.  Latour’s thesis allows for the possibil-
ity, in taking a comparative anthropological  stance towards the Modern Occident, of a flatten-
ing, rather than a self-relativizing action, and he argues for the inclusion of the errors, mistakes, 
‘blind alleys’, the prosaic and banal, to symmetrize such an anthropology. Otherwise, the ac-
count is one sanitized in favour of successes, dominance and truth(s), even if they are multiple. 
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dominant discourse that presents madness as an illness ameliorated by psychi-
atry. While I look at a number of novels within Faulk’s oeuvre I dwell mostly on 
Human Traces (2006). Postcolonial perspectives from the review chapter offer a 
positionality to critique Faulks’ work, and given the relatively sparse scholarship 
on his work generally, and on Human Traces specifically, I set the novel along-
side traditional historical accounts of psychiatry, some of which he cites. I 
demonstrate that there is an uncritical assimilation of traditional, dominant per-
spectives on madness, and psychiatric accounts, into his novels. This, I sug-
gest, is one of the means by which epistemic violence might be perpetrated 
against mad populations, and one vector within the acculturation (colonisation) 
towards a bio-medical model. 
Chapter 4: Toni Morrison and madness 
Morrison is a key contemporary figure in African-American and postcolonial lit-
eratures who writes often about the themes of subjugation, domination and 
trauma. However, little critical literature addresses madness per se in her work. 
In this chapter I work with The Bluest Eye (1970:1999), her first novel, and God 
Help the Child (2015), her most recent. While the former is much written about 
the latter is not and both deal with issues of madness arising out of racist, miso-
gynistic society without recourse to psy-science as an explanatory outlook. Mor-
rison’s work is an example of how writing about madness might look that avoids 
psychiatrizing the mad experience and so acts as a counter to Faulks’ work. 
Chapter 5: Conclusion 
In this final chapter I return to my research questions and suggest that the 
schema that I develop out of the review of postcolonial writing is useful for as-
sessing psycho-colonisation. Given that mad and disabled activism values plu-
rality over univocal thought about the mad/disabled experience, I argue that plu-
rality and interdiciplinarity should be integrated into mental health practice. 
While it may be unfamiliar within the course of professional training and clinical 
discourse, humanities-based approaches and thought offer an equivalent 
knowledge of madness. However, I recommend this with caution because there 
is a history of activism in both the social model of disability and the recovery 
model being assimilated, and then domesticated, within mainstream practice. 
Examining psycho-colonisation also reveals the toxic or damaging processes of 
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psychiatric contact. I argue that the status of psy-science is directly related to 
the way in which it promulgates a wider view of its utility and worth. This is de-
spite, and maybe because of, its implication in eugenic genocide, incarceration, 
and racism, and even today may well be a distracting influence in uncovering 
sources of distress and madness in socio-economic and epistemic conditions. It 
is the case that there are alternative ways of representing madness within litera-
ture, and in the ways in which cultural products, that are also ways of maintain-
ing dominance (Boal, 1979:2000; Dorfman, 1983; Ngũgĩ, 1986), can be ques-
tioned and resisted. As a number of postcolonial activists point out, colonisation 
damages both the coloniser and the colonised, and so in this scenario, the ex-
tent of the possible worth or contribution that psy-science may make towards 
humanely comprehending madness is lost. 
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CHAPTER 2: POSTCOLONIAL STUDIES IN THE HEALTH AND MENTAL 
HEALTH LITERATURE15. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I review a number of (counter16) canonical, postcolonial 
works as well as the state of postcolonial writing in medical and psy-science 
fields. The works of anti-imperial activists are considered canonical due to their 
timing – at the point of active resistance to colonisation – and the subsequent 
status afforded their work in the postcolonial field because of the ideas they ex-
press and the quality of their writing. As stated in section 1.8, they are by no 
means the final word, nor unproblematic, for reasons such as their treatment of 
gender. While most postcolonial writers I look at are from within the decolonisa-
tion movements on the African continent, I also include Ashis Nandy, from India, 
whose work has been cited in other postcolonial mental health writing (Mills, 
2014b). I have not looked at Olive Mannoni’s work in detail because of the way 
Prospero and Caliban (1950) has been implicated in proposing the problematic 
inferiority complex of black Africans. Later in the review, following Frantz Fan-
on’s work, I turn to Michel Foucault, who I suggest is a good bridge between ac-
tivism against French colonialism and the psy-science field, especially since he 
begins to develop ideas of psychiatric racism and colonisation in the European.  
The purpose of my review is to engage with, and develop, themes that emerge 
from the postcolonial works below. I do so with the intention of advancing a ten-
tative typology of colonisation that may be used to assess the presence of psy-
cho-colonisation. I suggest this is tentative, not because of uncertainty on my 
part, but rather with a sensitivity to the idea that colonisation is not singular or 
uniform. Themes may show themselves, therefore, to different degrees and in-
tensities depending on such factors as context.  My close reading of the select-
ed texts draws upon Geertz’s ‘thick description’, described in the last chapter. 
                                                          
15
 Parts of this review was published as Penson, W.J. (2014) ‘Psy-science and the colonial rela-
tionship in the mental health field’. Mental Health Review Journal . 19:3. pp.176-184. See ap-
pendix. 
 
16
 Counter-canon is a term sometimes used to denote the resistive nature of writing in postcolo-
nial and other fields, that separates anti-imperialist writing from the canon of the imperialist col-
oniser.  
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By this, I mean, that I return to themes and ideas, visiting and revisiting them, 
and, in doing so, I develop an increasingly nuanced account. Hence the ‘thick-
ness’, as some themes will emerge with a density through their repetition and 
presence. In addition, I synthesize the emerging ideas and themes within a wid-
er reading of the postcolonial field, and supplement this with a commentary on 
how this relates to psy-science and mental health. The final section of the chap-
ter (2.7) condenses the emerging themes by way of summary. I take the themes 
forward into chapter 3, assessing Faulks’ work and conversely note their ab-
sence in chapter 4 in Morrison’s novels. Morrison is writing about themes of 
colonisation, racism and psycho-colonisation but she is not enacting them. 
 
2.2 The concerns of colonisation 
  
Before I undertake the review of the (counter) canonical texts, I give a 
discursive overview of the literature broadly relating to medicine, and psy-
science specifically. This literature recognises that medicine and psychiatry 
were exported from Europe to the colonies, and often operated within the colo-
nial and imperial ethos. Initially, I have two aims. Firstly, to outline the concerns 
arising from the extant literature that engages with medicine, psy-science, colo-
nisation and imperialism. This provides a context for my study. Secondly, it is 
the variability of these accounts, and development of this literature, that is the 
gap within which my project sits, especially with regard to psy-science. Fur-
thermore, as discussed in the introduction, the possibility of psycho-colonisation 
in the Global North, towards European populations, has had little attention. Be-
fore I look at this literature specifically, I draw together some concerns and ob-
servations. 
  I am not suggesting that some medical treatments were/are unhelpful as 
they entered the colonies, rather, I question the nature of the exchange, the 
privilege of certain socio-cultural positions over others, and so, the power rela-
tionship in the export of medicine. It is worth labouring the point that the psy-
technologies described in historical work such as Foucault’s History of Madness 
(2006), his lecture series (2003, 2008) and Porter’s (2002) social history, were 
well established within Europe in the latter part of the colonial period of the nine-
teenth century, having grown steadily through the latter part of the eighteenth 
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century. There is, therefore, the rise of a psy/medical discipline, supportive dis-
courses around psychopathology, tools and resources such as clinical judge-
ment and the asylum, a growing interaction with legislation and the constitution 
of mental norms. When psy-science is taken to the colonies many of these 
practices go with it. 
As Miller (1986) notes, psy-science has never been without its critics, in-
cluding those people who have driven psychiatric practice towards more hu-
mane treatments and conditions for inmates (subsequently patients). Postcolo-
nial theorists of hybridity, such as Homi Bhabha, argue that the point of colonial 
contact is the point of transformation for both coloniser and colonised. Psy-
science, its resistors and critics, may likewise experience mutuality arising from 
their contacts. This contact may result in transformations, or hybrids, that 
emerge in unexpected ways, especially given that colonisation is argued by 
many of the authors reviewed below to be something that diminishes the colo-
niser, as much as it subjugates the colonised. The local application of psy-
science in the colonies, and at home, is therefore anticipated to change both the 
psycho-colonised and the colonising psy-discipline. This is exemplified in the 
development of the sub-disciplines of cross-cultural psychiatry and ethnic psy-
chologies. Hybridity occurs, at least in part, because in exercising disciplinary 
power, this exercise is rarely, if ever, total and without resistance. Also, at least 
in part, psy-science is assimilated into local cultures abroad, albeit an assimila-
tion that transforms psy-science to varying degrees. How this looks will likely 
vary – resistance in a colony may be quite different to that in a European coun-
try, at least in part because of the way the latter is naturalised within psychiatric 
historical discourse. For instance, a number of postcolonial writers draw on psy-
choanalysis as a theoretical frame within which to interrogate domination and 
colonisation. As already pointed out, there is some literature that examines the 
activity of psychiatric disciplines as colonisers in the Global South. However, 
there is very little literature that then reconnects psychiatric colonisation to the 
Global North as a set of practices that originated here.  
I want to draw further attention to how this last point is pertinent to this 
study. The literature about psy-science in the colonies, which draws attention to 
psychiatric colonisation, most often retains its focus in the (former) colonies. As 
such, colonisation is rarely, and not until recently, a term used to characterise 
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how psychiatric activity in the Global North treats citizens indigenous to the 
Global North. On the occasions that postcolonial theory is applied to health and 
human sciences in the Global North, this tends to be with a view to understand-
ing health provision for diaspora, migrants and ethnic minorities. It is almost as 
if the exoticism of colonial psychiatry obscures its roots (and its persistence) in 
European psychiatric practices. What emerges is a sense that psy-practice is 
somewhat naturalised when considered in relation to the mad people of the 
Global North, and problematized when applied outside of its ‘natural’ context in 
the Global South. While in the Global North there is a presumption of its rightful 
place, even with pressure to increasingly civilise psychiatric practice, in the 
Global South the arrival of psy-science is questioned. This is consistent with no-
tions of neo-colonisation wherein psy-science has been globally distributed, via 
organisations like the World Health Organisation (Watters, 2011). The 
North/South dichotomy of psycho-colonisation is evident in the way in which the 
language of colonisation is used to critique European interests elsewhere in the 
world, but not at home, even though the practices that become integral to the 
process of colonisation are developed and applied in the cultural West/North. 
As Zeilig (2016) puts it: 
 
Black Americans had been living for hundreds of years under a form of colonial 
occupation, an ‘occupation’ by the state, the ‘pigs’ (police), who were an alien 
and unwelcome force in neighbourhoods. The profound discrimination against, 
arrests and murders of black Americans meant that this oppressed community 
constituted a nation (p.245-246) 
 
Colonisation of the black “nation”, one such internal colony, is argued as a reali-
ty of life in the USA. Could this not also be true of other marginalised, op-
pressed, populations even if the exact historical conditions, the processes and 
sites of colonisation, vary? 
Paradoxically, categories and classifications invented in the Global North 
are objectionable and, simultaneously, the organising principle of resistance17. 
For instance, the invented category of race becomes the subjectivity around 
which colonisation is organised, and then becomes integral to the discourse of 
                                                          
17
 Harrison (2003) discusses the problematic of anticolonial resistance articulated in the lan-
guage of the oppressor, for example, the colonised activist writing in English or French. Like-
wise, Baldwin (1965), in his essay ‘Princes and Powers’,  attending a conference of African 
writers in Paris in 1956, draws attention to the French context, language of writing and presen-
tation and to the problem of African nationalism(s) that, in an attempt to find solidarity, may 
erode difference. 
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resistance.  Likewise, for the mad, the presumed presence of psychopathology 
underwrites the lived subjectivity, in terms of a disease to be contained and 
treated. I return to this idea later when looking at Foucault’s work, where he de-
scribes how the mad are compelled to ‘come to know themselves’ within a psy-
chiatric discourse. Recent literature builds on former anti-psychiatry critiques to 
refresh and extend the critical body of work that calls traditional psychopatholo-
gy into question. Movements like Mad Studies (Ingram, 2016), and notions of 
neurodiversity (Graby, 2015), question the way in which perceived psychologi-
cal difference and ‘abnormality’ transform into psychiatric disease states. By 
engaging with such marginalised critiques there is the possibility of seeing that 
the interpellation of native people into colonialist discourse bears some resem-
blance to the interpellation of the mad into psychiatry. The technologies of psy-
science are thus reconnected, in the Global North, via the colonisation of the 
Global South. In postcolonial studies this has been termed ‘writing back’ (Ash-
croft et al 1989), which is the way in which indigenous, colonised writers, abro-
gate colonialist perspectives, assimilate ideas and languages, and thus resist 
and subvert the colonialist intention. In effect, resistant writers turn back the Im-
perial (clinical) gaze.  As Anderson (1998), in his discussion of United States 
medicine in the Philippines, questions “One would almost imagine that medicine 
in North America has lost its colonial, and colonizing, character in 1788 (and 
that medicine in Europe never was colonial at home)” (Anderson, 1998, p. 524). 
By returning colonisation to the discourse on madness this review writes back 
into psy-science and so it is both an account of psycho-colonisation and an in-
tervention.  
The application of postcolonial studies in general health and medical cri-
tiques are more developed in the area of tropical medicine than other areas of 
the field. However, critical themes emerge in such writing that are pertinent to 
the mental health field. For instance, the ways in which those people who are 
colonised tend to be viewed as primitive and lacking. Similarly, critics in the psy 
and mental health fields tend to draw on three formulations of psy-science in 
relation to colonialism. The first is that psy-science is a variably racist Western 
practice within the Global North. Secondly, that psy-science is a product of Eu-
ropean and North American thought and practices that are imposed upon other 
people, such as those of the Global South (see Mills (2014a) for an account of 
 
 
47 
 
such activity). Thirdly, psy-science is typified as a coloniser because it is a dis-
course that is enacted upon the mental health service user or patient other, who 
becomes subjugated, subjectivized, and thus a (psycho-) colonised person (and 
community). This last formulation includes notions of the ‘colonisation of minds’ 
(Ngũgĩ, 1986); Fanon, 1952:2008), and a particular kind of ‘racism’ (Foucault, 
2003), not necessarily predicated on ethnicity. Such formulations draw upon the 
history of psychiatry and psychology as disciplines participating within European 
empires, and which have promulgated racist theories. Colonising processes 
would then include diagnosis, as the power to describe and designate in a rela-
tion of unequal power. Description and ‘naming’ are often cited as colonising 
processes within postcolonial literature18. As previously mentioned, this last 
formulation is relatively rarely written about in the application of postcolonial 
theory to madness and psy-science, and is the main concern of my thesis.  That 
is, postcolonial perspectives may illuminate colonising processes in psy science 
per se.  
Critiques of this kind are unlikely to find favour within mainstream, con-
temporary psychiatry. In fact, European Empires formed their own discourse 
around the civilising mission, that is, proclaiming the fundamental rightness of 
their ventures and the greater good they served, and Mills (2014a, 2014b) 
makes this argument about psychiatry. Such a civilising mission echoes in the 
quotation on the international mental health agenda (chapter 1, section 1.7) 
(Thornicroft & Votruba, 2015).  Hobsbawm (2008) views humanitarian ventures 
in imperialism as, at best, ill-conceived, and, at worst, a thin attempt to conceal 
the true agendas of gaining control, international political advantage, land and 
natural resources, and labour. It is unlikely, therefore, that answers to questions 
of psy-science and psycho-colonialism will be forthcoming from the very disci-
plines that are implicated. While the next section is pre-occupied with psy-
science and medicine as human sciences, their relationship to culture is some-
thing to which I will return later. Postcolonial activists, and writers such as 
Cesaire (1972: 2000), Fanon (1967b), Memmi (1965) and Ngũgĩ (1986), would 
                                                          
18
 See Davis (1990) for a discussion of such descriptive processes in the novels of Nobel Prize 
winner Toni Morrison. An evocative quote from Salman Rushdie typifies the theme “‘They [Brit-
ish institutions, physicians and border police] describe us’, the other [manticore] whispered sol-
emnly. ‘That’s all.  They have the power of description, and we succumb to the pictures they 
construct.’ (Rushdie, 1988/2000, p.168) 
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question the separation between the arts, and disciplines such as the human 
sciences, commerce, industry and bio-politics, in the colonial relationship.  
 
2.3 Colonisation in health and medicine. 
 
Having broadly mapped out some concerns about the area of colonisa-
tion, medicine and mental health, I will begin to examine the literature that deals 
with medical colonisation. Bivins (2012) is a good place to begin, because of 
how she outlines the contribution she thinks postcolonial perspectives make to 
understanding international medicine. Her article looks at post-war tropical med-
icine and, in doing so, raises some points of general interest for my review. 
Mental health and psychiatry are, however, absent from Bivins’ article, which 
may indicate the way in which tropical medicine shows interest in the ‘exotic’ 
health issues of the colonised population and country. Psychiatric problems are 
perhaps seen less as a tropical issue, and more as a global phenomenon with, 
at most, small variations, across populations19.  She suggests that “[a] post-
colonial approach using such tools [here being the ideas of ‘agent’ and ‘subal-
tern’] should allow biomedicine to be assessed in conjunction with other hege-
monic forces that (arguably) transcend states societies and cultures.” (p.2). 
Bivins goes on to note four points about the contribution postcolonial studies 
can make to such areas as medicine and health care: 
   
1. “a ‘postcolonial approach’ that decentres European and North Ameri-
can perspectives, integrating these regions within a global whole con-
stituted through processes such as colonialism and decolonisation.”  
2. A “postcolonial history [that] depends less on conventional periodiza-
tion, emphasising instead the continuity of attitudes, relationships and 
entities through different regimes.” 
                                                          
19
 There is a common idea about incidence rates for schizophrenia which is that it is “equally 
frequent in all countries” (Read, 2004a, p.57) and such ideas are used in psychiatric educational 
material. Schizophrenia is often described as a global phenomenon that does not ‘respect’ such 
variations as class and location. As Read (2004b) goes on to point out, this makes schizophre-
nia a curious illness for lacking in variation, and when looking at both incidence and prevalence 
rates, they vary enormously. However, despite researchers like Fernando (2011) and Metzl 
(2009) demonstrating variations of schizophrenia diagnoses on the basis of race, Frances 
(2013) suggests that “[w]hen rates of diagnosis differ, it is because of bias or cultural blind spots 
in the raters, not real differences in the patients they are rating”(p.22). While Fernando and 
Metzl are questioning diagnostic validity, Frances is construing the mistake as being one of cul-
tural-competence, not that diagnosis itself is culture bound.  
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3. That “Postcolonialism places power – its circulation and appropria-
tion, its agents and objects, its forms and tools of expression, and its 
limits – at the heart of historical analysis” (ibid)  
4. And that “postcolonial analysis militates against binarisms and di-
chotomies, and often rejects straightforward divisions between ‘subal-
tern’ and ‘agents’” (ibid) 
 
Bivins has laid out a broad schema for applying postcolonial studies within trop-
ical medicine, but there is nothing intrinsically necessary for retaining that de-
marcation. Her points have wider medical application (she goes on to specify 
implications for such things as blood disorders and ‘Asian’ rickets) and specifi-
cally suggests that: 
 
Not only might medical practices developed for and deployed in colonial set-
tings influence medicine in the metropolitan centres […] but there might be 
something intrinsically colonising about western medicine’s rhetorical claims of 
modernity, and its universalist ambitions. (Bivins, 2012, p.3-4)20.  
 
Bivins develops the notion that there is an intrinsic coloniality to medical prac-
tices, but she is unclear whether that is back in the West, which I am suggesting 
is the case. Likewise, Kelly (2015) takes the view that Western health practices 
bring with them ‘biopolitical imperialism’ – that is, an assessment of health at 
the population level, with population level interventions, and an incitement to 
certain forms of health orientated governmentality. Similarly, this is argued by 
Rentmeester (2012), who notes bioethical perspectives that pathologise race, 
and Bashford (2014), who provides extensive accounts of racist public health 
practices aimed at maintaining, and enhancing, the health of a desired popula-
tion (in that case white Australians).   What Bivins is proposing is that colonisa-
tion occurred within medical practice in the colonies, and travelled back to the 
metropolitan centres, a phenomenon which is relatively well written about. Trac-
ing medical practices back into the Global North raises the possibility, again, 
that in mental health contexts, madness and mental health may well be a colo-
                                                          
20
 For instance, Schiebinger (2013) reviews the practice of experimentation with inoculation in 
colonised populations, and the advance of pathological medicine through the examination of 
black, native bodies. This is despite the paradoxical theorising of black people as being different 
and lesser than their white counterparts thus undermining generalizability. In Homi Bhabha’s 
work, reviewed later, there is the idea of the ‘same but different’ which describes a colonial motif 
that allows proximity between colonised and coloniser, without endangering the idea of an es-
sential difference as the basis of the colonial relationship. 
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nised area within the Euro-American continents (which makes calling large psy-
chiatric institutions colonies (Whitaker, 2002) less incidental). 
 Reimer-Kirkham & Anderson (2002) examine the critical possibilities that 
postcolonial thought offers the nursing discipline. While they review the field and 
juxtapose epistemological concerns – the positivist aspirations of nursing 
against the more fluid challenges of cultural and historical perspectives – they 
do not question nursing as a discipline in itself. Rather, they see nurses as key 
figures in an increasingly ethical and culturally engaged postcolonial praxis. 
This is expressed in the question they pose for nurses, of “how we either help 
sustain or question inequalities and injustices?” (Reimer-Kirkham & Anderson, 
2002, p.8). The nurse, therefore, retains agency, and, as with neutrality and 
whiteness in Carter’s (2007) book, their own culture-bound perspective gets 
lost. While Reimer-Kirkham & Anderson offer ‘headlines’ for nurse researchers 
interested in postcolonial perspectives, these tend to become general recom-
mendations of self-reflexivity. There is little in their recommendations that speak 
specifically to a postcolonial framework for research and practice.  
 I think this final point is worth dwelling on, especially in light of a remark, 
ironically, that Reimer-Kirkham & Anderson (2002) make: “[…] the more radical 
beginnings of postcolonialism are largely forgotten in contemporary conceptions 
of postcoloniality, especially as the field has typically been subsumed into aca-
demic settings such as English departments.” (Reimer-Kirkham & Anderson, 
2002, p.8). Firstly, this sounds like the objections that Ahmed (1992) and Sardar 
(1995) raise about postmodern thinking, which I mentioned in section 1.8, about 
the way that radical thinking becomes domesticated within the academy. Sec-
ondly, this quotation gives a clue as to the problem of how health based disci-
plines relate to postcolonial activism and thought. Even though the authors raise 
the issue of where postcolonial scholarship has come to be accommodated (in 
English departments), they do little to advance the activism they mourn. It be-
comes evident, as my review develops, that health and mental health critics can 
see the worth of postcolonial perspectives, and do see what they believe to be 
either current, or historical, disciplinary colonisation. But then there is a break 
between that realisation and what to do with that finding. I think that there is 
perhaps a need to take a further step back into the ontological and epistemolog-
ical assumptions of the field rather than accepting a proneness to bolt postcolo-
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nial thinking into current disciplines.  Fanon aside, Reimer-Kirkham & Anderson 
(2002) spend most of their discussion in the literature after Edward Said’s work 
(late 1970s to mid-1990s), and have not explored the rich literature written at 
the time of decolonisation and anti-imperialist struggles. Given this, they are not 
likely to know that English departments have been the site of intellectual and 
practical resistance to colonialism21. The ferocity of the resistance and oppres-
sion seems dependent on where in the world the English department is located 
(for instance, Fanon (1965) gives an account of campus-based resistance and 
insurrection in French occupied Algiers in the 1950s). I would contest the idea 
that the radical roots have been forgotten (Hudis (2015) links the ‘I can’t 
breathe’ race equality movement in the US in 2014/15 to a (mis)quotation of 
Fanon).  
There is little to indicate, again beyond Fanon and his psychiatric prac-
tice, that postcolonial scholarship was to be found in health disciplines at the 
time of decolonisation, and so it cannot have been forgotten by such disciplines. 
It is almost as if health discipline scholars and practitioners struggle to place the 
literary, political and cultural roots of postcolonialism as an essential part of de-
colonisation. This struggle for health writers to accommodate the history of 
postcolonial activism is reminiscent of Latour’s (1993) concern for the drive to-
ward disciplinary purification. The urge to view the ‘natural’ and ‘cultural’ disci-
plines as distinct, is strong, despite the hybridity between them. Perhaps this is 
symptomatic of a postcolonial concern — both Hutcheon (1988), from a post-
modern scholarship view, and Toni Morrison (as discussed in Davis, (1990) and 
Matus, (1998)), regard (re)memory as an essential part of the postcolonial/anti-
imperialist movement. To remember what has been written out of history, or in-
deed obscured, is, for them, a powerful act of resistance and reparation. To 
write the early days of postcolonial scholarship and activism back into the 
health, medical and psy-science discourses, which I undertake  to do in this 
thesis (even where this remembering is problematic), may indicate going be-
yond an historical exercise, and entering into the world of anti-colonial re-
sistance.  
 
                                                          
21
 See for instance Ngũgĩ (2012) for an account of his direct participation in such resistance. 
English departments have been part of the problem in the sense that they have relegated indig-
enous literatures, however, such departments are also the place where this has been vocalised 
and tackled. 
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2.4 Colonisation in the mental health literature. 
 
Having taken a view of some of the writing in the field of postcolonial 
health and medicine, I will concentrate now on the mental health field. There are 
a number of examples from the mental health literature that confirm the obser-
vation that commentators and critics typify psy-science as colonial. Some writ-
ers refer directly to psy and medicine in colonial terms – as a coloniser, or in be-
ing imperialist – and others use the language of the area that connotes colonial 
concerns, such as notions of borders and dominion. My aim is to build a sense 
of the ways and extent to which, critical writers account for psy-science in colo-
nial terms.  
Suman Fernando is a key figure in this area, given he is credited with the 
development of cross-cultural psychiatry in the U.K., and has been a major con-
tributor to research suggestive of racist psychiatric practice. He describes the 
colonial history of the psy-sciences, their material presence in terms of asylums, 
and also their current global, ‘imperialising’ presence (Fernando, 2008).  In 
2011, he reiterated his view of the imperial presence of psychiatry (Fernando, 
2011), and argued for a mental health system in which psychiatry is ‘custom-
ized’ to local, non-Western contexts. He suggests that: 
 
[…] this enlightenment of European thought happened during the heyday of 
slavery and colonialism when powerful myths of racism were being refined and 
integrated into European culture. It could be argued that racism is indeed a ‘Eu-
ropean value’ permeating much of post-Enlightenment-European thinking, in-
cluding that which underpins Western psychology and psychiatry (Fernando, 
2011, p.48). 
 
Pilgrim (2005) also picks up such thoughts when he describes how the 
colonial experience of a range of people historically thought to have psychopa-
thologies (which were formerly attributed to racial difference and inferiority), 
were reflective of a colonial context.  Pilgrim’s use of the term ‘ex-colonised 
groups’ (ibid p.186) recognises the significance of historical colonisation. More 
problematically, and unlike some of the other writers represented here, he ap-
pears to resolve the possibilities of neo-colonisation through his use of the pre-
fix ‘ex’. Pilgrim is thus noting colonisation as an historical occurrence, implying 
that it is no longer the case. However, he does not define the point where the 
disjuncture between historical colonisation and current practice lies. With a simi-
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lar historical focus, Keller (2001) describes the active role psychiatry took in 
British and French colonisation, in subjugating indigenous populations, and the 
punitive regimes of institutional settings in those colonies. 
Rentmeester (2012) considers some of the same issues within medicine 
and bioethics, however, her discussion returns to the familiar point of cultural 
competence within medicine. She notes transgenerational issues that arise out 
of colonisation and suggests that “postcolonial thought […] gives bioethicists a 
vocabulary in which to articulate how relationships between past trends in path-
ogenesis and disease susceptibility can be epidemiologically and clinically rele-
vant to the care of present day individuals, families and children.” (Rentmeester, 
2012, p.366). This is an unquestioning view of psy-science and the origins of 
psy-thinking.  It favours a siding with ideas of the necessity of fair access to 
treatment, within a historically informed frame, as the main issue. Curiously, 
though, she goes on to list some of the psychological and psychiatric outcomes 
of colonisation, and how the “infiltration” of psy-perspectives adds to the stigma 
felt at the level of race. Rentmeester acknowledges how colonisation involves 
classifying subjugated populations, enforcing Eurocentric norms and ideas of 
deviancy, and taking white norms as a benchmark. She goes on to add that “co-
lonial medicine stigmatized people of colour” (Rentmeester, 2012, p.368). But 
she arrives at a mixed conclusion; on the one hand “[A]n ethnographic ap-
proach to multiculturalism can be helpful in health care because every encoun-
ter between clinician and a patient is a cross-cultural one” (ibid p.372). Given 
her concerns for an approach sensitive to transgenerational issues, this seems 
to suggest the position of the clinician as one of ‘agent’, and probably white, and 
the patient as ‘other’, and likely black. Either that, or the mention of ethnography 
is an invitation towards self-reflexivity on the part of clinicians and a highly nu-
anced attention to contextual and social cues. On the other hand, Rentmeester 
suggests that “[p]ostcolonial thought challenges medicine to account for its co-
lonial history [which it has not done] and for having wielded its authority in ways 
that stigmatized and pathologised psychic citizenship in communities of colour” 
(ibid). The mix of a contemporary caution to not re-enact colonial relationships 
of the past presently, which is presumably possible if not already the case, 
seems to be ill at ease with the resolution of a colonial history that has gone, 
thus far, unrecognised. Rentmeester seems reluctant to go as far as suggesting 
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that there was a historical relationship of colonisation, and that it is one that re-
mains in contemporary practice, if somewhat transformed since the advent of 
decolonisation. 
A number of psychiatric practices have been linked to colonisation, 
sometimes in a direct imperial action, by making a presumed ‘subnormal’ or ‘in-
ferior’ population amenable, and available, to study and experimentation.  Read 
& Masson (2004), Snyder & Mitchell (2006) and Pichot (2009) provide accounts 
of the participation of medicine and psychiatry in Western eugenic movements. 
These were established in the U.S and mainland Europe, before being opera-
tionalised, for example, within Nazi occupied areas, and through mass sterilisa-
tion programs in the USA. Nazi medical experimentation was based on an ethos 
linked to ethnic cleansing and population ‘cleansing’ in the production of genetic 
hygiene. Whitaker (2002), Finzen (2002) and Bentall (2010) also review human 
experimentation, which includes a number of practices, often in the form of 
‘treatment’, such as psychosurgery and insulin therapy, which are now consid-
ered mostly unacceptable and inhumane.  Although there are only around five 
cases of psychiatric psychosurgery in the UK each year (Brown, 2009), this rate 
varies considerably in other countries. Spandler & Calton (2009) argue that 
even the accepted current practice of forcible treatment, wherein patients are 
judged unable to consent, may contravene international conventions on human 
rights with regards to, amongst other things, torture. In fact Mendez’s (2013) re-
port for the United Nations finds aspects of the incarceration and forced treat-
ment of those with psycho-social disabilities (which includes psychiatric disor-
ders and cognitive impairments) meets international criteria for torture.  
Mendez’s findings raise further concerns that arrive at a convergence of 
ideas around madness, confinement and modern slavery.  Szasz’s book Psy-
chiatric Slavery (1977:1998) outlines the ways in which modern psychiatric 
thinking and patient detention meet legal and historical criteria of enslavement 
in the U.S.  He describes a legislative change in the U.S. that made psychiatric 
treatment a right, which was interpreted as one which was necessary to impose. 
The irony being, here, that someone who did not consent could have their right 
to treatment imposed upon them. His work begins to track a route that pre-
empts the phenomena that the mad, disabled and people of colour are over-
represented in U.S. prisons (Ben-Moshe et al, 2014) that has been argued as a 
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relationship between (neo)colonialism and health  disciplinary discourse 
(Chapman et al 2014). Furthermore, the practice of forced labour within some 
U.S prisons meets international criteria for modern slavery22. This adds up to at 
least part of the mad population being enslaved currently. 
Considering this connection to incarceration further, Foucault’s 
(1975:1991) Discipline and Punish, considers the gamut of human sciences of 
the ‘new penology’, and notes that Judges:  
 
assist as far as they can in the constitution of delinquency, that is to say, in the 
differentiation of illegalities, in the supervision, colonization and the use of these 
illegalities by the illegality of the dominant class (Foucault, 1975:1991, p.282).  
 
Besides judges, and what they symbolise, in Abnormal he refers directly to psy-
chiatry as a colonising presence, and, in the final lecture of that volume, refers 
to psychiatry as operating its own ‘racism’ (Foucault, 2003).  Foucault also ar-
gues that psychiatry has its roots in the application of force, not therapeutics. 
Force works the will of the clinician onto the patient, primarily through physical 
means (Foucault, 2008) such as incarceration and physical deployment in oc-
cupational activities. From the fourth lecture of the Psychiatric Power (2008) se-
ries, Foucault refers regularly to disciplinary colonisation, and in particular to the 
similarity between how the ‘mad’ and ‘savage’ are classified as related, and 
then subjugated on the basis of their shared classification.  Dealing with a 
slightly later period, Appignanesi (2008) describes nineteenth century diagnos-
tics as ‘imperializing’ (Appignanesi, 2008, p.81). The case of Henriette Cornier, 
who, in a fit of madness, murdered her employer’s child (which Foucault (2003) 
also discusses at length), “set the new alienists up as border guards patrolling 
the line between reason and madness” (Appignanesi, 2008, p.84). Later she 
refers to “the growing psychiatric and psychological imperium” (ibid p. 543).  
Likewise, Bowring (2015), in her discussion of the history of melancholy, notes 
“[s]cience’s dominion over melancholy as an illness has long sought to clarify 
the symptoms of insanity” (Bowing, 2015, p.23). 
                                                          
22
 “10% of those in forced labour are in state imposed forms of forced labour (prisons or work 
imposed by the state military or armed forces)”  
http://endslaverynow.org/sites/default/files/ESNStatisticsUsedNov14.pdf  (accessed  29
th
 Feb-
ruary, 2016, 1600).  
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Barker (2003) argues that there are damaging activities within psychiatry 
and that “these coercive dimensions of contemporary psychiatric practice main-
tain a link, however, it is disguised, to the colonizing presence of 19th century 
psychiatry […] which generated a more subtle, but no less powerful paradigm of 
social control” (Barker, 2003, p.98).  Barker suggests that “the psychiatric colo-
nization literature is, as yet, somewhat limited, focusing mainly on the after-
effects of colonization” (ibid, p.98). Accepting such an argument involves idea of 
the mental health service user as ‘subordinate’. Lewis (2006), in discussing user 
involvement, writes that “[…] there is some risk that at first, like other colonized 
peoples, they [service users] would have so internalized the hierarchies of their 
previous masters [clinicians] that they would continue to privilege the priorities 
and values that went before (Lewis, 2006, p.159). Leader (2012) suggests that 
“[T]he clinician who attempts to graft his own value system and view of normali-
ty on to the patient becomes like the colonizer who seeks to educate the na-
tives, no doubt for their own good" (Leader, 2012, p.6). Taking these sources 
together it appears that there is some concern that psy-science grew within the 
imperial and colonial frame, and has arguably not broken with that frame. Cer-
tainly, the moment of that break is not clearly identified, and in the eyes of such 
commentators, current practices fit with colonial practice. In addition, the ways 
in which psycho-colonisation is described seems to make use of the idea of col-
onisation metaphorically and analogously, while simultaneously referring to ma-
terial, ‘real world’ effects of psycho-colonisation.  
Fern (2005) identifies historical themes of colonisation, suggesting that 
“[d]eep in the psyche of Black people in this country [the UK] there is a vaguely 
remembered experience of slavery and colonialism” (Fern, 2005, pp.135-136).  
He goes on to typify colonial power as using tactics of “control”, “stereotyping”, 
assuming “intellectual superiority” to “undermine the autonomy of indigenous 
peoples”, to “divide and rule”, for “cultural suppression”, “punishment” and “de-
monization” (ibid, p.136). Earlier in this chapter, Fern summarises what is evi-
dently a comparable list of how black people currently experience mental health 
services, thus linking past colonialism and current practice. It will become evi-
dent later in this chapter that Fern’s own list of colonial indicators reflects the 
writing of canonical post- and anti- colonial thinkers. 
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Besides Fern’s brief consideration of what characterises colonialism in 
psy- science, there appears to be little development, in the mental health litera-
ture, of the notion that psychiatry operates a colonial presence, beyond stating it 
as such. Foucault (2008) provides some description of colonising processes, 
but they are variably expanded upon in his more well-known texts, and are only 
partially developed in his lecture series (Foucault is given more detailed consid-
eration later in this chapter). Even Fernando (2008), who cites Fanon, in a cri-
tique of racist psychiatry, goes on to recommend an ethnically customised psy-
chiatry. This is arguably at odds with Fanon, whose position was that a subju-
gated population ought not to lend legitimacy to its dominators through negotia-
tion. In Fanon’s view, repelling the coloniser was/is the only route to emancipa-
tion. Fernando’s interpretation of this key postcolonial thinker is less faithful to 
the original than might be anticipated, but prudent for an area of resistance that 
may have to rely on attrition rather than revolution to achieve change (Burstow, 
2014). In the related field of neuroscience, Sutton (2012) is concerned with the 
over-interpretation of brain imaging data, and “the colonisation of the entire hu-
man map by brain research” (Sutton, 2012, p.813).  This appears to reflect 
Midgley’s (2001) concern for the way human sciences operate within, what she 
terms, a “strange, imperialistic, isolating ideology” (Midgley, 2001, p.1). 
China Mills (2014a; 2014b) is one of the few postcolonial scholars who 
demonstrate a rigorous engagement with postcolonial perspectives in relation to 
psy- science. She builds a picture of geopolitical neo-colonisation (Mills 2014a) 
wherein psy-sciences are partners with Big Pharma in the exportation of psy-
epistemologies and pharmaceutical products to parts of the world where their 
reach has not yet been fully realised. Mills moves between this macro geopoliti-
cal level, and her research in rural India at the level of communities. Further-
more, she looks at the application of Homi Bhabha’s work on “mimicry” to pro-
vide a reading of service user stories who aim to “pass” as “normal”(Mills, 
2014b). “Passing” is a term with specific meaning in the area of race and colo-
nisation, and I will also return to this in chapter 4 on Morrison.  As such, Mills is 
one of the few critical writers that put specific, postcolonial theory to use in cri-
tiquing psy-science. Watters offers a similar picture in Crazy Like Us (2011), 
and his case studies describe a number of Western psy-concepts that have 
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been exported, with catastrophic effects, to the Global South (a concern also 
raised by Cox & Webb, 2015).  
A number of researchers understand colonisation to be psychologically 
pathogenic, but neglect the role that psy-science may have in the process of 
colonisation and empire. It is as if psychiatry sits outside of the damaging activi-
ty of colonisation, perhaps assuming medical beneficence, without reference to 
the circumstances by which psy-science is present. Carothers’ (1947) study of 
psychiatric epidemiology in Kenya is seen as a key document in the develop-
ment of international psychiatry. Carothers writes about the “African’s attitude to 
life, the relation of this attitude to insanity in the African, and some possible 
bearings of this on the aetiology of mental reaction types and of insanity in gen-
eral” (Carothers, 1947, p. 548). In just a short excerpt, Carothers is making the 
Kenyan an index of the totalised African – that is generalising the Kenyan to Af-
rican, and generalising within the Kenyan population.  He is also invested in a 
certain subject/object relationship that negates observer effects, or context, and 
he is using the idea of the Kenyan/African as a means to speculate on insanity 
generally. He goes on to note that “the African is going through a period of cul-
tural transition; his native institutions are decaying, and he is rapidly acquiring 
an attitude that approximates to that of the European” (ibid). Carothers is ne-
glecting the British colonisation of Kenya and the subjugation of Kenyan culture. 
His sense of cultural transition is most likely the forced cultural acquisition of 
European ways. He goes on to look at diagnosis rates for different disorders 
and uses the “American Negro” as a comparison group for African diagnosis, 
that is, to look at the same type of person within a Western context. A flawed 
psychiatric typology is thus applied within a spurious typology of race. 
Pols (2006) writes a history of psychiatry in Indonesia, explaining that 
psy- science arrived with Dutch imperialists holding orientalised views of Indo-
nesian madness. But Pols neglects to speculate on how psy-science came to 
remain in Indonesia, post-independence, as a neo-colonial presence. Likewise, 
Heaton (2013) describes a recent history of “mentally ill” Nigerians in the UK, 
and elsewhere in Africa. Heaton places the word “lunatic” in quotation marks to 
denote his distance from the usage, but not the term “mental illness”, which is 
naturalised within the text as unproblematic. Heaton suggests colonisation, mi-
gration and alienation are key factors in the development of psychopathology, 
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but psy-science is offered neutrally, as a source of care and treatment, with little 
coverage of the challenges of cross/trans-cultural psychiatry. 
In an effort to bridge the gaps between Western models of mental illness 
and other cultural perspectives and experiences, Canadian psychiatrist Lau-
rence Kirmayer has written extensively about the possibilities of intercultural 
and trans cultural psychiatry and psychotherapy. He is open to the limitations in 
the uni-vocal view that psychiatry is prone to take in its conceptions of distress. 
Kirmayer is trying to engender flexibility, through what appears to be an act of 
mediation in practices and world views. Despite these efforts, within the context 
of my thesis, I would argue that these attempts fall short and this is because of 
the incommensurability of the task rather than a fault on the part of Kirmayer: 
although the slippage and problematic of trans-cultural psychiatry become swift-
ly evident in his writing.  
Kirmayer is very willing to reflect on the partiality of psychiatry and that it 
is located within culture, and one which shaped psychiatry’s emergence and 
positioning. Although for Kirmayer (2006) “[c]ulture is a biological construct in 
that evolution has resulted in our biological preparedness to acquire through 
various forms of learning and […] neural machinery” (p.130). Furthermore he 
suggests “psychopathological phenomena may emerge from recursive loops 
that link physiological and social processes”(ibid). Bio-medical speculation is 
again presented as plausible and near factual.  While not directly suggesting 
this, there is a subtext that disciplines such as psychiatry might offer fundamen-
tal knowledge of both culture (given where it arises from) and madness (psy-
chopathology). 
It quickly becomes the case that transcultural psychiatry is concerned 
with a certain kind of other. Kirmayer et al (2003) describe a pilot project that is 
aiming to support clinicians in culturally aware and responsive interventions. 
Their case examples show how an Hindu Indian woman, a Caribbean man and 
a South Asian man are responded to initially poorly by clinicians, and then with 
culturally competent input, far better. These efforts are not to be dismissed as 
practical responses to a presenting set of problems. But not once does transcul-
tural practice ask the same questions, or make the same demands of the practi-
tioner faced with a white, Christian, right wing psychotic. Such a patient is as-
sumed to more culturally available to the service area and clinicians. The unex-
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amined assumption, right alongside the discussion of psychiatry in culture, is to 
obscure and assume whiteness to be ubiquitous within the discipline. At its 
worst Kirmayer (2007) tips into bland generalities about “his own” culture refer-
ring to “the ongoing epidemic of lawsuits in the US that seek to blame every un-
happy event on some person or personified institution” (p.250); or “[a]s por-
trayed on TV talk shows and sitcoms, North Americans are more comfortable 
talking about emotions and relationships […]” and how “[w]e measure our indi-
vidual worth in terms of competitive achievements, material wealth, power, and 
control” (ibid). These generalities sit alongside other discussion of the growing 
multi-culturality of US and Canadian cultures which raises the questions of who 
the “we” is in the above, where they are and how is Kirmayer affiliated to them. 
In a more subtle way Kirmayer’s attempt at articulating the problem is revealing 
of the internal inconsistency. When his writes:  
 
psychotherapy that ignores the internalized concept of the person runs the risk 
of leaving the patient with no way to continue either the coherent construction of 
the private experience of self or the social interaction that sustains the self in 
community (Kirmayer, 2007, p. 242-243).  
 
This is fraught with problems; the separations between self and community, the 
concept of internal and of the self, and the slip that confirms the person as pa-
tient. Elsewhere, this problem is stated in the title of another paper “Cultural var-
iations in the Clinical Presentation of Depression and Anxiety: Implications for 
Treatment and Diagnosis” (Kirmayer, 2001) in which he discusses some of the 
regular preoccupations of the field: culturally bound disorders, somatisation, up-
take of treatment and even resolves to history colonisation (“during periods of 
colonization” (p.26) in the past tense).  
I suggest this is an incommensurable problem to which I return in my 
conclusion when I discuss decoloniality. In brief; if, as Mignolo & Walsh (2018) 
argue, modernism and coloniality are utterly entangled and co-dependent with 
each other, and psychiatry is both a contributor and result of modernism, then 
nothing psychiatry can do will change its inherent problem of coloniality. Kir-
mayer is, in effect, attempting to customise a deeply problematic practice that is 
more globally a significant contributor towards causing the hurt and trauma it 
seeks to repair. Despite his plea for ‘cultural safety’ within mental health ser-
vices for patients from a range of backgrounds (Kirmayer, 2012), I see less re-
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vision of his earlier texts, their assumptions and conclusions than I can feel sat-
isfied with. 
Thus, there are a range of questions left unaddressed by these often par-
tial accounts: if psy-science has its roots in colonialism, at what point did it 
break with this history? Exactly how is psy-science colonial in a contemporary 
context? What are the processes and activities of contemporary mental health 
practice that would lead us to either accept, or reject, psychiatric practice and 
associated disciplines as colonising? If the conclusion leans towards the propo-
sition that psy-science is in fact colonising, then what should the response be, 
and from who? If psy-science is a coloniser, how would the decolonisation pro-
cess look?  Given that often the accusers of psychiatry, too, have shown varia-
ble engagement with scholarship that has arisen out of the colonial experience, 
perhaps this shows an all-round problem. That is, that both psychiatry and its 
detractors employ colonialism to their own ends, whether that be a pejorative 
characterisation of psy-science, or a neo-colonial maintenance of professional 
guild interests. Engaging with postcolonial scholarship may therefore move the-
se questions forward. 
 
2.5 (Counter) canonical writing in the post- and anti- colonisation literature. 
 
As I have shown above, it is the case that a number of critics in the men-
tal health field consider that psy-science and associated disciplines operate with 
psycho-colonising and neo-colonial practices.  This assertion can be thought of 
as applying in two ways, as previously mentioned. Firstly, that psycho-
colonisation is a material colonisation with reference to geopolitics and socio-
economics, as seen in such things as the global pharmaceutical industry. Sec-
ondly, as cultural and epistemic colonialism, that underwrites and dominates 
local meanings of madness, distress and difference to inculcate deference to 
Western psychiatry. Metaphor and analogy are frequently drawn upon to both 
typify and critique psycho-coloniastion. The second area also refers to the inter-
pretation of cultural difference in psychiatrized ways, including acts of re-
sistance to colonisation. Both areas remain a concern in former colonies and 
more recently, those subjected to neo-colonialism, including the on-going op-
pression of indigenous populations by longstanding settler colonisers (Ware et 
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al, 2014). Both Hall and Spivak are mentioned with regard to these areas in the 
introduction. Equally, some writers and researchers view colonisation broadly 
as problematic, but gloss over, or do not consider, that there is a role that psy-
science may have in perpetrating it. For instance, this may be discerned in the 
idea that colonisation is a historical phenomenon which leaves contemporary 
traces, the effects of which can be ameliorated through sound cross-cultural 
awareness in disciplinary practice.  
As noted above, a postcolonial perspective considers the metropolitan 
centres as a further site, with a particular history, that is amenable to critical ap-
praisal. This is especially so since, alongside colonisation abroad, forms of sub-
jugation are operated at home. The discussion below will deal mostly with the 
processes and indicators of colonisation in the Global South. As I set out earlier, 
my thinking is that the processes of colonisation will be most clearly evident in 
the writing from former colonies. By developing a ‘thick description’ of these, the 
processes and practices of psycho-colonisation becomes amenable to descrip-
tion.  
Towards the end of this chapter I draw out themes that emerge from the 
literature. As stated earlier, this is not an effort to write a grand narrative of col-
onisation, but rather to enable greater clarity in exposing colonising processes 
in psy-science, and the cultural representation of psy-science. That is, to offer 
some conditions, a schema, by which the discourse and practices of psy-
science can be assessed within a postcolonial frame of reference. This is with 
the intention of noting the ways in which psycho-colonisation is present through 
the literary vector in the case of this thesis, and allowing for other assessments 
to be made beyond this specific piece.  In broad terms, these have already 
been noted as to include such things as the colonial use of education, ‘map-
making’, importing religion, administration and bureaucracy, the imposition of 
language, travel, tourism and technology (Sreberny-Mohammed, 1997). All of 
these factors, and more, contribute to the epistemic violence of colonisation.  It 
is evident that while themes do emerge, the activities of colonisation do vary. 
For instance, variation may be seen over time, in place, and by subject position. 
Some characteristics of colonisation may, therefore, apply variably – there is no 
single form of colonisation nor resistance to it (Harrison, 2003). Having noted 
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the broad colonisation schema, I go on to dwell specifically on how literature 
may contribute to colonisation and literature in subsequent chapters.  
 
2.6 Texts from the Postcolonial (counter) Canon 
  
The following review employs a ‘thick description’ approach that circles 
through the texts reviewed, noting themes and regularities that contribute to the 
scheme provided at the end of the chapter. The scheme emerges from themes 
in the texts below. I have taken the broader, activist writing in decolonisation 
first before moving on to those that specifically cite psychiatry and madness. 
The review demonstrates the careful consideration necessary, I believe, to key 
postcolonial literature, before accusations or assessments of psycho-
colonisation can be rigorously made. The use of the scheme is important but 
partial here. I use the scheme to build a context which situates postcolonial and 
psycho-colonial critiques – literary sources are just one vector within the 
scheme by which psycho-colonisation might occur. But working without such a 
scheme, I argue, falls foul to the criticism I raise in sections 1.1 and 1.4, which 
is to leap conceptually without groundwork. As will be seen in chapter 3 on 
Faulks, the themes of colonisation emerge within texts even if they are not able 
to mobilise them physically in the world. Likewise, in chapter 4 on Morrison, 
those themes are remarkably absent unless they are being problematised.  
 
 Albert Memmi (1965) The Colonizer and the Colonized (CC). 
 
The first text I review in this section is Memmi’s The Colonizer and the 
Colonized (1965). From the outset Memmi characterizes colonialism as a rela-
tionship of domination and subjugation, and suggests “[…] for if colonization de-
stroys the colonized, it also rots the colonizer” (CC p.xvii). In this, and other 
ways, the colonial process is seen as one that is bi-directional, and in present-
ing it as such Memmi is also laying the possibilities for why colonisation should 
be resisted by the colonised and abandoned by the colonial23.  At the macro 
level Memmi sees “[…] the pyramid which is the basis of all colonial societies” 
(CC p.xiv) and that this hierarchical arrangement is one where “[…] privilege is 
at the heart of the colonial relationship – and that privilege is undoubtedly eco-
                                                          
23
 Memmi refers to the coloniser as the ‘colonial’ although this does not indicate the specific 
standing of a person described as such. The colonial can therefore be a non-native labourer 
from the imperial country as well as a civil servant. 
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nomic” (CC p.xii). A pyramid of this kind is hierarchic and relies on a wide basis 
of subjugation before rising to the pinnacle of privilege.  Memmi hints at how 
colonisation can be resolved, because a pyramid cannot retain its shape, or its 
stability, if the wide base dissolves. The hierarchy is reliant on, and successful 
when, people embrace their positioning and so “even the poorest [colonial] 
thought himself to be – and actually was – superior to the colonized” (CC p.xii). 
Memmi indicates that while economic domination is a component of the colonial 
outlook, there is also a subject position adopted by the colonised, which is one 
of inferiority towards others thought more superior. Likewise it is applied against 
others that are below (more inferior) in the pyramid.  Such a positioning attitude 
is not merely a side effect of economic colonialism, but a strategy seen in Eng-
lish colonialism in India and French in Algiers. Here, a local middle or ruling 
class is either retained or is instituted as a local administrator of colonial busi-
ness.  
Memmi draws attention to why a pyramidal hierarchy might sustain itself. 
He identifies the small coloniser (CC p.10-11) who:  
 
defends the colonial system so vigorously [and] it is because he benefits from it 
to some extent.  His gullibility lies in the fact that to protect his very limited inter-
ests, he protects other infinitely more important ones, of which he is incidentally, 
the victim. But, though dupe and victim, he gets his share (CC p.11).   
 
The hierarchy is perpetuated through a sense of merit, entitlement, superiority 
and sufficient anxiety at the prospect of losing what one has, even if that is 
meagre. While typifying the ‘small coloniser’ as a dupe or victim, Memmi is not 
absolving the colonial, but is clear that “a colonialist, is, after all, only a colonizer 
who agrees to be a colonizer” (CC. p.45). In this sense, even the ‘small coloniz-
er’ shows agency, even if that is to choose self-abjection over resistance. 
Memmi is also underplaying how the ‘small colonial’ may also initiate small acts 
of resistance even if, as with Bhabha’s view of mimicry, such acts are also erod-
ing of one’s sense of self. Althusser’s concept of interpellation suggests that the 
oppressed must recognise themselves, at least to an extent, in the ‘calls’ an op-
pressor makes on the stigmatised identity. The act of domination requires that 
the subaltern, or subjugated, recognise themselves, even if that recognition is 
internalised toxicity, and this is a paradox of resistance. Fanon recognised the 
way in which the black man might recognise himself in the language of white 
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racism, as did Foucault, in how the mad person is brought to recognise them-
selves through psychiatric discourse. Or, as   Frosh (2013) puts it “colonial 
power is built on this capacity of the coloniser to remove the source of subjec-
thood from the colonised, and this power is reflected and institutionalised con-
tinuously by the gaze” (p.148). However, Memmi does suggest that the ideology 
of the dominant coloniser is “adapted by a large measure by the governed class 
[…] The colonized gives his troubled and partial, but undeniable, assent” (CC 
p.88).  In Memmi’s eyes, the fact of a pyramid hierarchy, and also that re-
sistance is variable, suggests that there remains an assent to the coloniser. As 
likely, at least in part, is that assent is granted to the coloniser through the suc-
cess of other colonial strategies. These are discussed below and include tactics 
of cultural erasure resulting in self-alienation. There may well be the suppres-
sion of stories of resistance by the coloniser. Presumably, the notion of colonial 
superiority (that there is a naturalised state of superiority, with a subsequently 
naturalised state of dominance) runs with the belief in colonial legitimacy. Self-
alienation through the experience of subjugation, predicated on theories of su-
periority, appears in all the writing that follows on colonisation. 
Memmi concludes that “it is impossible for the colonial situation to last 
because it is impossible to arrange it properly” (CC p.146). In psycho-
colonisation such conflict is written into the diagnostic frame as a feature of 
madness – unpredictability, irrationality and non-compliance.  Latour’s problem-
atization of the polarisation of knowledge, a venture which is bound to fail in hy-
bridity, does so because knowledge and suppression cannot be entirely ordered 
and sanitised.  This is in part due to the impossibility of the reason underpinning 
the colony; “[…] the more the usurped is downtrodden, the more the usurper 
triumphs and thereafter confirms his guilt and establishes his self-
condemnation” (CC p.53). This also applies to disability and madness, which 
despite efforts of reparation, correction, enforced docility by disciplines, resist, 
consciously or otherwise, the enforced normality (Penson, 2011). As the superi-
ority and legitimacy begin to appear less coherent and sustainable, so too do 
the subject positions adopted, and dissonance ensues.  Such observations are 
reworked by Bhabha (1994:2004) in his accounts of mimicry and ambivalence. 
These terms refer to the idea that, as the coloniser attempts to civilise the colo-
nised, through requiring the adoption of, say, European dress codes, this in turn 
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undermines those dress codes. The colonised do not quite look the same, and 
so there is a persistent ambivalence (McLeod, 2000). This mimicry and ambiva-
lence is used by Mills’ (2014b) in her example of psychiatric passing and the 
mimicry of normality. The colonial effort is at least partly to do with the civilising 
mission: “[a] paternalist is one who wants to stretch racism and equality further - 
once admitted.  It is, if you like, a charitable racism — which is thereby not less 
skilful or less profitable” (CC p.76). For those colonialists who have “adjusted 
his life to his ideology” (CC p.45), this may assuage guilt in the belief of a great-
er good, while continuing to press the economic and cultural advantage.  
For Memmi, colonial superiority and legitimacy follow a number of prob-
lematically reasoned positions, as follows:   
 
Colonial racism is built from three major ideological components: one, the gulf 
between the colonialist and the colonized; two, the exploitation of these differ-
ences for the benefit of the colonialist; the use of these supposed differences as 
standards of absolute fact (CC p.71).   
 
Human sciences (including education, sociology, psychology and medicine) 
have supplied at least part of the rationale for the superiority operated by the 
colonialist. The dichotomised positions of advanced/primitive, civilised/savage 
and human/animal all rely on judgements of classification. These dichotomies 
state the distance necessary for attaining superiority, but also, constitute the 
coloniser as the charitable paternalist in the better of the two positions. The co-
lonial holds the belief that, without colonisation, progress towards civilization 
would never have occurred because of the integral primitive/native deficit (CC 
p.112-113). There is a shift from the idea of invasion and exploitation in the co-
lonial’s mind to one that is about civilising the native, to the extent that they may 
be made civilised. But, given the dichotomies above, remediation cannot be ful-
ly achieved, otherwise, to do so would be to degrade the dichotomy and prove 
the primitive to be the equal of the coloniser. The civilising mission, therefore, 
renders the native always somewhat lesser, even when improved. The “abso-
lute fact” of this is the circularity of thinking necessary to continue the colonial 
relationship, and which in a large part cannot be sustained due to the conditions 
of that reasoning. This highlights a substantial discourse in colonisation, that is, 
the premise of the civilising mission as a device which alters the truth of vio-
lence, in the minds of the colonisers, to something necessary and worthy. By 
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comparison, poorly evidenced genetic vulnerability or brain dysfunction in mad-
ness permits the assertion of an intrinsic fault that can be remediated but not 
cured. Recovery becomes a life-long project of ‘less than normal’, and the ‘time 
bomb’ of relapse is to be monitored for, and guarded against. 
Memmi suggests that systems of classification in the colonial relationship 
are typified in a number of ways. In the first place there are:  
 
[…] a series of negations. The colonized is not this, is not that. He is never con-
sidered in a positive light; or if he is, the quality which is conceded is the result 
of a psychological or ethical failing (CC p.84).   
 
Memmi is suggesting that while the colonised are produced through the classifi-
cation and ‘the gaze’ of the coloniser, this is perpetually pessimistic, never in 
terms of what “he” (the colonised) is. This strategy succeeds in maintaining the 
distance between colonisers and colonised through a sustained negative ap-
praisal. Memmi is arguing that any positive appearances are discounted as an 
aberration and that even positive attributes on the part of the colonised are a 
failure on their part to sustain a consistent inferiority. Equally, such an aberrant, 
positive moment is a fault of the coloniser judging it so. This possibility echoes 
in France’s (2014) suggestion that problematic diagnosis in psychiatry, where 
race is concerned, is an aberration of clinical judgement, not an effect of the na-
ture of diagnosis (see footnote 19).  Either way, part of the decolonisation pro-
cess will involve the colonised ceasing to “define himself through the categories 
of the coloniser. The same holds true of what more subtly characterise him in a 
negative way” (CC p.152). 
A second factor in sustaining the inferiority of the colonised is the sum-
mative ways in which they are described (with the coloniser having been self-
appointed as the describer).  Memmi argues that “…all oppression is directed at 
a human group as a whole, a priori, all individual members of that group are 
anonymously victimised by it” (CC p.73) and:  
 
another sign of the colonized depersonalization is what one might call the mark 
of the plural. The colonized is never characterised in an individual manner; he is 
entitled only to draw in anonymous collectivity (“They are this”. “They are all the 
same.”)” (CC p.85).  
 
Having been typified negatively, the stereotype is applied across a population, 
again reminiscent of diagnosis and psychiatric epidemiology. This may give 
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some insight into the assent that also forms the pyramid, as those that are typi-
fied in such a way respond to the invitations of paternalism for betterment 
(which can never be achieved) and identify with the oppressor/colonialist (“How 
could [the colonized] hate the colonizers and yet admire them so passionately” ( 
CC p.x)); “The first ambition of the colonized is to become equal to that splendid 
model and to resemble him [the colonizer] to the point of disappearing in him” 
(CC p.120)).  To arrive at the “mark of the plural” involves a number of other 
manoeuvres, not least of which is the erasure of variations that are the reality of 
any population, other than variations authorised by the coloniser, who holds a 
power to describe. 
Such manoeuvres can be ones that remove the colonised from history, 
which Memmi considered “the most serious blow” (CC p.91), and a further 
erasure that underwrites the local culture, and erodes the “mother tongue” (CC 
p.107).  So, “colonization kills the colonized. It must be added that it kills him 
spiritually. Colonization distorts relationships, destroys or petrifies institutions, 
and corrupts men, both colonizer and colonized” (CC p.151). The destruction of 
history adds to the self-alienation of the colonised as he is: 
  
torn away from his past and out of his future, his traditions are dying and he 
loses the hope of acquiring a new culture. He neither has language, nor flag, 
nor technical knowledge, nor national or international existence, nor rights, nor 
duties (CC p.127-128).   
 
Thus, one’s own knowledge of self and community are underwritten, if not en-
tirely outlawed. The system of colonisation is a total system that accounts in all 
ways for the abjection of the colonised, and the erasure is complete with the 
removal of citizenship, civil participation and “finally, the colonizer denies the 
most precious right granted to most men: liberty” (CC p.86). In this sense the 
colonised exists only to the extent of the coloniser’s categories in modes of liv-
ing, valued through the coloniser’s routines, and at the gift of the coloniser and 
the small coloniser. It is true, also, of the normativity demanded of mad people 
in rehabilitation and remediation services, whether that is a disciplinary act of 
instilling docility (Penson, 2011), or an enticement to passing (Mills, 2014b). 
Memmi, in referencing the death of the spirit, brings attention to the effect of 
colonisation, psycho-emotionally and socially, that is, the self-alienation that 
must come from living in a total system of subordination. “So goes the drama of 
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the man who is the product and victim of colonization.  He almost never suc-
ceeds in corresponding with himself” (CC p.140). Later, in the psychiatric case 
studies appended to The Wretched of the Earth (1967b), Fanon reflects on the 
job of a humane psychiatry that re-connects patients with their environment, 
thus repairing the alienation. 
In summary, while economic factors typify the rationale driving colonisa-
tion, rather than just conquest, success requires further strategies on the part of 
the coloniser. Superiority and legitimacy are established on the basis of some 
‘presumed as fact’ whole, and on the view of the total inferiority, or pathology, 
on the part of the colonised. Legitimacy is seen as a self-evident fact towards 
the colony, and the colonial’s reasoning is imposed. Tactics are employed to 
erase resistance and to shore-up the superiority through systems of classifica-
tion that are premised on the negative construction of the colonised, while set-
ting unachievable standards for becoming ‘civilised’. Equally, the conditions 
whereby autonomy is achieved and progress occurs are never allowed. There is 
a seduction within the system which is one of minor gains in a hierarchy, and 
taking those meagre gains is again part of the spiritual and cultural death of the 
colonised.  The result, ultimately, is that the colonised are set against them-
selves — culturally, socially and psychologically. In turn, this is a position that 
increases the malleability of a population deemed naturally subordinate, while at 
the same time engendering the anger and despair that further characterise in-
fantile primitivism, thereby confirming the coloniser’s typology. 
Memmi’s Decolonization and the Decolonized (DD) (2004) is, in many 
respects, the sequel to The Colonizer and the Colonized, although it takes quite 
a different approach and perspective. It is certainly a less hopeful book, maybe 
even embittered, and aims to review the progress, or lack of progress, made in 
decolonisation. He writes that by publishing DD “…I fear I have managed to an-
noy just about everyone.” (DD p.x) and makes a number of arguments that 
leaves few stakes unscathed. Curiously, though, he doubts that there is such a 
thing as neo-colonialism, instead, preferring to believe that former colonies have 
in fact allowed their gains in sovereignty to be squandered, and that formerly 
colonised people have settled for less than they ought. While a number of writ-
ers do point out the ‘gangster’ attitude of former revolutionaries, well placed to 
gain accelerated wealth in decolonisation movements (Zeilig, 2016), this alone 
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cannot account for the failures of decolonisation. Paradoxically, Memmi does 
understand the ‘lethargy’ that continued past decolonisation and does refer to 
the U.S., India and China as empires. Former colonisers are also blamed in that 
they too have not rehabilitated, and instead have continued to take advantage 
of former colonies, have operated policies that undermined self-determination, 
and have also have stood by as tragedy unfolded in former colonies. Memmi 
suggests that literature, as an element of the cultural decolonisation process, 
exemplifies aspects of this problem. Whereas theorists such as Bhabha may 
celebrate the use of the coloniser’s language, as a route to resistance and ap-
propriation through hybridity, Memmi suggests that this may be a relatively 
empty premise, with the coloniser’s language being “the only tool he will have 
mastered and without it he would have been reduced to silence” (DD p.40). He 
goes on to lament that the “best tool for communication remains the language of 
the foreigner. This was already true during the period of colonization, and it is 
still true now.  Was it worth so much effort to face the same dilemma again?” 
(DD p.40).  
In Memmi’s work there is the start of a typology wherein the qualities of 
the colonial process can be discerned. As the other key thinkers are reviewed 
below, many of these themes and ideas recur, adding to the thick description of 
colonisation. Before moving on to Aimé Césaire, I will summarise what is cov-
ered in Memmi’s work connecting it to psy-science. This is with the intention of 
drawing attention to the themes above, as they arise, as well as the writers that 
follow. So, colonisers have economic gains to make in dominating others (the 
relationship between medicine, psy, Big Pharma, the Prison-Industrial Complex 
is enormously lucrative, as well as the disciplinary prestige gained). In part, this 
requires a pliable population that can be construed as inferior (such as unprov-
en genetic fallibility, social drift, toxic families and insufficient resilience). Such 
inferiors are subject to study (the truth rules of empiricist human sciences) that 
generates knowledge to classify (diagnosis and formulation) and civilise (reme-
diation, treatment, therapy, surveillance and containment). Such activity relies 
on a densely hierarchised system of disciplinary cooperation (medicine, nursing, 
policing) which are designated as legitimate (legislation, judgements of mental 
capacity, the need to act in advance of ‘crime’ to suppress dangerous behav-
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iours). These themes, and their corresponding activity in psy-science, continue 
to show through the rest of the chapter.  
 
Césaire, A. (1972:2000) Discourse on Colonialism. (DC) Trans. J.Pinkham. 
New York: Monthly Review Press. 
 
Césaire offers another account of the colonial relationship, and again 
there is a view that colonisation debases the coloniser as well as the colonised, 
thereby undermining claims of civilisation by the former. Césaire notes that be-
ing civilised is not something that automatically follows Western technological 
advancement.  Colonisation is characterised as a “rot” or “gangrene” (DC p.35) 
that sets in, and spoils all of the achievements of the coloniser. Césaire most 
powerfully articulates this in relation to Nazism, and suggests that in the case of 
the White European world: 
 
[…] what he [the white European] cannot forgive Hitler for is not the crime in it-
self, the crime against man, it is not the humiliation of man as such, it is the 
crime against the white man, the humiliation of the white man, and the fact that 
he applied to Europe colonialist procedures which until then had been reserved 
exclusively for the Arabs of Algeria, the “coolies” of India and the “niggers” of 
Africa.” (DC, p.36, emphasis in the original) 
 
He is pointing out the double standards present in colonialism, and the invest-
ment of colonialism in racism, and theories of the naturalised emplacement of 
the inferiority /superiority dichotomy. What Césaire overlooks is how Nazism 
prioritised the mad, disabled and socially stigmatised as the early recipients of 
its murderous eugenics programme due to their genetic inferiority and the taint-
ing of the human genome that they were thought to bring. Late nineteenth cen-
tury eugenicist thought included notions of finding a correspondence between 
madness, criminality and racial inferiority; an attempt at a unifying theory of nat-
uralised dominance and race superiority. Such theorising has its roots as much 
in the human sciences in the colonies as it does in Nazism. Crucially, the Euro-
pean eugenics movement is a clear indicator of how colonial practices can op-
erate in the Global North.  
Césaire posits that there is a process that underlies this notion of essen-
tial inferiority, what he calls the equation “colonization = “thingification”” (DC, 
p.42). He is referring to two things in the term “thingification”. Firstly, Césaire 
refers to the commodification of all aspects of the colonised landscape and life, 
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and the undermining of any natural processes of development that may have 
occurred had colonisation not happened. Secondly, Césaire is also referring to 
“thingification” as constituting a certain object/subject dichotomy, that is, the 
colonised becomes a thing (the object) at the behest, and for the use, of the 
conscious, advanced coloniser (the subject). A feature of thingification, and the 
theory of inferiority it accompanies, is the psychologization of the colonial ob-
ject.  Césaire writes: 
 
Following him step by step through the ins and outs of his little conjuring tricks, 
and he will prove to you as clear as day that colonization is based on psycholo-
gy, that there are in this world groups of men who, for unknown reasons, suffer 
from what must be called a dependency complex, that these groups are psy-
chologically made for dependence; that they need dependence, that they crave 
it, ask for it, demand it; that is the case with most colonized peoples (DC, p.59) 
 
Dependence, therefore, becomes a natural, essential state of the colonised, 
and as with the paternalistic, civilising mission that Memmi described, the colo-
niser is in fact doing a favour for the colonised, is in service to the colonised, 
and so is responding to the call to come rule and civilise them. Psychology, and 
disciplines that advance pathological psychological accounts, are here, too, im-
plicated directly. Bhabha (1994:2004) notes this as a ‘narcissistic authority’ that 
calls on the colonised to “Tell us [the coloniser] why we are here” (Bhabha, 
1994:2004, p.142, original emphasis)24. The infantilisation of the colonised as 
more simple in every respect, reverses the colonisation process, from one im-
posed upon a colonised people, to one imposed upon the coloniser — as a du-
ty, morally and ethically. Such is the tone of the WHO, mentioned earlier, re-
garding the ‘burden’ of disability and disease, and its fiscal metrics. Césaire 
goes on to suggest that psychologisation and infantilisation have a further func-
tion, which is to obscure material conditions and brutal acts. Epistemic acts of 
violence facilitate and enact a discourse which envelops and obscures the bru-
tality of colonisation. Within this discourse acts of resistance on the part of the 
colonised, are seen to come from a neurosis attached to an “imaginary oppres-
sion” (DC p.61), and in terms of madness. Torture, murder, forced labour and 
                                                          
24
 There is a passage in Italo Calvino’s novel If On a Winter’s Night a Traveller (1979:1998) that 
captures this dynamic perfectly: “To be sure, repression must also allow an occasional breath-
ing space, must close and eye every now and then, alternate indulgence with abuse, with a cer-
tain unpredictability in its caprices; otherwise, if nothing more remains to be repressed, the 
whole system rusts and wears down” (p.236). 
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incarceration are naturalised, acquiring lawfulness, meeting a local necessity 
and providing proportion towards fulfilling the civilising mission by any means 
necessary.  
Kelly’s (2000) introduction to DC offers a perspective on my research 
question about the worth of the humanities in postcolonial activism, as he out-
lines how literature has an essential role in decolonisation. Kelly notes that 
Césaire is describing the revolutionary ways of poetry and poetics, and that it 
offers a response to the positivism that underpins the colonialist venture; “Poetic 
knowledge is born in the great silence of scientific knowledge” (Césaire quoted 
in Kelly (2000) p.17).  Césaire goes on to suggest that poetry “…is the only way 
to achieve the kind of knowledge we need to move beyond the world’s crises” 
(ibid).  The essential role of literary and cultural production is a recurring motif in 
understanding what is targeted in the colonising process (whose language is 
spoken, whose literature is studied, what works become canonical, whose 
‘methods for knowing’ prevail) and a key strand in models that offer a route to 
decolonisation (through reinstating national literatures, using theatre to raise 
consciousness, performing poetry to galvanize cultural identity).  
 
Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o (1986) Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of Language in 
African Literature. Woodbridge: James Currey/Heinemann. 
 
In section 1.8 I describe Geertz’s thick description, and it is as I turn to 
Ngũgĩ’s Decolonising the Mind (DM) which also dwells on culture and litera-
ture(s) as part of the colonising and decolonising process, that the thickness 
grows of my description grows. While Ngũgĩ, likewise, begins with the proposi-
tion that colonisation is aimed at controlling wealth, he soon broadens this view. 
Certainly, he looks to culture and language as the medium within which coloni-
sation, after its physical force, sustains its presence and privilege.  He notes 
that “to control a people’s culture is to control their tools for self-definition in re-
lationship to others” (DM p.16). With this rationale in mind, he begins to outline 
the strategies colonisers use to control self-definition, and, by extension, the re-
lations between people.  There is “the destruction or the deliberate undervaluing 
of a people’s culture … and the conscious elevation of the language [and cul-
ture] of the coloniser” (DM p.16). Ngũgĩ goes on to explain the significance of 
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this, that “the domination of a people’s language by the language of the colonis-
ing nations was crucial to the domination of the mental universe of the colo-
nised” (DM p.16). Force only gets the coloniser so far, and if the coloniser is to 
have a pliable workforce, and also a population with which to reflect back the 
civilising mission onto the coloniser, then the coloniser needs to operate psy-
chosocial control. As with Foucault’s ideas mentioned earlier, the first act of 
subordination in the psychiatric encounter is that of force, not one of therapeu-
tics. Thereafter, in works like Discipline and Punish he develops notions of pan-
opticism, wherein the scrutinising act is towards the perception of self, to instil 
self-censorship and obedience. Ngũgĩ describes, as others have, the route to 
that control through the subjugation, and the replacement, of the native culture 
and language. This is not through an exchange by equals engaged in cultural 
translation and syncretism (Burke, 2009), but rather through a systematic, and 
intentional, rewriting of local codes and practices, that privilege the coloniser’s 
culture, language and codes as superior. It becomes apparent that this is a pro-
cess, as well as a content issue, in that it is not just about what is valued in cul-
tural terms, but it is the ‘how’ of cultural and linguistic transmission that is co-
opted. Hence, the requirement of certain conditions of education, training, em-
ployment, administration, etc., that colonisers demand. The result is that: 
 
[…] native languages [and culture] were associated in his [a child’s] impres-
sionable mind with low status, humiliation, corporal punishment, slow-footed in-
telligence and ability or downright stupidity, non-intelligibility and barbarism, this 
was reinforced by the world he met in the works of such geniuses of racism as 
Rider Haggard […] (DM p.18) 
 
Ngũgĩ is focused here on the child who learns, from its early years, to feel 
ashamed and at odds with its own culture, an effect that is, again, one of self-
alienation. He is outlining the role that psychologisation takes in negatively typi-
fying African people. Here, black people are assessed as lacking in cognitive 
aptitude, which both supports the notion of inferiority (an enduring preoccupa-
tion with racially driven cognitive psychology (Riecher, 2001)), and their fitness 
to be both ruled and a source of labour. Ngũgĩ draws an immediate link to Eu-
ropean literature (Haggard) and the role it takes in perpetuating these psycho-
logical stereotypes (a role I suggest is important to psycho-colonisation with re-
gard to Faulks in the next chapter). While primarily psychological, judgements of 
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cognitive ability are also a cornerstone of psychiatric assessment. Thus, litera-
ture and culture are tools of propaganda that have a place in disparaging local 
culture, a confirmation of inferiority and the coloniser’s superiority.  The “nega-
tive image becomes internalised and it affects their cultural and even political 
choices in ordinary living” (DM p.18). The gestalt of colonisation is achieved by 
physical and psychosocial training into inferiority, which is paradoxical and in-
tensifying. It is paradoxical in the sense that the inherent savagery and degen-
eration proposed in the racist ethos, alongside the forces of rehabilitation and 
correction, are those that make the civilising venture always ambivalent and 
perpetually deferred. It is intensifying in the sense that there is a ‘weight’ of cul-
tural, psychological and social judgement laid on each black body, and as in the 
eugenic hygiene movement, the single body becomes linked inextricably to the 
typology of a whole people. 
Ngũgĩ hints at this ambivalence when he proposes that “Africa actually 
enriches Europe: but Africa is made to believe that it needs Europe to rescue it 
from poverty” (DM p.28). This quotation reverses the colonising relationship — it 
is Europe and the coloniser that needs Africa, not the other way around. Simi-
larly, in a Foucauldian reversal, this might mean that it is the mad that provide 
the conditions for psychiatry emerge.  Africa becomes the necessary ‘patient’ to 
the European ‘medic’, and one that is produced through a certain essentialist 
manoeuvre that constructs African inferiority as a fact of nature (like a germ or a 
break), thus naturalising this view and concealing an ideology that constructs 
race, degeneracy and civilisation even before conquest (Bhabha, 1994:2004). 
Native Africa (and other colonies) fleshes out a scale of evolutionary and cultur-
al development partially written back in Europe, on the basis of class, criminali-
ty, madness and deviance.  
Ngũgĩ offers an account of self-alienation reminiscent of Fanon’s (who  I 
come to shortly): 
 
Colonial alienation takes two interlinked forms: an active (or passive) distancing 
of oneself from the reality around; and an active (or passive) identification with 
that which is most external to one’s environment. It starts with a deliberate dis-
sociation of the language of conceptualization, of thinking, of formal education, 
of mental development, from the language of daily interaction in the home and 
in the community. It is like separating the mind from the body so that they are 
occupying two unrelated linguistic spheres in the same person. On a larger 
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scale it is like producing a society of bodiless heads and headless bodies. (DM 
p.28) 
 
Colonisation produces an effect that is a break with one’s environment and with 
oneself. Ngũgĩ is perhaps referring to what Fanon develops as a psychopathol-
ogy of colonisation, and adds how colonisation places a person, or a population, 
at odds with its own cultural reference points. This is not to romanticise native 
culture (McLeod, 2000) as being one of healing and wholeness, but to perceive 
in colonisation a regime of truth imposed through force and disparagement, one 
that is non-consensual, and has the effect of splitting, (“heads from bodies, bod-
ies from heads”). This arises from the epistemic violence of colonisation, and 
the demand that the subjugated internalise their inferiority, and thus their de-
pendence upon the coloniser’s benevolence.  As with Memmi, there is a further 
problem, which is that the belief in racial inferiority as an essential quality makes 
the civilising agenda a self-sustaining impossibility – the black native can never 
be white. The closest the colonised can get is ‘mimicry’ and ‘nearly the same, 
but not quite’ (Bhabha 1994:2004). Getting closer to the coloniser’s vision of 
self, within the coloniser’s own language, by definition, threatens colonial supe-
riority and invokes a narcissistic violence aimed at reinstating tradition (Burke, 
2009). Such non-consensual, imposed cultural disjunction is a cause of the 
kinds of splitting that result in ‘psychopathological’ distress for both the colo-
nised and colonial. Such distress is one that the coloniser can further account 
for through inscribing it within psy-science, doubling it back into theories of psy-
cho- and bio- degeneracy and conceal the harm linked to its wider economic 
and socio-political activity (Read, 2004a). Again, such discourse conceals the 
real psycho-emotional results of colonisation in favour of distress/madness as a 
naturalised phenomenon merely discovered, observed, described and treated 
by psy-science. 
Ngũgĩ suggests that medicine, and science generally, are devices that, 
on the one hand, are enormously productive, but on the other, facets of capital-
ism. Here, imperialism is a mode for creating wealth through the impoverish-
ment of others, and this impoverishment refers also to the health and psycho-
logical wellbeing of the colonised population. The importing of the imperial 
methods and epistemologies are “pretences to free the African from supersti-
tion, ignorance and awe of nature [but it] often resulted in deepening his igno-
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rance, increasing his superstitions and multiplying his awe of the new whip-and-
gun-wielding master” (DM p.67). Among the writers here, there is agreement 
that the conditions of colonisation, and the drive of the civilising mission, undo 
potential gains of sharing Western thought. The global agenda for access to 
psychiatric technologies may prove to be yet another civilising mission within an 
“Empire of Good”. 
Ngũgĩ’s argument moves towards the humanities and culture as a di-
mension of the colonial experience, and in particular he begins to focus on the 
novel, which is a format imported by colonisers, on their terms. He suggests 
that the development of the African novel, here an example of cultural hybridity, 
is held back through two things. Firstly, the missionaries and colonials con-
trolled the means to print. Secondly, from the early 1950s, the institution of uni-
versities (and the education of Africans in Europe and the U.S. that also institut-
ed the English language canon) trained thinkers in the worth of certain litera-
tures, and not in the development of local writing. Cultural hybridity, in one 
sense, is an unequal venture, and certainly, what occurs from this point is an 
unresolved thread of discourse in the postcolonial arena. That is, the extent to 
which using a European format such as the novel can be adopted, and written 
in English by the colonised, and still remain true to decolonisation. The relativity 
within arguments of hybridity and mimicry, as forms of resistance, become prob-
lematised not least because they fail to address the reinstatement of local lan-
guages and forms, post-decolonisation. The problem is one of understanding 
the constitutive role of language in identity, and squaring the oppressor’s lan-
guage with the resistance it enables and the epistemic damage it necessitates 
for these activist writers. This at least drives Ngũgĩ in part to write, while impris-
oned as a political prisoner, in his own language, and as he terms it, within the 
“neo-colony” and with “neo-slaves” (DM pp.77-80). 
As already mentioned, literature is seen as a key strategy for resistance 
in the colony, and a route to rebuilding local cultural points of reference and 
identity. However, in the chapter The Quest for Relevance, Ngũgĩ outlines his 
own experience, which was that the neo-colony engages with the prospect of an 
African literature along a tension between two points; the first point arises from 
a group of intellectuals that disparage local thinking and native literatures in fa-
vour of the former coloniser. And the second position is one that favours contin-
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ued resistance to colonising influences and the reshaping of the neo-colony. 
What Ngũgĩ seems to see, and this echoes Memmi’s later text, is that neo-
colonials are in power in the former colony. The shift towards embracing West-
ern contact and agendas post-decolonisation often leaves foreign or colonial 
culture as most privileged.    
 
Nandy, A. (1983:2007) The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under 
Colonialism. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
 
Nandy’s The Intimate Enemy (TIE) (1983:2007) arises out of a Hindu 
view of the colonisation of India. Additionally, Nandy tends to write with a great-
er engagement with gender and sexuality. Many of the issues already noted are 
again evident; the coloniser is debased, for instance, as “the victors are ulti-
mately shown to be camouflaged victims, at an advanced stage of psychosocial 
decay” (TIE p.xvi), and there is the misuse of sociological and psychological 
concepts to shape the ‘subjecthood’ of the colonised. He develops the idea that 
colonisation always has a civilising mission, at least in part to assuage the guilt 
and moral bankruptcy that would be otherwise evident to colonised and colonial 
alike. Nandy suggests also how the coloniser may operate at home in the Glob-
al North in this deception; the coloniser “came from complex societies with het-
erogeneous cultural and ethical traditions […] it is by underplaying some as-
pects of their culture and overplaying others that they built the legitimacy for co-
lonialism” (TIE p.12). As is seen later in Fanon’s work, the civilising mission re-
lies on a sense of charity that in turn:  
 
[…] drew a new parallel between primitivism and childhood. Thus, the theory of 
social progress was telescoped not merely into the individual’s life cycle in Eu-
rope but also into the area of cultural differences in the colonies (TIE p.15) 
 
In a footnote, Nandy draws attention to the “equation between childhood 
and primitivism [which] received powerful support from psychoanalytic ethnog-
raphy” (TIE p.55) which involved seeing primitive cultures as evoking the char-
acteristics of childhood. Like Ngũgĩ, Nandy is drawing psychologising and psy-
chiatrising thought into the colonising relationship.  
Nandy discusses the interplay of the West’s ‘model’ of India and the view 
that the colonised hold of themselves. He sees that while this is largely rejected, 
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like Said, he notes the potency of the Western image and how some Indians are 
also induced to use it. As with those authors discussed above, the invitation, if 
not seduction, into the colonial frames of reference, are both insidious in their 
reach, and powerful in their representation. This is even to the extent that the 
colonised self-image involves a reference to that of the colonial image – even 
where that image is rebuffed, it still holds a relationship. The seduction looks to 
be one wherein:  
 
[...] the Indian is compromising; he has a fluid self-definition, and he is willing to 
learn the ways of his civilised brethren unconditionally, providing such learning 
is profitable. Some cultural traits can be used both as ethnopsychological cate-
gories and as protective stereotypes. (TIE p.104) 
 
Nandy presents a view of self-alienation that seems less concerned with a 
pathological rupture, and more with the possibility that psychological assimila-
tion can be seen as flexibility, even a healthy way of coping. This will be particu-
larly pertinent to the later discussion of Morrison’s work in chapter 4. Nandy 
presents dissociation as protective; it prevents internalisation of what should not 
be ‘owned’. He writes: 
 
This is a self from whom one is already somewhat abstracted and alienated. 
Such splitting of one’s self, to protect one’s sanity and ensure survival, makes 
the subject an object unto himself and disaffiliates the violence and humiliation 
he suffers from the ‘essential constituent’ of his self. It is an attempt to survive 
by inducing in oneself a psychosomatic state which would render one’s imme-
diate context partly dreamlike or unreal […] the survivor must be in the world 
but not of it (TIE p109) 
 
Even at the level of resistance, Nandy subverts the coloniser’s attempts 
at hyper-masculinity – to engender resistance as a fight which would be to ac-
cept the coloniser’s terms. This is quite different to writers such as Fanon, who 
depend on the metaphors and the reality of violent resistance. Nandy does, 
however, cite these activists as important sources for him to draw from. As al-
ready suggested, different forms of colonisation may well invite, and require, 
different forms of resistance. Nandy values the comic, the effeminate and the 
weak, as forms of resistance that are all the more potent for their refusal to ac-
cept terms of conflict. Likewise, if conditions of madness, such as dissociation, 
can be understood as healthy and adaptive responses to colonisation, mad-
ness, for some, may be a process of resistance, not pathology. 
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Finally, the postscript to the edition written in 2007 reveals that Nandy 
has arrived at a conclusion on what colonialism is: “it has become more obvious 
that colonialism is mostly a game of categories and politics of knowledge. That 
as long as the game and the politics survive, colonialism, too, will survive in 
some incarnation or other” (TIE 117). As already suggested, problematic cate-
gories, and the politics of knowledge, are as much a part of the critique of psy-
science as they are colonisation, and will thus be an important dynamic of psy-
cho-colonisation. 
 
Fanon, F. (1952; 2008) Black Skin, White Masks.  New York: Grove Press. 
 
Having reviewed key postcolonial scholars and activists outside of psy-
science, I turn now to Fanon who bridges the gap between postcolonial thought, 
madness and psy-science. Fanon takes a prominent role in postcolonial stud-
ies, and is of special significance to this thesis due to his credentials as a psy-
chiatrist, which inform his perspectives on colonisation. His theorising of racism, 
the colonial relationship, and the necessities of decolonisation, have been im-
mensely influential in postcolonial theory and activism, decolonial thought and 
cross cultural psychiatry activism such as in the work of Suman Fernanado.  
Black Skin, White Masks. (1952;2008)(BW) will be considered here leaving his 
other major contribution, The Wretched of the Earth (1967)25, aside. The latter 
tends to be thought of as a manifesto for decolonisation, whereas at this point 
BW, offers an insight into the workings of colonisation and racism before decol-
onisation has been entirely mobilised.  
Fanon offers an instruction to “[…] all those who undertake to describe 
colonization to remember one thing: it is utopian to try to differentiate one kind 
of inhuman behaviour from another” (WB p.67) and that “all forms of exploitation 
are identical, since they apply to the same “object”: man” (WB p.69). So, “colo-
nial racism is no different from other racism” (WB p.69). Fanon’s position en-
courages the cross-fertilisation of understandings of colonisation and racisms (a 
                                                          
25
 The Wretched of the Earth includes an appended set of case notes from Fanon’s psychiatric 
practice. In the preamble, he suggests that one of the dilemmas of psychiatric treatment in the 
colonial context is that it brings the colonised further into contact with the colonising culture. He 
then goes on to treat, what would be considered now, a number of trauma cases. While of some 
interest here, the case studies do not shed light on how the mad colonised might be understood 
in the global north. For instance, the case studies often related to how the colonial context 
‘forced’ people to rape, torture and murder those actually, or perceived to be, on the opposing 
side. 
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term Foucault applies to the subordination of psychiatric patients), but also 
warns against hierarchical and differential modelling of oppressions. 
In BW, Fanon suggests his analysis is psychological, but as the text 
moves on, it becomes clear that the psychological is often a reference to interi-
ority, and the analysis is often psychosocial and political in nature. He uses the 
phrase ‘sociodiagnostics’ (BW p.xv) to describe the practice of assessing the 
state of a racist and colonial society (a number of the examples Fanon gives in 
the text draw on his experience of being in metropolitan France). His reference 
to the “worm eaten edifice” (BW p.xv), echoing Césaire’s reference to rot and 
gangrene, of the foundations of society, draws attention to how colonialism 
permeates, and undermines, developed society. It references the empty prom-
ises of equality and advancement in the face of imperialism. In WB Fanon un-
dertakes an interdisciplinary study, eschewing a fixed method in favour of 
blending psychological observation, psychoanalysis, polemic, political discourse 
and poetics (Zeilig, 2016). The opening chapter of BW examines language and 
its role in describing the black man, in the manner already considered, that is, 
one of empowered description (Penson, 2011). It locates the black man discur-
sively, and, therefore, in relationship to discourse and materiality. Fanon views 
language, and the use of the coloniser’s language, as a key process by which 
the black subordinate can become closer to white; “a true human being” (BW 
p.2). He suggests that “a man who possesses a language possesses as an indi-
rect consequence the world expressed and implied by this language” (BW p.2). 
This is significant in a number of ways, such as those already discussed, for in-
stance, the power to describe, “thingification”, and the induction into a certain 
linguistic order that leads to pseudo-humanity on the part of the colonised, in 
the eyes of the coloniser. In addition, language becomes a route, paradoxically, 
to both neo-colonisation and resistance, where the coloniser’s language is sub-
verted and customised. Finally, the possession of language is significant to the 
understanding of madness in that one of the contentions of madness proposed 
by Foucault (2006) is that madness, or unreason, is a state of non-language, a 
slippage from language. Insofar as the black man has no language recognised 
by colonial power, he is not human, and, likewise, this is true of the mad.  
Like those writers reviewed previously, Fanon takes the position that “All 
colonized people – in other words, people in whom an inferiority complex has 
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taken root, whose local cultural originality has been committed to the grave – 
position themselves in relation to the civilising language” (BW p.2). But this quo-
tation implies a further pair of qualities; firstly, that there is something that pre-
empts, or at least is early in, the adoption of the coloniser’s language, that is, 
the constitution of an ‘inferiority complex’26, maintained through the erasure of 
local culture. This inferiority complex is predicated on a range of colonising 
strategies which use language. Secondly, the colonised ‘position themselves’, 
and so, in the absence/repression of local language that of the coloniser is used 
(suggestive of Memmi’s idea of assent), facilitating cultural erasure through ep-
istemic violence. The subtext remains one that understands that with language 
comes discourse, and the concepts of the coloniser. Finally, in this brief quota-
tion, Fanon seems to be conflating the notion of a given people having an infe-
riority complex, within a certain power relationship, with that of being colonised. 
It may be that, more than any other characteristic, Fanon notes the importance 
of the internalisation of inferiority (be that psychological, genetic, spiritual, phys-
ical, social, cultural) as both a condition and effect of colonisation. In searching 
for the presence of a colonising process, it may be found in discourse or prac-
tices that infers, or explicitly constructs inferiority. That is, the discourse on non-
normativity, susceptibility, genetic undesirability or deviancy, as index refer-
ences to some presumed inferiority. It follows that what may be seen materially 
is that those designated as inferiors have a certain place in society. He is clear 
though - “It is the racist who creates the inferiorized.”27 (WB p.73, emphasis in 
the original). 
Inferiority is psychologised and biologised, as is shown in the following 
example: 
Dr.H.L.Gordon, physician at the Mathari psychiatric hospital in Nairobi, writes in 
an article in the East African Medical Journal: “A highly technical skilled exami-
nation of a series of 100 brains of normal natives has found naked eye and mi-
                                                          
26
 The idea of ‘inferiority complex’ has been criticised, and Mannoni’s Prospero & Caliban (1990) 
is credited with the idea as applied here. In the absence of evidence, it hypothesises an unhelp-
ful notion of predisposition, which is at the crux of a number of objections in this thesis. That is, 
the problematic idea that the black colonised person/population are prone to such complexes in 
certain circumstances. 
27
 Paul Gilroy offers a useful qualification that “race is a political category” (Gilroy (1987:2002), 
p.35) and that “[r]ace has to be socially and politically constructed and elaborate ideological 
work is done to secure and maintain the different forms of racialization” (ibid). I would add that it 
is the notion of the ‘inferior’ that mutually sustains, at least in part, the possibility of the racial 
construction alongside feminised, disabled and mad inferiorities. Perhaps, this is more recently 
described in intersectional ways. 
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croscopic facts indicative of inherent new brain inferiority.” “Quantitatively,” he 
adds, “the inferiority amounts to 14.8 percent” (WB p.13) 
 
It is not simply the stating of a ‘fact’, Gordon is also using what are termed ‘ele-
vator words’ (Hacking, 2000), (words that suggest greater rigour than is actually 
the case), with the intention of stamping a certain medical authority in ‘technical 
skill’. It is thus both the message content, and the form, that is important to psy-
chologising and medicalisation discourse.  As Fanon suggests; “The problem of 
colonization, therefore, comprises not only the intersection of historical and ob-
jective conditions but man’s attitude to these conditions” (WB p.65) – not just 
the ‘facts’ therefore, but the conditions of the facts themselves. Furthermore, he 
discusses psychiatrization as a tool of colonisation in two ways. Firstly, in for-
mulating the notion of psychological inferiority. Even in cases where the trauma 
of colonisation is acknowledged, it is done so within a framework of the ethnic 
psychopathology, that is to say, that terrible circumstances and experiences still 
have to interact with the ‘native’ psychological system to produce trauma. Sec-
ondly, given the prevalence of ‘depth psychology’ models in this area, it permits 
theoretical speculation of the seeds of trauma still being in inferiority, predating 
the colonial experience. The colonised are never permitted a ‘normal’ psycholo-
gy (and if they were to be, it would be to set up a premise not unlike that of the 
nation state following colonisation; the notion of a native psychology brings that 
very thing into being).  
In his essay Medicine and Colonialism (1965), Fanon outlines in greater 
detail his view of the role of medicine in the anti-colonial struggle. His frustration 
is evident when it comes to the suspicion that colonised people have for medi-
cine by dint of its roots in the imperial centre. He notes that for Algerians, doc-
tors were also colonisers as landowners and business people (Zeilig, 2016). 
Fanon makes a bold statement about the basis of this, which has consequenc-
es for how psy-science in the Global North might be viewed. He writes “At no 
time, in a non-colonial society, does the patient mistrust the doctor” (Fanon, 
1965, p.123). He goes on to describe how the doctor perceived in this way will 
go to great pains to offer good care so as not to confirm the anxiety the colo-
nised patient might have. If Fanon is correct, another indicator of colonialism is 
the extent of mistrust a population has towards helping professions. Fanon 
highlights that in some hospitals the French psychiatric services experimented 
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on Algerians and French soldiers from sub-Saharan Africa, doing such things as 
inducing epileptic seizures to look at “estimating the specific threshold of each 
of the different races” (Fanon, 1965, p.124), activity that is endemic in European 
psychiatry in the nineteenth and early twentieth century.  Suspicion of medical 
intentions is endemic within psy-science to the extent that patients may have to 
be incarcerated and treated without their consent because medical good wishes 
are insufficiently persuasive for the patient. This phenomenon of mistrust, like 
the notion of inferiority/dependency complex and neuroses in the oppressed, 
become unhitched from medicine and located in the mad person. Fanon goes 
on to expand this point in that health professions come to view the colonised as 
needing veterinary work (not medicine) because of their “roughness” and the 
patient resists by offering partial truths; he “does not confess himself, in the 
presence of the colonizer” (ibid p.127). Furthermore, the colonised patient fails 
to take treatment as prescribed (“he cannot be depended upon to take medicine 
regularly”, ibid, p.128), in ways that bear a striking resemblance to contempo-
rary delivery of mental health care:  
 
[…] in spite of promises and pledges, an attitude of flight, of disengagement, 
persists. All the efforts exerted by the doctor, by his team of nurses, to modify 
this state of things encounter, not a systematic opposition, but a “vanishing” on 
the part of the patient. (ibid p.129) 
 
While Fanon does advocate the adoption of Western medicine within the limits 
of a certain kind of relationship – neither dominating nor colonial – he under-
stands the place of medicine in the colonial relationship, and its effects. He 
summarises this as follows: 
 
Colonial domination […] gives rise to and continues to dictate a whole complex 
of resentful behaviour and of a refusal on the part of the colonized. The colo-
nized exerts a considerable effort to keep away from the colonial world […] 
however the colonized and colonizers are constantly establishing bonds of eco-
nomic, technical, and administrative dependence…The dominant group arrives 
with its values and imposes them with such violence that the very life of the col-
onized can manifest itself only defensively […] Under these conditions, colonial 
domination distorts the very relations that the colonized maintains to his own 
culture” (Fanon, 1965, p.130). 
 
Returning now to White Masks, Black Faces, Fanon notes the preva-
lence of infantilization, as white people ‘talk down’ to black people (WB p.14). 
This is an “attempt to reach down to them, to make them feel at ease, to make 
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oneself understood and reassure them” (WB p.15). The characteristics of colo-
nisation described thus far, interrelate; the theory of inferiority sustains and is 
nurtured by the civilising mission in both grand and local, interpersonal terms.  
Attempts at a connection between white and black people (initiated perhaps by 
the former on certain terms), are on the basis of a presumed ontological hierar-
chy. Kindness is shown to the subordinate in such a way as to maintain relative 
positions, to absolve guilt, and finally to offer improvement.  
One of the most extended chapters in the WB is “The Black Man and 
Psychopathology”, which makes a broadly psychiatrically and psychoanalytical-
ly informed, critical account of racism and colonisation. Fanon’s argument offers 
insight into the psychology of the colonial process and also, sadly, demon-
strates it too. Frequently he turns back the ‘clinical gaze’ onto the white racists 
by suggesting their inadequacy in either their latent, or not-so-latent, homosex-
uality. He suggests that even the “children of bandits” could be taught civility, 
which most people can be, except “in cases of perversion or retardation” (WB 
p.121). Perhaps the ‘little colonial’ is a position to be taken in other power pyra-
mids, regarding other forms of marginality. Fanon suggests that “[…] in the psy-
chological field the abnormal is he who demands, appeals and begs” (WB, foot-
note, p.121) seemingly separating out the notion of a true abnormality (most 
likely “the pervert and the retard”). Foucault, in the History of Madness (2006) 
describes how the mad came to be an over-inclusive category of beggars, pros-
titutes, the destitute and the idle. 
Eugenics are implicated in Fanon’s consideration of psychopathology. 
Early in the chapter he cites the family as being a building block of society — it 
“represents a piece of the nation” (WB p.121). Snyder & Mitchell (2006) explain 
that in eugenic thinking, the individual is seen as a building block, metonymical-
ly corresponding to the nation. So, the health of the nation is contingent on the 
gene hygiene of the individual and the family. Fanon is also citing the family as 
the site of psychodrama and the place where cultural parenting and psycho-
pathology emerge. Description and classification have been discussed already 
as important elements of the colonial process, but this is seen also within the 
family. It goes as follows “[…] the family is at the base of human societies solely 
because it is dominated by the primacy of language: naming, he [Lacan] ar-
gued, enables a subject to acquire an identity.” (Roudinesco, 2014). This is in 
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keeping with Hall (1989), and the works reviewed here, that is, that naming, de-
scription and classification construct meaning, which bears a relation to materi-
ality and conditions within the colonial experience. And thus, such units of 
measurement as the individual and family are political entities not scientific 
(Midgley, 2001). 
Fanon suggests throughout this chapter that the black experience of 
psychopathology only makes sense in contact with a white, subjugating culture, 
that “the normal black child…will become abnormal at the slightest contact with 
the white world” (WB p.122). Higashida (2013) likewise sees his autistic alterity 
when in contact with neurotypicals. He writes: “[…] I didn’t even know I was a 
kid with special needs. How did I find out? By other people telling me that I was 
different from everyone else, and that this was a problem” (Higashida, 2013, 
p.15). To live so is to live in a colonised state of “negation, self-alienation and 
self-hatred produced by colonialist rule” (Boehmer, 2005, p.162) Like Dorfman 
(1983), Fanon sees that cultural contacts are mediated through, what may 
seem to be, innocuous cultural products, such as comics.  But, white popular 
culture – adventure stories, films and comics, do two things. Firstly, they pre-
sent whiteness as a neutral, natural benchmark for a host of positive qualities, 
and blackness for those of evil, savagery and regression28. “[A] host of infor-
mation and series of propositions slowly and stealthily work their way into an 
individual through books, newspapers, school texts, advertisements, movies, 
and radio and shape his community’s vision of the world” (WB p.131). Secondly, 
the black child learns to desire whiteness, and to construe blackness as an un-
desirable other without being conscious of this operation (I return to this point in 
chapter 4 with Morrison’s novel The Bluest Eye). To be sure, “the black child 
subjectively adopts a white man’s attitude” (WB p.126). Those people who iden-
tify in affiliation, come to split with themselves, with others, and with their place 
in the world. Fanon calls these “salavinizations”, a reference to being “alienated 
[…] failing to find his niche in society” (WB, footnote, p.164). Beyond the trauma 
of colonisation, and the explicit models of inferiority that are forced upon the 
subjugated, the induction into cultural whiteness also affects the black child - 
“he is made to feel inferior” (WB p.127). 
                                                          
28
 Joel Kovel’s White Racism: A Psychohistory (1970:1988) goes into considerable depth theo-
rising the way in which blackness became associated with negative meanings over the course 
of the development of Western culture. 
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As the chapter progresses, Fanon advances his psychoanalytic account 
and construes white responses to the black man resulting from a process of 
‘phobogenesis’, with the black man being the catalyst of phobic development in 
the white person. Fanon argues that the phobic response is based in the black 
man being a “biological danger” (WB p.143) understood as a reference to myths 
of physiognomy and the black phallus, fertility and sexual animalism, and ‘mis-
cegenation’. “[T]o have a phobia about black men is to be afraid of the biologi-
cal, for the black man is nothing but biological. Black men are animals.” (WB 
p.143) and  as a result, “[…] the black man must be branded as an outsider 
down to his chromosomes” (WB p.152).  
While Fanon notes that Freud, Jung and Adler did not take the black man 
into account in their theorising, he also begins to suggest that this is acceptable 
because European neurosis (perhaps psychopathology broadly) does not apply 
to the whole of humanity. For instance, he casts doubt on what might be found 
through studying “schizophrenia in the case of the black experience – provided 
this disorder exists over there” (WB p.132). Likewise, Metzl (2009) casts doubt 
on schizophrenia in black communities as he describes how, in the U.S in the 
1930s through to the 1950s, schizophrenia was predominantly a diagnosis of 
white housewives passively withdrawing from their roles, until the black civil 
rights movement when it steadily became a diagnosis of angry black males and 
frequently associated with dangerousness. Other critics likewise question the 
universal use of psychiatric taxonomies (Grech, 2015; Mills 2014a; Watters, 
2011).  
Fanon suggests that “European culture has an imago of the black man 
that makes him responsible for every possible conflictual situation” (WB p.146). 
He also suggests through his psychoanalytic rendering of racism and colonisa-
tion that early psychosexual conflicts enable the very possibility of prejudices 
developing, which are further enacted through cultural forms. In the spirit of 
psychoanalysis being a subversive model (Roudinesco, 2014); Fanon places 
the genesis of colonial conflict back into the normal European family. The re-
sultant fixation on black people comes later, through a process of Othering ( an 
example of reading/writing back to empire).  Such an Othering, much like Fou-
cault’s formula of productive power, has the danger and threat of blackness 
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most in the foreground. In effect, there is a proliferation and intensification of 
discourse on dangerousness:  
 
there is a quest for the black man. He is yearned for; white men can’t get along 
without him. He is in demand, but they want him seasoned a certain way. Unfor-
tunately, the black man demolishes the system and violates the agreements 
(WB p.153).  
 
Active resistance on the part of black people and the colonised, and also the 
paradox inherent in the coloniser’s models, in that they are unachievable due to 
their own internal conflicts (like the civilising attempt that becomes the same, 
but not quite), undo the full effect of domination.  
Finally, in discussing his patients, mainly women, Fanon notes that such 
cases demonstrate “[…] that at an extreme the myth of the black man, the idea 
of the black man, can cause genuine insanity” (WB p.180). Initially, this looks to 
be a reference back to phobogenesis, and the black man being the imago of 
conflict. However, I also suggest that Fanon is referencing the notion that the 
myth of the black man was imposed upon him by white colonisers, and as such, 
the myth and idea also drove him mad, and set him at odds with himself. Fur-
thermore, the absence of black women (noted by hooks, 1982), and their nega-
tion within the postcolonial (and feminist) activism of the time, was one that 
again would instil madness. Through Fanon’s work the intimate relationship be-
tween madness, colonisation and psy-science, with all its tension, emerges 
clearly. Whether that is a psychoanalytically informed reversal of the colonising 
gaze, or the psychologising of inferiority along racial lines by white psychiatry, 
the connection is evident. 
 
 
Foucault, M. (2008) Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the Collège De France 
1973-1974. London: Palgrave McMillan. 
  
Towards the close of Discipline and Punish (1975:1991), and in the last 
lecture in the series Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège De France 1974-1975 
(2003), Foucault refers to the judicial disciplines and psy-science, and in par-
ticular psychiatry, as colonisers. However, it is in the Psychiatric Power (PP) 
lectures that this idea is referenced further, and more developed. The order of 
publication confuses the development somewhat; of the three citations Psychi-
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atric Power is the earliest delivered, but the last published in English. However, 
the notion of colonisation is most cited in this earlier lecture series, and only ref-
erenced in the latter two. I turn to PP now for two reasons. Firstly, Foucault’s 
influence, as broadly identified with the post-structuralist and anti-foundationalist 
movements, was one felt in postcolonial scholarship, and theorists such as 
Bhabha cite him extensively. Secondly, his treatment of psy-science as a colo-
niser begins to further bridge the gap between the postcolonial field and the 
psy-science field. What follows is an extended quotation from PP that is sum-
marising the “asylum machine” in its processes and arrangements. In this quo-
tation there is evidence of the colonising processes and strategies that are out-
lined above. In particular, themes such as the power of description, the applica-
tion of a privileged epistemology and pedagogy, a presumption of inferiori-
ty/superiority, the requirement to internalise the privileged epistemological and 
ontological demand, a discourse of reparation and advancement (those tech-
niques and strategies that Foucault refers to as the ‘supplement of power’ (PP 
pp.161-166)), become evident: 
 
We could say that at bottom the asylum machine owes its effectiveness to a 
number of things: uninterrupted disciplinary training; the dissymmetry of power 
inherent in this; the game of need, money, and work; statutory pinning to an 
administrative identity in which one must recognize oneself through a language 
of truth. However, you can see that this is not the truth of madness speaking its 
own name but the truth of madness agreeing to first person recognition of itself 
in a particular administrative and medical reality constituted by asylum power. 
The operation of truth is accomplished when the patient has recognized himself 
in this identity. Consequently, the operation of truth takes place in the form of 
charging discourse with the task of this institution of individual reality. The truth 
is never at issue between doctor and patient. What is given at the start, estab-
lished once and for all, is the biographical reality with which the patient must 
identify if he wants to be cured. (PP p.161) 
 
Foucauldian thinkers tend to think of Foucault’s work in terms of writing a histo-
ry that tells of the ‘now’ (Veyne, 2010). In considering his history of the dis-
course of psy-science at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, I en-
tertain the prospect that it contains a contemporary message, that the postcolo-
nial themes of the twentieth century can be perceived within it.  
Foucault goes on to argue that “psychiatric power is therefore mastery, 
an endeavour to subjugate” (PP p.174).  The psychiatric interview is about the 
patient enunciating what the psychiatrist already knows. The doctor reforms the 
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patient’s narrative in psychiatric parlance and narrowly directs patient disclosure 
along the lines of clinical interest (not unlike the facilitative role of literature sug-
gested by Oyebode in the last chapter). This evokes the clinical role as one of 
deliberating reality, drawing reality out of madness and intensifying reality (“and 
to intensify power by asserting it as reality”, PP p.190), within an asymmetrical 
relation of power. While the extended quotation above refers specifically to the 
institution of the asylum, and disciplinary powers within it, in a later lecture of 
the same series, Foucault begins to draw attention to the means by which psy-
chiatric power diffuses outwards from the asylum. It does so through a growing 
preoccupation with childhood development and developmental problems char-
acterised by “a colonization of idiocy by psychiatry” (PP p.211) which leads psy-
chiatry into the domains of family, education and community provision. 
Foucault’s account of colonisation hinges on the asylum opening a psy-
chiatric space with a physical location.  It is also a metaphorical, psychosocial 
space, wherein such things as disciplinary knowledge, can be brought to bear. 
These two spaces interact in what Tremain (2006) calls “dividing practices” – 
division from normality broadly, and into subtypes of abnormality, specifically. 
The notion of insanity and that of idiocy, speak to some underlying, and funda-
mental, quality of inferiority. These are inscribed in the then, relatively new, 
measures of normality (applied generally in studying ‘deviancy’, race, madness, 
‘sub-normality’ and criminality (Pick, 1989)). Idiocy is particularly pertinent in 
that it is a developmental disorder, or permanent condition, deviating from a 
‘normal state’ which references Ngũgĩ’s ideas of superiority on the basis of a 
presumed, racialised, cognitive aptitude. This sits alongside the historical 
equivalence made in psychiatry between leucotomised Europeans and the psy-
chological capability of Africans (Meerai et al 2016) – a barbarism towards both. 
As in much institutional care of the time, and into the twentieth century, 
inmates and patients are put to work. Foucault notes that:  
 
in 1893, there were about two hundred children at Bicêtre [asylum] whom 
worked … This all went well, since, even selling the product of their work at a 
very low, wholesale cost and not market, price, they succeeded in making “a 
profit of seven thousand francs” after wages for their masters (PP p.218).  
 
This putting to work of the colonised is echoed throughout the book Disability 
Incarcerated (Ben-Moshe et al, 2014), which makes the point that the prison-
industrial complex in the U.S. and Canada particularly, is highly lucrative for the 
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private providers of incarceration. The imprisoned have come to include high 
numbers of disabled, mad, the indigenous, and people of colour. Ben-Moshe et 
al (2014) argue, as do the chapter authors throughout their book, that this is ex-
emplary of both historical colonisation, and contemporary neo-colonialism. 
The place, and potency, of disciplinary description is also clearly important to 
both the treatment and containment of idiocy and the status of psychiatric pow-
er. Within the legislation of the time, in France, on-going care was predicated on 
presumed need, the ability of the family to pay for care, and also whether the 
‘patient to be’ was thought to be dangerous. What follows is the common prac-
tice of doctors falsifying reports of dangerousness in an effort to gain care for 
the patient, and for the institution to be paid by the local authority. As Foucault 
puts it, “the notion of danger becomes necessary in order to transform an act of 
assistance into a phenomena of protection […] danger is the third element ena-
bling the procedure of confinement” (PP p.220). Whether well-intended or oth-
erwise, the description of the person in terms of inferiority first, then the inscrib-
ing of their needs in terms of threat towards the family, become the means by 
which medicine and local authorities can remove people to ‘care’. Later, this be-
comes an anthropological fable, transforming retrospectively, accounts that lo-
cate many kinds of social deviancy in a formerly un-described state of ‘imbecili-
ty’, thus allowing “the reconstitution of the broad category of all those who may 
represent a danger to society” (PP p.220). Prostitutes, drunks, robbers and rap-
ists were presumed to be untreated, and free, idiots. In a later lecture, Foucault 
returns to this theme and argues that psychiatry and crime become closely affil-
iated because of the power that comes with being a profession involved in the 
treatment and containment of danger (PP p.250).29 This revision of the notion of 
the deviant career, and the subsequent rationale it gives to intervention, is re-
markably close to the ways in which colonisers described the broad state of in-
feriority of a colonised population. Deviancy and dangerousness in a population 
are ways of rethinking resistance, and encouraged local in-fighting, and aided in 
                                                          
29
 In Foucault, M. (Ed.) (1978) I, Pierre Rivière, having slaughtered my mother, my sister and my 
brother - : a case of parricide in the 19th century. Foucault et al show the case of Pierre Rivière, 
who is convicted of murder, and whose case shows an early example of the growing relation-
ship between law and medicine in such things as the development of what we would call the 
expert witness and the assessment of sanity (or not) as a component of being fit to stand trial. 
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bringing would be ‘traitors’ to justice (Fanon describes such circumstances in 
French occupied Algiers). 
In the course notes that accompany the lecture series, Foucault summa-
rises the power relation between psychiatry and madness. For me, the sum-
mary outline resembles the civilising mission in colonisation. Foucault writes 
that:  
 
what these power relations involved first and foremost was the absolute right of 
nonmadness over madness. A right translated into terms of expertise being 
brought to bear on ignorance, of good sense […] correcting errors […] and of 
normality being imposed on disorder and deviation (PP p.345).   
 
In addition, the in-country workings of psy-science and the colonising behaviour 
abroad have a parallel relationship, evident in the course context notes by 
Jacque Lagrange, in the same volume. It goes as follows: 
 
The analysis of power of the psychiatric apparatus is structured around three 
axes: that of power, insofar as the psychiatrist is established as a subject acting 
on others [on behalf of the state as self-appointed civiliser]; the axis of truth, in-
sofar as the insane individual is constituted as an object of knowledge [the mad 
person/colonised becomes something to be known and put to a purpose]; and 
the axis of subjectivation, since the subject has to make the norms imposed on 
him his own [epistemic violence; the systems of education, bureaucracy etc. 
that underwrite local knowledge and replace it within a hierarchical framework] 
(Lagrange, 2008, p.361). 
 
2.7 Conclusion. 
 
Through my review of some of the key thinkers of postcolonial scholar-
ship, I have drawn out a number of qualities and characteristics that typify their 
thinking on the colonial process, which I consider as having rigour, and thus 
value, in supporting the use of a postcolonial lens. As I stated in my introduc-
tion, concerns of psycho-colonisation are best articulated within a postcolonial 
frame of reference, and the writers reviewed in this chapter are authorities on 
colonisation from the side of being colonised. This does not mean that colonisa-
tion becomes amenable to a straightforward assessment, but rather that the 
state of colonisation comes into view. Neither is it the case that all examples of 
marginality, power imbalance or prejudice become examples of colonisation. 
However, there may well be some connection if it is true that racism and patri-
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archy are linked (Ward 1988), as are homophobia and misogyny (Sinfield, 
1994). 
  Below, I offer nine themes that emerge from my reading of the texts in 
this chapter. I suggest that these themes have a simultaneity – that is, all of the 
characteristics or themes outlined below are present to a greater or lesser de-
gree for most of the time during colonisation. Taken together, some assessment 
can be made of coloniality, and I suggest, by extension psycho-colonisation. 
 
1. The civilising mission. Here, the coloniser believes that they offer (not 
impose upon) the colonised, improvement justified through a presumed 
superiority and ensured through a certain power differential. 
2. Superiority/inferiority dynamic.  The coloniser construes a degree of infe-
riority on the part of the colonised involving a dichotomy. This is often in 
all senses — psychological, moral, social, cultural, biological (including 
genetic), and so colonial interventions are made in these areas. The di-
chotomy is one of superior/inferior. Local thinking is underwritten, with 
the replacement being that of the imposed, superior thinking of the colo-
niser. This interacts with point 1 as a concurrent rationale for invasion. 
3. Empowered description. The coloniser devises methods of classification 
and measurement that confirm the necessity of points 1 and 2 above. 
The totality of such assessment, naming and description, is also to pro-
gress the civilising mission. However, this is an issue of degree, because 
full civilisation is unobtainable through the inferiority/superiority dynamic. 
Empowered description mobilises ‘scientism’30 to elevate what is other-
wise a socio-political activity. As Foucault suggests, such totalising disci-
plinary activity results in subjectivization (“thingification”), with the pur-
pose of achieving governmentality (perhaps through instilling rather than 
activating an inferiority complex), which in turn supports the achievement 
of points 4 through 7. 
4. Pyramidal structure. The socio-political structure is one that retains the 
coloniser at the apex with gradations of proximity to the white, coloniser 
ideal as one descends the pyramid. Symbolically, this also represents 
                                                          
30
 Karl Popper in his book The Poverty of Historicism (1957:2002) suggests that scientism is a 
device within social science discourses that aims to elevate the status of the science being un-
dertaken while never actually managing to do so. Popper’s thesis is that a science akin to that 
of physical sciences is unobtainable to social sciences. 
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the flow of, and accrual of, wealth, upwards, but also shows how the 
wide base is dominated by the narrow top. Positioning in the pyramid 
suppresses dissent because few are prepared to sacrifice their position 
to help those below or alongside. 
5. Cultural subjugation. The coloniser, having asserted superiority in all ar-
eas, undertakes to organise the colonised along the lines most amenable 
to local control, and also to reflect back their superiority. Local culture is 
targeted for erasure with the coloniser’s culture taking its place. This, in 
effect, rewrites history with a ‘zero point’ being at the moment of mass re-
education. There is thus, no true culture before the coloniser, and only 
what the coloniser deems relevant, enters the socio-cultural frame as cul-
ture. 
6. The advancement paradox. Despite the best efforts of the coloniser to 
civilise and educate the native colonised, these efforts are thwarted. 
While this is a result of points 2, 3 and 4 (presumed superiority, diagnosis 
of inherent lack, reduced opportunity within a pyramid), it is couched in 
terms of points 2, 3 and 5, that is, the inherent poverty of potential in the 
colonised. No reference is made, therefore, to the lack of advancement, 
or partial adoption of the colonial form, being a form of resistance to col-
onisation, as this would begin to call into question the substantiality of the 
pyramid. 
7. Colonial concessions. Following resistance and activism, some attempt 
is made to appease the colonised wish for recognition. Out of initial at-
tempts to deny agency to the colonised, comes the possibility of negotia-
tion, but only within the terms set by the coloniser, such as a certain form 
of representation. A number of things result; the formation of an intellec-
tual class from the growing middle class of the colony that is educated in 
the metropolitan centre; the appearance of a move towards political rep-
resentation without a commensurate move to suffrage; and the fetishiza-
tion of the colonised for instance, culturally, intellectually and sexually. 
The illusion of concession means diaspora begins to look more like cul-
tural exchange than the result of moving labour. 
8. The power of arrest. The ‘gift’ of having a voice, and of beginning to take 
a greater role in self-determination, is not to be confused with any real 
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repositioning regarding all the points raised above. The colonised are 
expected to be thankful for concessions made, and the inferiority now in-
cludes infantilization by a benevolent guardian. Concessions are at the 
gift of the coloniser, and throughout the negotiation there remains a pow-
er of arrest. That is, that there is a fine line between acceptable forms of 
dissent and activism. Transgressing the rule of law (the law imposed 
from the metropolitan centre) permits aid to be withdrawn, sanctions to 
be imposed, freedom to be limited and the rule of law to be suspended in 
favour of suppression. 
9. Colonial Gain. The coloniser can be seen to make material (wealth, re-
sources, military advantage) and symbolic gains (improved social stand-
ing, philanthropy). Colonisers gather prestige and wealth, which travels 
up the pyramid. The ‘little coloniser’ makes gains also, as does the neo-
colonial that remains affiliated to the former ruler, but more importantly 
they continue ‘passing’ and so remain safe, but alienated, within the co-
lonial gaze. 
 
In addition, Bhabha (1994:2004: 100-101) considers what he terms the “min-
imum conditions and specifications of such a [colonising] discourse”. He sug-
gests that there is a “recognition and disavowal of racial/cultural/historical differ-
ences” as a strategy to create ‘subject peoples’ through the use of such things 
as surveillance. “It seeks authorization for its strategies by the production of 
knowledges that are stereotypical but antithetically evaluated”. That colonial 
discourse constructs the idea of a population of “degenerates” on the basis of 
“racial origin” that justifies “conquest” and “systems of administration and in-
struction”. As such the colonised become “a social reality which is at once an 
‘other’ and yet entirely knowable and visible”. “It employs a system of represen-
tation, a regime of truth, that is structurally similar to realism” (ibid) and denies 
the various subject positions and intersectionalities of the colonised, rather deal-
ing in broad generalities, similar to the process Said (1978:2003) calls ‘oriental-
ism’. Clearly, there is certainly an intertextual relationship within the postcolonial 
field, and there is a striking resemblance between texts about what characteris-
es the colonial process.  
A number of the thinkers reviewed here have understood first-hand the re-
sults of colonisation. The imposition of a system of thought and being, so totalis-
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ing is traumatic, alongside the actual violence of the colonial process. As Hall 
(1989) suggests, the meanings advanced through language operate in concert 
with the material world towards a whole experience, and so in this regard colo-
nisation has a material, epistemic and ontological impact.  Should the psy-
sciences be operating colonially, and I think that they do, there remains the 
possibility that a position of resistance is one that avoids and refuses the terms 
of psy-science. It may be posited that where colonisation is concerned, and de-
spite the idea that psy-science can be remoulded to the decolonised usage, or 
that psychoanalysis offers a route to subversion, there is no black psy-science. 
It arrived with the coloniser, was imposed by the coloniser and variably was 
adopted by the colonised (see Pols, 2006 for how this happened in Indonesia). 
This will be a premise developed in later sections when considering how Morri-
son’s novels can be seen as postcolonial cultural products, a historical refer-
ence to the colonial experience without recourse to white, colonial subject posi-
tions (like a Foucauldian history that tells the past as a telling of the conditions 
of the now), that writes into existence an alterity in experience of black women 
together, and of madness without psy-science. As such, this offers the possibil-
ity of a psychological alterity, or madness, again without recourse to what may 
be a colonising psy-science. Indeed, the mad did not ask for psy-science, but it 
has been imposed upon them. 
The next two chapters examine literary sources that exemplify different posi-
tions in their treatment of madness that subsequently reveal their orientations in 
psycho-colonialism. In chapter 3 the work of Sebastian Faulks is analysed as an 
example of writing that is psycho-colonising. It is so in two ways. Firstly, his 
novels present an orthodox history of psychiatry within the imperial period, with-
out problematising either. Rather, I go as far as suggesting that Faulks is cele-
brating the early days of modern psychiatry and ‘blind’ to the problems of the 
Imperial backdrop. Secondly, I locate his novels in a contemporary context, 
which refers to how his novels are understood to provide authoritative fictional 
accounts of psychiatry socio-culturally for modern readers. This is one way in 
which psychiatrizing accounts of madness find their ways, through cultural diffu-
sion, into the world of readers. Such writing constitutes madness as mental ill-
ness, and psychiatry as the preferred, rational response to it. Clearly, this sits 
alongside other cultural messages about madness and medicine. In chapter 4 
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though, I turn to Toni Morrison who, assessed against my nine themes above, 
avoids psycho-colonisation specifically, while resisting colonisation broadly. 
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CHAPTER 3: PSYCHO-COLONISATION AND FAULKS’ HUMAN TRACES 
(2005) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 4 shows how Toni Morrison writes about madness and distress 
without recourse to psycho-colonising psy-science perspectives, and the 
themes arising out of the postcolonial literatures reviewed in the last chapter are 
evident in her work. She writes about themes of colonisation and racism from 
within the discourse of resistance, and from within the experience of being colo-
nised. Morrison exposes colonising tendencies, their effects, and the ways in 
which they are resisted or subverted. Her writing presents both a story of colo-
nisation (through what happens to characters, the way the story progresses), 
and also a means in itself to resistance (the placement of her work socio-
culturally within postcolonial literatures).  In this chapter, I will show the work of 
Sebastian Faulks as being the near opposite where madness is concerned. 
Themes of colonisation are evident at the level of characterisation and the way 
in which his novels are placed within a popular discourse on madness. Human 
Traces (2005) draws heavily upon, and locates itself so closely to, orthodox his-
tories of psy-science, and Faulks’ is unquestioning of the imperial or patriarchal 
contexts. This is noteworthy within a literary context in which many contempo-
rary, historical, novels aim to do the opposite. That is, contemporary historical 
novels often question the stability, centrality and neutrality of previous canonical 
texts and received histories through ‘re-visioning’ and ‘writing back’ 
(Widdowson, 2006). Human Traces fails to do what Sanders (2016) suggests, 
of adaptions and ‘appropriation studies’: it does not engage in “an important act 
of questioning that moves us well beyond an act of simple imitation” (p. 207).  
This chapter will take Faulks’ Human Traces as an exemplar of psycho-
colonisation, and one that is evidently located within traditional psy-science dis-
course on madness. The novel presents an orthodox history of psychiatry, and 
by extension, therefore, an orthodox view of madness. This is particularly evi-
dent when passages and themes from Human Traces are set alongside those 
of traditional psy-histories. The two texts I draw on for comparison are Shorter’s 
 
 
99 
 
A History of Psychiatry (1997)31 (which Faulks cites as a source), and Lieber-
man’s Shrinks: The Untold History of Psychiatry (2015). By drawing on Lieber-
man (2015), a later text, I show how Faulks was not simply following Shorter’s 
lead, but repeating themes well established in the psy-science domain.  
Faulks is presenting a fictional, but extensively researched, history of 
psychiatry in the latter part of the nineteenth century, and the first few years of 
the twentieth. In his postscript for Human Traces he writes “I do not think novels 
should contain bibliographies, because making lists of books at the end of a 
work of fiction is usually an attempt to shore up a flimsy text” (HT p.789). He 
goes on to suggest that “in this instance, because I have had to draw on expert 
opinion to an unusual extent, I must make an exception” (ibid). Wessely’s 
(2005) review in The Lancet is mostly sympathetic, suggesting that Faulks is 
“more than a little in love with the subject and its practitioners”(p.1765) . Wes-
sely goes on to note that Faulks has thoroughly “done his homework”, is eru-
dite, and spares the reader little, not even the more uncomfortable truths of psy-
history. In fact, Wessely’s only criticisms are about whether Faulks has taken 
later ideas and moved them earlier, and, more significantly here, that his “non-
fictional history of psychiatry” (Wessely, 2005, p.1766) is too non-fictional. Wal-
den (2005) is similarly impressed, and describes the novel as “hyper-realist” 
(p.35). Clarke (2008), a mental health nurse and academic, suggests that 
Faulks: 
 
lures you into a delusion of straightforwardness by means of the clarity of his 
prose. But it is a (worthwhile) effort because it interiorizes psychiatric ideas 
within history where they acquire a timbre not found in technical writing. Ironi-
cally, the importance of psychiatry to human encounters becomes an unassail-
able assertion in this impressive fiction (Clarke, 2008, p. 83)  
                                                          
31
 Shorter positions himself in no uncertain terms: “It [his book] is a social history that identifies 
distinctive national contributions” which does not step outside of Europe and the US. He goes 
on to say that “Above all, I have tried to rescue the history of psychiatry from the sectarians who 
have made the subject a sandbox for their ideologies. To an extent unimaginable for other are-
as of the history of medicine, zealot-researchers have seized the history of psychiatry to illus-
trate how their pet bugaboos - be they capitalism, patriarchy, or psychiatry itself – converted 
protest into illness…” He adds that: “Although these trendy notions have attained great currency 
among intellectuals, they are incorrect, in that they do not correspond to what actually hap-
pened”. In fact mental illness, “has a reality independent of conventions of gender and class, 
and this reality can be mapped, understood and treated” so that “[T]he story I want to tell you is 
straightforward” (p.viii). Furthermore, Shooter’s work travels authoritatively: in Smith’s (2016) 
modestly critical history of social psychiatry in the US he cites Shorter to suggest that “psycho-
surgery reached its zenith in this period, as did other heroic biomedical treatments, such as 
Electroconvulsive Therapy and insulin shock treatment” (p.3, my emphasis). The use of ‘heroic’ 
tropes will be returned to shortly. 
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As with Morrison, Faulks is laying claim to the notion that fiction can rep-
resent truths. However, he is drawing on the status of expert opinion, and histo-
ries conducive to psychiatry.  Hers arise from memory, oral histories and schol-
arship that have been otherwise unwritten, or even placed under erasure, from 
the people who lived the experience of racism, colonisation, trauma and mad-
ness directly. Human Traces has a place, therefore, in how such a history 
emerges in contemporary discourse around madness and mental health, in that 
the history of European psy-science is one that is written to construct psy-
science in a certain way. A Foucauldian view would note this as being the pow-
er/knowledge relation that forms an expert knowledge-base on the one hand, 
which becomes the basis of disciplinary power on the other. In reciprocity, the 
exercise of disciplinary power invokes disciplinary knowledge, and sustains the 
means by which such knowledge is formed and circulated. Both Elden (2016), 
with reference to Foucault’s work, and McClintock (1995) in the postcolonial 
field, present how the close links between race, sexuality and madness, both in 
psychiatry (the former), and in domestic imperialism (the latter), were made. 
Anne McClintock, an Associate Professor at Columbia University, has worked at 
the intersection of feminist, post-colonial, socialist and psycho-analytic theory to 
provide nuanced histories, such Imperial Leather, the one I make use of here. 
Such links are on the basis of a presumed inferiority of women, the mad, chil-
dren, the ‘non-white’, ‘deviant’, and criminal, in a way that connects each to 
normality hierarchically and to theories of degeneration (Pichot, 2009). This is 
consistent with the themes that emerged in the last chapter.  Despite there be-
ing critical accounts available to Faulks as he was writing Human Traces, these 
are not engaged with, and not evident in the novel. He presents the mad as 
docile, intrinsically tragic, and in need of humane control. However, conversely, 
the doctors are pioneers, adventurers and heroes. The work of Morrison and 
Faulks can be considered alongside each other, therefore, because of the ways 
they engage with madness, both outside of, and within, the psycho-colonising 
frame.  Each exemplifies something different about the colonising. 
Despite some characters taking a trip to Africa to discover the ‘origins of 
man’ and madness32, little reference is made to the imperial context, and Faulks 
                                                          
32
 I look in some detail later at the trips that characters take to East Africa and Pasadena. In a 
curious parallel Faulks and his wife made the same journey referred to with a sense of the un-
 
 
101 
 
rarely problematizes the practices of medicine, and the emerging modern psy-
science. He seems to be offering a history that notes inhumane practices, but 
introduces a separation between that and a psychiatry that is more properly 
practiced. Faulks, Shorter and Lieberman are prone to a strong teleological ten-
dency, telling of a sometimes conflicted, but nonetheless, continual advance-
ment of early psychiatry and alienism, into a fully-fledged medical science. 
MacDonald (1980) suggests otherwise, that: “[H]istorians of psychiatry depict 
the period [early modern English] in heroic terms, celebrating the achievements 
of a small band of physicians and scientists who led the people of Europe out of 
the darkness of superstition” (p.60). He goes on to suggest that this is not the 
case, and the passage to modern psychiatry was one of “mazy wanderings” 
(ibid).  
For Shorter and Lieberman (and the male protagonists of Human Trac-
es), psychiatry becomes the prime medical discipline. All three writers view psy-
chiatric practice as one that had clear delineations between torture, quackery 
and genuine therapeutics. Psychiatry and psy-science are thought to reveal 
something about the very nature of being human – recalling tropes of essential-
ist and Universalist claims. In the novel, such outlooks build on the presentation 
of mad people as having little inherent worth, other than what their bodies can 
be made to show about madness.  Almost all the themes arising out of my re-
view of postcolonial scholars in the last chapter are evident in Faulks’ presenta-
tion of psychiatry, and by extension, in the orthodox histories alongside which it 
sits. While there is some doubt to be had in equating the author with the charac-
ters or indeed the narrator in a novel, in Human Traces, the author is omnisci-
ent, where present, and is always congruent with the character positions. 
Faulks does consult the authoritative psychiatric sources aligned with medicine, 
he does make his own trip to Africa to repeat the journey that Thomas Midwinter 
takes, and he does present himself as embedded in the British establishment33. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
known, when he writes about going on the “remotest, trackless parts of Masai country, where 
the Land Rover broke down in the dark” (HT p.792); his own heart of darkness in trying to find 
Echo Mountain. 
33
 The author’s bio for a novel is usually penned by the author. For Faulks’ latest novel Where 
My Heart Used to Beat (2016) the bio says he “comes from a family of lawyers. His father was a 
judge and his brother, Edward, is a barrister who became a minster in the Ministry of Justice 
under the coalition” (no page number) – none of the women in the family are mentioned. He 
read English at “Emmanuel College, Cambridge”; he worked in journalism, “is a member of the 
Authors XI cricket team and the Boffins CC, and plays tennis in the West Middlesex league for 
his local club, Campden Hill”. Faulks has also been a member of the Government Advisory 
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These concerns need contextualising further within my study. I am arguing that 
novels (and other cultural products) say something about the nature and con-
tent of discourse in an area such as psy-science, and they also construct mean-
ings socio-culturally. Furthermore, that in the process of colonisation, literatures 
are mobilised to propagate the coloniser’s ways, while underwriting those that 
are considered inferior and subordinate; an epistemic violence. In this way, lit-
erature and cultural production are political and cultural strategies that support 
colonisation (and conversely, resistance too). For instance, Foucault’s History of 
Madness (2006), does that by drawing on tropes of madness within Shake-
speare’s plays, the story of Don Quixote and the art of Brueghel and Goya, to 
illustrate his broadly anti-psychiatry argument. Despite what I would consider a 
somewhat Whiggish account of psy-science history, whenever Jeffery Lieber-
man wants to explain the social and cultural presence of psy and madness, he 
turns to films and novels. That said, both Morrison’s and Faulks’ novels do not 
just represent their respective histories, but they are part of the documentary 
building of those histories in the present. Texts do not just have a past; they 
have a future, which they have a role in forming (Morretti, 2005).  
Both Morrison and Faulks are successful writers, and both are regarded 
as having something of worth to say on their respective themes (both within the 
popular fiction arena, and for Morrison the critical literature that responds to her 
novels). For Human Traces, the effect, therefore, is one of a popular novel that 
presents an unproblematic, and I argue, a psycho-colonising view of madness. 
Additionally, it is one that makes a claim to authenticity within the fiction, and so 
it is presenting a plausible history of psy-science to readers. Human Traces de-
scribes the conditions by which contemporary psy-science can be seen as a 
noble medical venture, evoking a sense of continuity of practice and thinking. 
While the periodization of the novel may be open to question, what emerges is 
a growing split between biomedical and psychological explanations of madness. 
The former are informed by the growing discipline of neurology and evolutionary 
theories, and the latter by the work of Freud, and the growing discipline of sci-
entifically informed psychology. This is very much the time of the great male Eu-
                                                                                                                                                                          
Group and read from his novel Birdsong in Westminster Abbey on the centenary of the outbreak 
of the war” (ibid). The significance of this is not so much what Faulks has done, or the facts of 
his life, but the choices he has made in presenting a pen-picture of himself to the reader. In 
Wessely’s (2005) book review, the same class sensibility is evident: “I recently undertook a 
small study on literary depictions of psychiatry. In other words, in other words, I asked my 
friends at a dinner party to name the best novel about psychiatry.” (p.1765). 
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ropean polymath, here the psychologist, medical doctor and anthropologist.  As 
Shephard (2014) puts it “[i]n fact, race was science; in the biological sciences, 
the question of race defined the agenda – along with evolution” (p.45). 
Shephard (2014) also describes how ideas of race were applied to the “Irish 
Race” (p.19), an indication of psycho-colonialism in the Global North.  
McClintock (1995) extends this relation across sexuality, race (and likewise, 
popular images of Irish peasants and African slaves used exaggerated features 
to show their alikeness), gender, class and madness. But also, it is a history 
that is presented now, and so its effect is a contemporary one. In this way, Hu-
man Traces does not just show a colonising tendency within the history of psy-
science, it is a contemporary novel that perpetuates the colonising tendency. 
Faulks asserts the mission of psy-science as a civilising one, typified by self-
sacrifice on the part of the great men who pioneer it, and it is a discipline that is 
imposed for the good of the mad. Faulks suggests that it extends into our 
knowledge of what it means to be human, and that the means of the curative, 
civilising mission, are therefore beyond reproach, and even to be admired. 
 
3.2 Faulks, S. Human Traces (HT) (2005) 
 
After giving a brief synopsis I will undertake a close reading of Human 
Traces alongside other relevant texts, noting intertextual relationships, key 
themes and exemplifying moments. In particular I am reading for indications of 
psycho-colonialism both in the narrative and in the authorial presence. As men-
tioned in chapter 1 (section 1.8.3), Foucault’s notion of discourse is useful in my 
reading of Human Traces. By extension, situating this realist novel as a history 
of psy-science in the present, and drawing on Derrida’s work, evokes my earlier 
phrase, deconstructive non-modernity.  I will arrive at some of the key themes of 
colonisation in the novel, before looking at other areas, such as, the way in 
which women, and the mad, are presented. Women feature in the novel exten-
sively as a mad population, which speaks to the history of psychology and psy-
chiatry as not just colonising of madness, but of gender, too.  Many of the things 
denied to the colonised were also denied to women (Donaldson, 1992), and 
women feature as having their own forms of madness, intimately tied to notions 
of gender. As McClintock (1995) argues, imperialism and colonisation cannot be 
considered on the basis of race alone. Colonisation intersects with gender, sex-
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uality and class, as well as with the socially marginal, primitive, criminal and 
mad. 
The novel opens with Jacques Rebière, a boy growing up in rural, 
coastal France. Although his family is humble in some respects, they own land 
and the farm property they live on. Jacques is being educated by a local Curé 
who sees his potential. Jacques has a mad brother, Olivier, who is kept in the 
barn, partly due to his unpredictable behaviour, and in part due to the shame his 
presence brings within the family. It is Jacques’ concern for his brother that 
drives him to study medicine, and in particular, to seek a cure for insanity. In his 
madness, Olivier is preoccupied with astral rays from around the universe that 
control people. Jacques is presented with a conflict in his interest in the classifi-
cation of madness, that is, his proximity to Olivier brings the human back into an 
otherwise dehumanising process. It follows that “Every time he saw him in the 
asylum, Jacques had the same feeling: this was a real person, a man with a 
name, not, like the others, a patient, a mere example of an illness” (HT p.321)34. 
The extent of Olivier’s abjection is revealed in Jacques’ wish; “I want to bring my 
brother back” (HT p.23), which signifies the incommensurability of madness to 
the real and knowable person that Olivier truly is. Human Traces jumps forward 
to Jacques’ early twenties and his first meeting with Thomas Midwinter, and his 
sister Sonia. Thomas is also fascinated by madness and wishes to study medi-
cine and psychiatry. Jacques and Thomas have a strong connection and this is 
suggested to be romantic. They go for a walk on the beach after they meet for 
the first time and “Thomas wondered what he would have to do to elicit another 
of those smiles” (HT p.69). Jacques runs off to return with a picnic, and on his 
return says “I sense for the first time in my life I have found someone who can 
understand it. I only met you this evening, of course, but I know it … Here.” (HT 
p.71). Later, when Thomas explains their connection to Sonia, he says “But 
Jacques – Jacques, I feel as though I’ve been waiting all my life to meet him” 
(HT p.79), and Sonia remarks “My dear Thomas, you sound as if you are in 
love” (HT p.80). Jacques, however, is becoming fond of Sonia, and says under 
                                                          
34
 And it is Olivier that also seems to reference Pierre Rivierre, written about by Foucault et al 
(1978). In an incident with Tante Mathilde (Jacques’ grandmother), Olivier wrecks Jacques’ 
room and is sawing at his arm with a saw blade. Mathilde is convinced he means harm to her 
(HT p.28-35) and has him manacled. At the point of presumed danger, the mad were induced 
both into psychiatry, and into law, a relationship Foucault et al show is exemplified in the case of 
Rivierre. Thus, dangerousness and madness become inextricably linked. 
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his breath that he loves her (HT p.85), which Thomas hears, but there is an 
ambiguity in who that remark was intended for. Much later, Thomas “remem-
bered holding Jacques in his arms on the Deauville shore” (HT p.105). This is 
not developed within the novel and I am left wondering the relevance; there ap-
pears no on-going tension other than that which presents itself professionally, 
later in the novel.  
Both Thomas and Jacques complete their psychiatric training, and work 
in the field before securing finance to build their own asylum. Jacques marries 
Sonia, and Thomas becomes romantically involved with a female, ex-patient. 
Olivier comes to live at their mountain top asylum only to kill himself. Both male 
protagonists pursue their own theoretical orientations, with Thomas becoming 
increasingly bio-psychiatric and interested in evolutionary possibilities for ex-
plaining madness. Jacques develops as a proto-Freudian who considers 
dreams and trauma to be the root of psychiatric pathogenesis. This is sufficient 
synopsis to now begin considering some specific ways in which the novel 
demonstrates psycho-colonisation. 
 
3.3 Psycho-colonisation in Human Traces 
  
While psycho-colonisation can be discerned in Human Traces in the 
broad consideration given so far, it is in the close reading of the novel that this 
is most evident. The authoritative tone that presents male Europeans as lead-
ers, captains and pioneers over inferior others and the privileges that this brings 
throughout are clearly evident. Whether it’s the exploration of a colonised ‘na-
tion’, or the dismemberment of a corpse, the tropes of Imperialism are invoked.  
It is striking that, almost without exception, the male psychiatrists are presented 
as entirely beneficent. The exception is Charcot, the prominent French psychia-
trist, famous for teaching Freud, who later in his career had his theories discred-
ited (although he can be forgiven because “all pioneers faced setbacks on un-
charted roads”, HT p.454). Charcot is a key figure in psy-history, but his contri-
bution is often viewed in mixed terms. Despite his work being a precursor to 
psychoanalysis, some psy-histories see him as a quack. For Shorter and 
Lieberman, psychoanalysis is seen as an interruption of bio-psychiatric ad-
vancement, in favour of analytic storytelling. Jacques’ own mission emerges:  
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I have this idea that we somehow try to understand the meeting point between 
thought and flesh. That is what the next great aim and discovery of medical sci-
ence will be […] a medicine that would understand and cure those whose sick-
ness is in the mind and which could determine its causes …That is something I 
dream about (HT p.72).  
 
There is an irony that the hope for biological cures for mental illness is found in 
dreams, and later psychological interpretations of dreams are discredited. In 
their conversation, Thomas and Jacques typify pre-psychiatric asylum practice 
as being akin to prisons, and in doing so, set the break that they, and their con-
temporaries, make with inhumane practice. In this spirit, they note: “a large oil 
painting of Pinel striking the chains from the lunatics of the Saltpêtrière” (HT 
p.251). 
The connection between psy-science and colonisation is foreshadowed 
in Thomas’ home life. The family Dalmatians are called Elektra35 and Gordon 
(HTp.189); the former, a reference to the Greek myth, which later gave name to 
a psychological complex. The latter is possibly a reference to Charles Gordon 
(1833-85) who suppressed the Taiping Rebellion in China, became Governor of 
Sudan, and was killed in Khartoum. Furthermore, Thomas and Jacques are 
born in 1859, the year that Darwin’s The Origin of Species was published. 
After Thomas and Jacques begin to work together, both the sense of 
mission, and that of legacy, begins to emerge. They agree on their joint, life’s 
project, and anticipate success, that the “new diseases that could be named af-
ter them – Midwinter’s Disease, Rebière Syndrome; a great teaching hospital 
that would carry on their methods after their death” (HT p.74). In a way reminis-
cent of Said’s idea of the orientalised, references begin to appear, in which their 
calling resembles a voyage and exploration in exotic places.  As a colonisation 
within the Global North, McClintock (1995) sees imperialism in the way in which 
“social explorers […] middle- and upper-middle-class men ventured into the ter-
ra incognita of Britain’s working-class areas, striking the pose of explorers em-
barking on voyages into unknown lands.” (p.120). Such exploration was 
                                                          
35
 There is a further reference to the Thomas Midwinter’s education and background in Ancient 
Greek thinking. Sonia describes her upbringing: “The pattern of a candle shadows on the wall, 
the fiery little boy who needs your arm around him to make him sleep. Nothing happens to make 
you happy. There are no prizes or thunderbolts or adventures. Just the shadow of the candle on 
the wall” (HT p.88). This is a reference to Platonic thinking that Foucault argues influences early 
conceptions of madness, that is, the means by which the senses can fool reason, and subse-
quently lead a person to folly. 
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“[d]rawing on popular images of imperial travel, [and] these urban explorers re-
turned from their urban jaunts with a primitive accumulation of “facts” and “sta-
tistics” about the “races” living in their midst.” (ibid).  Thomas invokes a form of 
universality that connects him with Jacques, via the metaphor of (exotic) land-
scape and exploratory travel: 
 
He [Jacques] is just like me, but completely different at the same time. He has 
had all the same thoughts yet they have come from a different life, a different 
world. It’s like two men bumping into each other in the jungle when one started 
in Iceland and one in China – and finding they are reading the same book. He 
has a marvellous mind, he’s so lucid […] (HT p.79)  
 
By universality, I mean that one of the early indicators of the worth of their work 
is in empiricism, suggested in how their ideas are arrived at from different lives, 
in different places, but at the same time. That is, to arrive at the same conclu-
sions through separate observation. The backdrop of madness is distantly 
equated with navigation, a meeting, and then their mutual, narcissistic recogni-
tion within a jungle setting. Sonia humorously chides Thomas for noting 
Jacques’ greatness, which narcissistically refers to his own (although it is Sonia 
who entreats him to become trilingual and “go where the new discoveries are 
being made” HT p.64). 
A parallel emerges between Faulks and Thomas. Thomas had wanted to 
study literature for his degree, to which his father objected. Thomas’ love of lit-
erature, and linguistic skill, is the basis upon which he starts to explore mad-
ness. Thomas thinks “We will need to find some better words for “mind”, and 
Jacques responds “Very well. You can be the master of words”. (HT p.75). It 
was noted in the last chapter how to be a master of words is significant to world 
view and conceptions – the postcolonial writers note dominance in language as 
key to colonisation. Like Thomas, Faulks is also a literary writer, and former 
English student, seeking out the ‘truth’ of madness through literature. Likewise, 
the character Hendricks in Faulks’ Where My Heart Used to Beat (2016) is a 
psychiatrist who studied the classics; Mike Engleby, the protagonist and narra-
tor in Engleby (2008), turns out to have a personality disorder and possibly au-
tism, and is also studying English. And, like the more medical of the medical 
humanities scholars, doctors know the worth of the literary canon. Additionally, 
Engleby, when thinking about West Germany being occupied by the Allies, con-
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siders that it “must have been humiliating because it wasn’t as though they were 
savages in far-off islands who knew no better” (Faulks, 2008,p.19). Faulks 
makes a plea for the importance of literature in understanding the nature of hu-
manity and madness, before deferring to medicine. 
Thomas, at age sixteen, was living in the family house near Lincoln, and 
is the youngest son in a family of grain merchants. At this point, Sonia Midwinter 
(18) is being married off to Richard Prendergast — a marriage that ends after a 
few years by divorce. Thomas is introduced as having a gaze that “remain[s] 
fixed on a single person as though he was making an examination, dispassion-
ate and not necessarily kind” (HT p.48). His literary tastes include Shakespeare, 
who “tells you things that he’s discovered, like a great inventor” (HT p.49), sug-
gestive of a long line of insightful, English figures, who can discern what it 
means to be human. Thomas’ interest in medical terminology is established lat-
er (HT p56), and his consideration of medicine is that of the polymath and inter-
disciplinarian – to “become a doctor of medicine. Why not bring the labourer, 
science, to do the mule’s work in his greater project? Keats, after all, had been 
apprenticed to an apothecary and qualified as a surgeon.”(HT p.61). Thus, the 
necessary constituents of what makes Thomas a psychiatric explorer and inno-
vator are laid out, in the manner associated with the natural constitutions of the 
‘great men’ of the time.  
Again, there is this parallel with Faulks himself, who is exploring the early 
psychiatrists through a literary medium. This is of significance to the process of 
colonisation, in the way that Said suggests in the following quotation: 
 
I am not trying to say that the novel – or the culture in the broad sense – 
‘caused’ imperialism, but that the novel, as a cultural artefact of a bourgeois so-
ciety, and imperialism are unthinkable without each other. Of all the literary 
forms, the novel is the most recent, its emergence the most datable, its occur-
rence the most Western, its normative pattern of social authority the most struc-
tured: imperialism and the novel fortified each other to such a degree that it is 
impossible, I would argue, to read one without in some way dealing with the 
other. (Said, 1994, p.86) 
 
Said is discussing Conrad’s Heart of Darkness as a key European text that con-
structs Africa in the minds of Europeans. I have argued above, that Human 
Traces constructs madness and psy-science in a similar way. The period of 
Human Traces is intertextually connected with the timing of Conrad’s own trav-
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els that influence his novel, Heart of Darkness (1899). Conrad (born in 1857), 
and his novel, are real contemporaries of the fictional Jacques and Thomas. In-
deed, later in the novel, Thomas goes on his own mission into Africa to discover 
the origins of madness in the origins of man, and in both novels they (Thomas 
and Marlow) find their respective source of madness, and, en route, a nameless 
native, in service to the white traveller, dies.  
Human Traces jumps forward to when Thomas, having become Dr Mid-
winter, is taking a position at the “county lunatic asylum” as assistant medical 
officer and who is reading “A Manual of Psychological Medicine by Bucknill and 
Tuke” (HT p.91). It is from this point that the earlier foreshadowing of the psy-
mission is made explicit. Dr Faverill is the medical officer in charge of the asy-
lum, and Matilda is his help. Thomas thinks that “If the porter was not a former 
lunatic, then this woman [Matilda] certainly exhibited florid symptoms of insanity, 
muttering to herself and grinding the fingers of one hand inside the palm of an-
other” (HT p.93). This passage is just one of many wherein a character’s interi-
ority, and the narrator’s position, is ambiguous. The reader has previously met 
Olivier as a figure of pity and mad danger, Matilda is simply pitiable.  
As Thomas arrives at the asylum, he thinks that “psychiatry is a young 
discipline; that is part of its excitement” (HT p.94), repeating the break between 
psychiatry and the asylum he comes to practice in.  Thomas writes to his sister, 
Sonia, speculating on the role of the asylum and the nature of madness. He 
suggests that “They [passers-by] could just make out this vast folly, if you will 
forgive the word, the million delusions of its inhabitants contained in utter dark-
ness” (HT p.122).  ‘Folly’ is referencing two things. The first being Victorian 
buildings that are mostly without use, other than to scare people seeking such 
titillation within the grounds of a park or mansion. Often this was phantasised as 
a haunted place. Folly is also a word related to Foucault’s notion of unreason – 
madness as a medieval character – that of folly as a worthless enterprise.  
Faulks is drawing attention to what the orthodox histories of psychiatry 
note as a dark period of terrible incarceration (a folly in the care of the mad), 
which leads (and so is a necessary precursor) to institutional moral care, that of 
confinement as a useful practice. The asylum is looked upon from the outside 
as a liminal place of hauntings that connects the dead with the living, and sym-
bolically confines what is unholy, beyond, and most often, the edges of a town 
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or city. While the practice of visiting the asylum and the mad as a spectacle36 is 
mostly gone in the period that the novel is set, the dance (the ‘Lunatics ball’) 
described below, organised by Dr. Faverill, perhaps harks back to that, but with 
the intention of evoking pity through a tragic dignity. Certainly, it offers a safe 
view into that liminal place for the select few of local civil society. Furthermore, 
the idea of “utter darkness”, a practical reference to the intermittent gas lighting 
of the asylum, is also signifying the status of madness as beyond the influence 
of Enlightenment and reason, and the role psychiatry will take in bringing rea-
son to madness. In an illustration of this, McCleish, one of the senior asylum 
administrators, suggests the need for stewardship: 
 
We have our successes, our cures, do we not […]? […] Some people do leave 
the asylum and return to their families. However, the weight of experience is the 
other way. More than ten years ago a state hospital in New York made a point 
of policy that no patient should be discharged. They gave themselves the hon-
ourable task of acting as custodians […] our American cousins have the habit of 
always being a  wee bit in advance of us” (p.113)  
 
Despite these modest successes, McCleish remains doubtful of the possibilities 
of treatment, as he reminds Thomas that “asylum means. From the Latin a – 
without, sylum – cure. Get down Captain [even McCleish’s dog has rank]” (HT 
p.113). The different views held on the treatment of the mad retain, in both ac-
counts, an “honourable task”. In a way that recalls the ‘white man’s burden’, the 
asylum staff take the mad, and manage them, without much hope for success, 
or progress.  
While of dubious stylistic merit, Faulks uses exposition as characters 
give lectures, and expound, in their letters. This gives a sense of authority to 
both the character’s words, the text itself, and, so, to the ‘message’ for the 
reader. An early indication of this is in Faverrill’s welcome to Thomas: 
 
Doubtless you are aware, Midwinter, that families once looked after their luna-
tics at home, but the great men of our calling […] have demonstrated beyond 
contradiction that a well-run asylum can offer restorative benefits unavailable 
even to the most well-meaning family […] Samuel Tuke, among others, has 
shown that with kindness, a firm hand and tasks to occupy the mind most peo-
                                                          
36
 In Arnold (2008) and Jones (1993) there are accounts of the prevention of medical practition-
ers entering asylums so care was not given, specifically in London’s Bedlam (for which docu-
mentary records exist), and the display of inmates for entertainment for a fee. Arnold goes on to 
describe the many ways that inmates were exploited by those running the asylums. 
 
 
111 
 
ple can be helped in their affliction. The word asylum, let us never forget de-
notes safety (HT p94 my emphasis)  
 
Thomas agrees – he had visited the York Retreat and “It was almost a model 
society” (HT p.94). A first is noted here, which is that of the contribution that 
psychiatry might make to the whole of mankind, that is, in providing the basis of 
a model, ordered society. There is the paradoxical notion that a model society 
might be found in the antithesis of society, the asylum, but as worrying are the 
hints at the benefits of a custodial, patrician of society, that psy-science could 
become. This impression is built further in the notion of a curative European cul-
ture:  
Esquirol had become master of the asylum at Charenton, a place of cultivated 
gardens, billiards, dancing parties, tender nursing and something approaching 
douceur de vivre, from which patients had been sent home cured. Here, just 
outside Paris, the rising arc of enlightenment had seemed most exuberant (HT 
p.134) 
 
Later, the superficiality of this idyllic, psy-informed society is evident in an 
institutional ball, which is seen as an opportunity to give an impression of the 
mad passing37 for near normal.  Faverill suggests: 
 
It is my intention that we should invite observers from outside, representatives 
of the Committee of Visitors, county councillors, the gentlemen of the press. 
They must be allowed to see how well our little society functions. I appreciate 
that this will entail considerable preparation and, on the night itself, some vigi-
lance. (HT p.151)  
 
Without close management, this “little society”, perhaps metonymically referring 
to broader society, will show itself to not function so well. Again, there is here 
the sense of the internal colony, and that of exclusion to the interior. The lan-
guage in this passage is that of ownership and of the custodian. There is a “de-
gree of selection” (HT p.152) of which inmates should attend, but also, of who 
might benefit, as a dance can be therapeutic. Excluding the infectious and bed-
ridden inmates “gets rid of half” (HT p.153), but “any other odd cases” (ibid) can 
then be considered. Some will need “to be dosed first” (HT p.155), and so se-
                                                          
37
As McClintock (1995) notes, passing is an important process of both race and gender politics 
and Mills (2014b) notes the same for madness. The importance of passing is both to a ‘getting 
on in the world’ and the subversive implications passing has for the grand narratives that make 
it necessary.  
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lected, segregated and sedated, becoming a parody of an orderly society, one 
which is constructed and shaped to give a certain impression. 
Faverill, a respected figure for Thomas, expands on how he perceives 
his custodian role:  
 
I mean, that sometimes I find myself the captain of a stricken vessel. I have the 
stars by which to navigate; I try never to take my eyes from the heavens, be-
cause I know the constellations. I know the direction of our landfall. But on bad 
days I feel that we are holed below the waterline.” (HT p.95, my emphasis) 
 
Faverill speaks in such a way repeatedly, for instance, when he remarks that “I 
have occasionally, I believe, compared myself to the captain of a ship – a 
somewhat vainglorious comparison, it now occurs to me. But on a night such as 
this, I feel proud to think that this vessel sails onward.” (HT p.162). Faverill also 
says, “I am the emperor of this small realm” (HT p.220, and again on p.221). 
The captain becomes the emperor, and the text is pregnant with images of the 
history of madness. In this case, a reference to the Ship of Fools, thought to be 
an early example of the expulsion of the mad. Such a ship needs a captain, 
even where the expulsion is actually to the interiority, that is, to be excluded 
while remaining within the confines of society.  
The asylum is the locus of a struggle between the old prison mentality, 
and the newer, psychiatric captains. The orderlies appear to be both subordi-
nate to the doctors, but equally a law unto themselves. When Thomas meets 
the female patients, he is accompanied by Miss Whitman, an orderly, who 
wants the women classified, and allocated to a ward, swiftly. Thomas reflects 
that “The majority of the women he admitted would not be released and most of 
them would receive no medical consultation while they were in the asylum” (HT 
p.111). Thus, the proto-psychiatrists are being hindered by the inherited history 
of incarceration, which foregrounds the humanitarian nature of the profession, 
rather than their complicity in incarceration. Foucault’s History of Madness pre-
sents a different account of how incarceration made madness ‘visible’, and that 
this was necessary to how psychiatry formed. Foucault (2008) notes38 the cen-
trality of the asylum context which for Human Traces is crucial. Insofar that it is 
the ‘constitutive truth’, bound up within a socio-cultural regime that demands 
public self-recognition, and the resultant alienation.  
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 Full quotation is in section 2.6,  
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3.4 Psychiatrists: Pioneers, adventurers and revolutionaries. 
 
As well as stewards, custodians and captains, characters refer to the 
leading figures in nineteenth century psychiatry as pioneers and leaders (“It was 
not just scientific curiosity that drove them on, there was a deeper philanthropic 
motive […]” HT p.235). The word pioneer colloquially refers to cutting edge 
thinking in such a context, but for the period in which Human Traces is set, the 
meaning is bound-up with actual pioneers, European polymaths entering ‘new 
lands’.  Thomas notes that “[…] all the students he had met in Germany knew 
by heart Griesenger’s battle cry that psychiatry must emerge from its hermetic 
life as a kind of guild and become an integral part of medicine […]” (HT p 134-
135, my emphasis). He goes on to think about how psychiatry needs to devel-
op; “These were his heroes […] but psychiatry was in need of a new one” (HT 
p.135), leading to some further exposition on the problem of the new psychiatry: 
 
there was a rapid increase in knowledge and a growing consensus of the wise, 
it had to be admitted that there was an insidious and growing counter-
movement. The setting-up  of public asylums in France and Britain had brought 
welcome seclusion to many and had ended the use of chains and irons; but be-
fore long the huge buildings had come to falter under the mounting weight of 
numbers – from the jabbering multitude for ever at the gates [the great con-
finement]. The trouble was that although the pioneering writers had humanely 
and beautifully described the problem, they had not found any cures […] in the 
absence of cures, there can be only management (HT p.135) 
 
The confusion continues as to the nature of the history of incarceration, 
which made, and indeed, throughout the novel, makes, a mad population avail-
able to study. The mad are a “jabbering multitude” and the doctors/pioneers are 
engaged in an art cum science. The evasive cure for madness is articulated by 
Maudsley:  
 
The last volume he put away epitomised the urgent need for rapid advance. 
The Physiology and Pathology of Mind by Henry Maudsley argued that lunacy 
was passed on from generation to generation; that characteristics not only in-
born but acquired by a parent could be transmitted to a child and that the men-
tally ill were therefore part of a process called ‘degeneration’. As such, they 
were to be viewed as a waste product of healthy evolution and were fit only for 
excretion. (HT p135)  
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The eugenic movement is evident here, and I return later to ideas of degenera-
tion. As far as colonisation is concerned, there is an emerging picture of a dis-
course, where captains, pioneers and emperors are tasked with curing the bio-
logically inferior, mad multitudes. The institution, in Maudsley’s view, was of du-
bious worth, both in terms of medicines and confinement. He observed that the 
mad tended to do better at home, and recommended that psychiatry watch and 
learn, until better information was available. Within the context of the passage, it 
seems that this is less driven by a humanitarian wish for re-uniting the mad with 
their families, who presumably were often involved in their incarceration (Wise, 
2013). Rather, it reads as a practical solution to the problematic realities of the 
limited curative properties of the asylum. 
Such problems are part of the calling for Thomas:  
 
When he had committed himself to this life, he had been thrilled by the possibili-
ties it offered: the chance to solve intractable problems, to bring relief to those 
afflicted and enlightenment to all mankind. The zeal remained – it had in-
creased – but to it had been added, by his fuller understanding of where the 
science stood, a sense of urgency (HT p.137)  
 
Similarly, Jacques takes the view that the new psychiatry is something great 
and noble, when he considers how a prominent medic wants to take him on: 
 
In the morning he had witnessed human beings on the edge of greatness, men 
standing on the top of the mountain that only they, by virtue of their genius and 
determination, had known how to scale, and looking for the first time into a 
promised land the other side. These great explorers peering narrow-eyed into 
the mist […] when they became accustomed to the view and the mist began to 
clear, the vista that emerged was little less than a complete landscape of what it 
meant to be human – body, mind and soul – the geography of being, revealed 
in all its beautiful simplicity by the pure light of science. As if that exhilaration 
were not enough, one of the expedition leaders had now singled him out by 
name to join them – to be an associate in that enterprise (HT p.215 my empha-
sis)39 
 
Notwithstanding the greatness he is already anticipating, Jacques writes to 
Sonia, making a bold claim that foreshadows the ways in which psychiatrization 
has spread in the eyes of its current critics:  “We are on the edge of making 
great discoveries as will change the treatment of the sick, but more than this it 
                                                          
39
 Read this alongside Jeffrey Lieberman’s (2015) account: “Psychiatry is like no other medical 
speciality; it transcends a mere medicine of the body to touch upon fundamental questions 
about our identity, purpose and potential” (p.12). 
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will change what we understand it means to be a human being” (HT p.218)40. 
The heroic images and notion of pioneers continues, and is extended to a mis-
sion for understanding the mad, and also to tame the troubling mysteries of hu-
man nature. In addition, the tropes and motifs of heroic ventures and discovery 
are necessary to the diffusion and expansion of psy-science globally (Watters, 
2011), and the over-inclusion of almost any human experience into a psychiatric 
concern (Frances, 2013).  
Lieberman (2015)41 echoes these thoughts in his “untold history” of psy-
chiatry. He writes, “psychiatry does not merely have the capacity to raise itself 
from the shadows but the obligation to stand up and show the world its revivify-
ing light” (p.10) and that after “each new wave of psychiatric sleuths unearthed 
new clues” (p.11). So, “despite its many false leads and dead ends, the detec-
tive story of psychiatry has a gratifying finale in which its impenetrable mysteries 
have begun to be elucidated” (ibid). This was due to:  
 
a handful of renegades and visionaries who bravely challenged the prevailing 
convictions of their time in order to elevate their embattled profession. These 
heroes declared that psychiatrists were not doomed to be shrinks but destined 
to be a unique class of physicians […] As a result of their pioneering triumphs, 
psychiatrists now understand the successful treatment of mental illness. 
(Leiberman 2015, p.11) 
 
He goes on to describe psychiatrists as “pioneers” (p.33; p.196), who deal with 
the “daily grind of raving and catatonic inmates” (p.72) (see also footnote 10), 
who use the DSM, “the Bible of Psychiatry42 [which] might just be the most in-
fluential book written in the past century” (p.87), and whose “contents directly 
affect how tens of millions of people work, learn, and live – and whether they go 
to jail” (ibid). It continues: “[n]ever before in the history of medicine had a single 
document [DSM] changed so much and affected so many” (p.148). The DSM 
was at the heart of “a tectonic battle for the very soul of psychiatry” (p.88). Rob-
                                                          
40
 Bhughra et al (2017), in the forecasting paper for psychiatry’s future also make the claim that 
the discipline is on the cusp of making great discoveries, while elsewhere in the paper the con-
siderable limits to what can be claimed are also described. It seems psy-science is in a perpet-
ual state of deferment for what is most significantly to be discovered. 
41
 Lieberman was a former president of the American Psychiatric Association and the person 
who took the DSM5 into publication. Like Shorter, he makes his views of critics plain when de-
scribing the objections to DSM5, and how the APA leadership were subjected to “the complaints 
as the usual carping and hyperbole coming from rabid antipsychiatry critics and special interest 
groups” (Lieberman, 2015, p.274). 
42
 See Bhabha’s (1994:2004) chapter ‘Signs Taken for Wonders’ on the significance of the Bible 
in the colonial relationship. 
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ert Spitzer (who led on the rewrite of the DSM) was “a psychiatric revolutionary” 
(p.117).  
Looking back over the history of treatment, Lieberman notes that 
“[d]riven by compassion and desperation, asylum-era physicians devised a suc-
cession of audacious treatments that today elicit feelings of revulsion or even 
outrage”, although he suggests they “seemed worthwhile” when “weighed 
against lifelong institutionalization” (ibid). After the advent of psychopharmacol-
ogy, and the “accidental discoveries of miracle medications” (p.185), Lieberman 
suggests that “[o]nly manic-depressive illness, the final mental scourge of hu-
manity, remained bereft of treatment and hope” (ibid). When Aaron Beck is cited 
for developing cognitive therapies, it is considered “a moment akin to Martin Lu-
ther nailing his ninety-five theses to the Wittenberg church door” (p.224). Con-
temporary psychiatry treats “existential disease”, because, “only the brain can 
become ill from such incorporeal stimuli as loneliness, humiliation, or fear.” 
(p.289). Psychiatry finds the “true nature of their illnesses” (p.297) and enables 
people to “discover entirely new identities within themselves” (p.314). Like the 
lectures within Human Traces, Lieberman aims to educate the reader that “the 
truth is that we will only overcome the stigma of mental illness when the public 
is fully convinced that medical science understands mental illness and can pro-
vide effective treatment” (p.306), which hints at the extent of the civilising mis-
sion. The language is brimming with rhetoric and metaphor, all strategically 
aimed at convincing the reader of the scientificity and beneficence of the disci-
pline, with only lip service to its critics (which is most evident in the coverage of 
how homosexuality was removed from the DSM). These quotations do not just 
echo the messages of Human Traces, there is also a striking stylistic similarity 
between the speech of Faulks’ characters, and Lieberman’s delivery. 
 Colonisation, through the images associated with pioneers, emperors 
and captains, soon becomes directly present in the lives of Thomas and 
Jacques. For Thomas, this is seen early in the novel as Edgar, his older brother, 
is sent to make his fortune in Canada. Likewise, a brief reference is made about 
Sonia’s then husband-to-be, Richard Prenderghast, who, moving out of the lace 
business “starting a venture with some chums in London. You can’t go wrong at 
the moment” acting as brokers for “sugar” (HT p.46). The ‘sugar business’ is an 
indirect reference to the colonies. There are two parts of the story which are 
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more clearly referencing the colonisation of the time, albeit not problematically 
for Faulks, or his characters. Firstly, Jacques visits the USA, and later Thomas 
visits German East Africa.  
When Jacques visits Pasadena he writes to Sonia:  
 
My heart melts when I think of the men and women and their children who had 
to cross this terrible landscape […] what it was to be a rider for the Pony Ex-
press, going on and on through all weathers, attacks by Indians (HT p.461)  
 
His view from Pasadena suggests that “Nothing lies beyond, except what Cor-
tez saw from Mexico” (HT p.464). The (medical) gaze is clear and constitutes 
the land as being empty, and ready for European development, wherein lies the 
alignment between imperialist expansion and medical collusion.  In San Fran-
cisco, Jacques visits a Chinese area (HT p463). Professor James, his U.S. 
guide and contact, describes North America as “this paradise [that] was unex-
plored. It needed vision. It needed daring.” (HT p.467). The sense of America as 
an empty landscape awaiting Europeans is perpetuated, and indigenous peo-
ples are reduced to sub-human savages, or simply erased from the picture. 
Faulks is making indirect reference to the ‘Frontier Thesis’ credited to Frederick 
Jackson Turner, an American historian of the time. Ideas of the free, open and 
empty space that forms the frontier spirit through hardship, a rejection of Euro-
pean class structures, and the push west, are presented as the root of the 
American spirit, and the bedrock of the nation (Hutton, 2002). However, like 
Faulks, Turner’s thesis “paid little attention to Indians. It stressed the individual-
ism and self-reliance of the pioneer” (Limerick, 1995, p.699), and also like 
Faulks’ role with psy-science, the Frontier Thesis benefitted from being dissem-
inated through the fiction of the period (Collins, 2009). Professor James and 
Jacques travel, stay in hotels and eat in restaurants – and remarkably there are 
neither black characters, nor indeed references to people of colour, other than 
the ones cited here. Their presence is noticeable by their remarkable absence. 
The references that are made are to the colonisers, their plight, and the wonder 
of their adventure. While later I will suggest that Faulks is willing to contaminate 
late nineteenth century psychiatry with some late twentieth century psychiatric 
theorising, he is not prepared to do the same for contemporary ethics, black pol-
itics or anti-colonial thought. In Human Traces, black people know their place – 
either invisible, or in Africa, which is where Thomas goes. 
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 Thomas is invited to go to Africa on an expedition to examine the re-
mains of human fossils, and with a broader mission of trade and cartography. 
The trip is revealed mainly through letters back to Kitty (a former patient and 
now his wife), and Sonia at the new asylum, and also through some narrated 
passages. By this point in the novel it becomes noticeable that the men write 
back to the women; their wives and sisters play the part of silent witness to the 
reflection, knowledge production and mastery of their male relations. When Re-
gensberger, who is arranging the trip (HT p.546), is talking with Sonia, she asks 
“[…] what possible use an English mad-doctor could be to a cartographical ex-
pedition. Are you all expecting to go insane?” (HT p.547) Regensberger an-
swers “‘It is a question of spirit…Africa is a large country and it calls for a large 
response. When one sits by the campfire at night, it is better to be in the com-
pany of a man who has risen to the occasion’” (HT p.547). As it turns out, the 
expedition “consists of 38 porters, about 45 donkeys, four mules” (HT p.558), 
but the porters cannot be trusted to talk around the camp fire, or to rise to the 
occasion. Regensberger goes on; “there is a fine adventuring tradition among 
British doctors. They have always been mountaineers and explorers” (HT 
p.548), thus fulfilling the earlier indications of Thomas’s destiny. While the white 
Europeans have desirable types to which they conform, and into which they 
might expand, the natives remain homogenous, and, as is shown below, typified 
as childlike. Presumably, because of these qualities, the natives have respect 
for Regensburger “and he has no need of beating and bullying, which is what 
they expect from the white man” (HT p.568). 
Around the time Thomas is thinking about going to Africa:  
 
Regensberger told Thomas of his planned visit to German East Africa. ‘I expect 
you have heard of Oscar Baumann,’ he said. ‘He made two expeditions to the 
area for the German Anti-Slavery Committee, and a map of his journey was 
published in Berlin three years ago. It is a beautiful piece of work in its way, but 
it lacks detail… and in any event cartography was not his principle purpose” (HT 
p.492) 
  
There is no other reference to the violent excesses of colonisation in 
German colonial territory, or any other territory. Regensberger discards Bau-
man’s map due to its lack of cartographic worth, but no further mention is made 
of the anti-slavery sentiment. In the novel’s afterword, Faulks does confirm that 
there was a German Anti-Slavery Committee and Bauman was real. As the 
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passage goes on, the natives are presented as resentful, as if for no reason, 
thus confirming the disconnection in the European character’s minds of the 
conditions of their servitude. Regensberger wants to look at “fossil remains” and 
explains “Baumann told me of a particular place known to the Masai, though I 
believe they have little interest in it themselves. They do not understand the 
significance of such things.” (HT p.492). Consistent with their childlike state, the 
Masai do not comprehend the importance of the evolutionary/genealogical evi-
dence, which is a marker for their inferiority, and underpins the scientific neces-
sity of the civilising mission.  
A concurrent racism, connecting Eastern European labourers (and as 
McClintock has pointed out, Irish peasants), and natives, in the evolutionary ty-
pology of the ‘family of man’, is evident back in Europe, with the building of the 
new asylum for Thomas and Jacques. Geissler is running the building project 
and suggests “as for the labour, I have found the best men are Slovenes, and 
they, poor fellows will work all day for a bed and a hot meal at night.” (HT p.498) 
which remains unquestioned. Despite this, “Hans [who takes a supervisory role] 
watched over them fiercely, excited by his first position of authority and deter-
mined to make sure his employers were not cheated by the workforce” (HT 
p.515). Where it suits European, and here medical, interests there is a strata of 
inferiority that supplies manual labour both from the East of Europe, and from 
indigenous peoples in Africa. Geissler’s view is exploitative, and his primary 
concern is preventing the Slovenes from getting away with anything which is not 
thought their modest due. 
Back in Africa, Thomas is due to meet Crocker, who has “experience of 
the interior’”, is a “big white hunter”, and has also visited Zanzibar, which Burton 
“called ‘Stinkybar’” (HT p.556). In a way reminiscent of how the worth of the 
Black male slave had been calculated (3/5 of a white man in the US constitution 
(Kolchin, 1993)), “Crocker assured us we should need ten natives to each white 
man, which seemed excessive to me” (HT p.557) for the expedition into Masai 
country. It is in this leg of the journey that the infantilization, and sense of own-
ership, of the native porters becomes most evident. The natives are “boys” who 
need to “look lively”, or “they would receive a good thrashing from a powerful 
Nubian the Germans keep for the purpose. There was much muttering and roll-
ing eyes, but it seemed to work, as they set to with a will in the morning” (HT 
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p.558). Crocker claims to speak Swahili, “he certainly made himself understood 
over the thrashing business” (HT p.559). Later, “Thomas tried to make the 
bearers ration what they drank, but with little success, as they guzzled it like 
children” (HT p.591), putting themselves at risk of dehydration. Thomas ob-
serves that “When we pass a native, he stands aside deferentially, imagining, I 
suppose that we are his colonial masters [they were] – and at least we all do 
speak German” (HT p.558, underlining in the original). Additionally, “unlike the 
Indians we have met, the Africans are not a playful people. They are solemn 
and watchful” (HT p.562). Thomas writes: 
 
I have noticed that he [Crocker] talks to them [natives] as though they were 
children and he a rather fierce schoolmaster; when he rebukes them they look 
at their feet like naughty boys – but they do not seem to mind, provided they are 
paid. We give them pieces of calico, to make clothes, meat from game we have 
killed with our rifles and in some cases rupees […] It is not much, but the alter-
native for them is nothing but hunting with spears. (HT p.560)  
 
Typical of the civilising mission is the idea that before Europeans arrived, the 
Africans had nothing, When thinking over the significance of the fossils, Thomas 
suggests that:   
 
Even the natives, who have lived their lives hereabouts, seemed not to know 
quite what to say. They smiled a little and shifted foot to foot; they looked at us 
questioningly, as though we might explain it all to them. We looked back into 
their eyes, equally children, all of us, in the fading light, in the great mystery of 
our existence. (HT p.568) 
 
They then head to a ‘government’ station, a boma, “a fine place, with 
three Germans in charge of about a hundred natives”’ (HT p.559). Thomas and 
the narrator take a tone of dispassionate observation, using the gaze attributed 
to him, from the earliest introduction to him, in the Midwinter household. This 
observational style paradoxically emphasises, even further, the ‘thingification’ of 
the native porters, and Thomas does this as a psychiatrist, with the authority of 
empowered description, and like Conrad’s Marlow, narrating a travelogue win-
dow onto Africa. 
 Thomas also describes the native way of life and the brief conversations 
with the only African named (albeit a European name) and spoken directly with 
in the whole of his account:  
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The villages we pass through are generally dirty; the natives have little idea of 
hygiene, and all the filth runs down the open gutter. George, the chief bearer, 
told Crocker that when the whole place becomes too disgusting they simply 
abandon it and move on. […] George said they believe our skin colour is due to 
the fact that we come from the coast; they do not think of us as a different race, 
but as a sort of Coastal Negro. (HT p.561) 
 
Whether it is hunting, drinking or living in a village, the Africans are character-
ised as primitive and insanitary43. It is worth bearing in mind that at this point, it 
is Thomas who is narrating from the position of directly viewing the native dwell-
ings and their lives. These scenes would be an opportunity for Faulks, via this 
narration, to balance, or even disconfirm, the heroic tropes of imperial explora-
tion, and expose the exploitation, which would still have been presenting a his-
torically accurate picture. Not so; Faulks reiterates those tropes without prob-
lematizing them, and it is for the reader to decide the extent to which these ac-
counts might be questionable. Furthermore, such omission is done alongside 
the intrusion of authorial knowledge during the expositional passages in the fur-
thering of psychologising and psychiatrizing theory. Faulks is quite willing to use 
contemporary theory to correct the reader when it is in the interests of bio-
psychiatry, but not in the interests of anti-imperialism, anti-racist discourse, or 
addressing misogyny. It continues; the natives worship Gods, but “the spirits are 
quite easily propitiated, I have seen them offered nothing more than a tuft of 
grass” (HT p.562). They are excitable and cowardly, and when arriving at the 
crater where the fossils are located, the porters were “jabbering excitedly” (HT 
p.566). Crocker relates a story of hunting white Rhino, “Natives all ran away, 
shrieking, of course, leaving me on my own” and the carcasses of the expedi-
tion hunt “Leave it for the Masai. And the vultures. And all the rest of them.” (HT 
p.566). 
This tone and characterisation continues, and the Africans are continual-
ly equated with children, logged alongside animals, and known through the 
‘mark of the plural’ (Memmi, 1965, p.85). This reaches a pitch around the time 
the party arrives at the crater where the fossils are located. When Hannes, a 
cartographer with the expedition, wants to collect samples, Thomas reflects “I 
was surprised at the casual way he spoke, with no sense of desecration of the 
site, but I suppose that is how science progresses” (HT p.573). Desecration is a 
                                                          
43
 Race, racism and ideas of dirt have a long history – I return to this briefly in the next chapter. 
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regular signifier of domination in Human Traces - the discarding of the bodies of 
mad women, tribesmen and the site where samples are taken. Curiously, while 
Thomas thinks in such terms as desecration with regards to Hannes and the 
site, he has no hesitation himself when he performs an impromptu post mortem 
on a porter, who Crocker accidentally shoots in the chest (HT p.594). The porter 
had been threatening to desert the party with six others. Crocker explains that 
he intended to fire over his head, and while there is some argument over this 
Crocker is unpunished.  Crocker remains untroubled, and sleeps through the 
noisy mourning of the other bearers that night. A further porter is killed by a 
crocodile and a Masai bearer also dies – and Thomas suggests that the death 
of one of the bearers has upset him. With overtones of Conrad, Crocker replies:  
 
When you have spent as long as I have in the dark continent, Doctor, you will 
learn that the loss of a native life is not a cause for great concern, even to the 
family. Look what they have done with the corpse – thrown it to the jackals. (HT 
p.600)  
 
Given this, Thomas sees the opportunity to educate Crocker, and per-
forms a post-mortem on the dead porter, which for him involves an “aesthetic 
pleasure” (HT p.600). This is performed without regard or permission of the por-
ter’s fellow bearers, and is secretly done, away from the camp, by torchlight. 
Thomas removes the skull top which “is like pulling apart the two halves of a 
coconut” (HT p.602), a term which objectifies the man, and without awareness 
of the racist connotations. From that point on, the native is simply the brain – 
and while Thomas experiences wonder, the language is anatomical, distant, but 
horrifying as it is bold, as cerebrospinal fluid rolls down their arms as they 
speak.  Afterwards, hyenas and vultures eat the exposed brain, as the dogs ate 
the scraps of the women following Jacques dissection described below. 
The novel equates this trip with Thomas’ larger mission. He is still won-
dering about dementia praecox, a new diagnosis, and one which presents chal-
lenges like “the difficult country of madness” (HT p.613), a place to be con-
quered and explored like the Americas and Africa. Here are two significant dis-
courses in one short sentence. Firstly, that the colonisation of land and subjec-
tivity of madness are conjoined in the metaphor of the “difficult country” — a 
phrase hinting at struggle and resistance, as well as invasion. Secondly, the 
eugenicist metaphor of mental hygiene, that equates and binds the health (or 
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degeneracy) of the individual with that of the family, as a problem to be fath-
omed and resolved. Faverill offers some thought on this elsewhere in the novel 
when he writes that ‘mental illnesses’ are not diseases but remnants of “unde-
velopment” (HT p.624) that “arise during activity on the lower level of evolution 
remaining” (ibid), and “illusions etc., are not caused by disease but are the out-
come of what activity is left him (of what disease has spared); his illusions are 
his mind.” (HT p.625), that is, inferiority through regression. During the course of 
the quotation, it is unclear to what degree Faverill is thinking of madness in dis-
ease terms. 
Earlier evolutionary forms offer the route to understanding the madness 
of white Europeans, and there is a reciprocated call-back in Olivier’s madness. 
His hallucinations and delusions evoke the fetish when:  
 
Two bridles dangled from a wooden post like effigies in the church of some ob-
scure religion; and the function of such things seemed altered, thought 
Jacques, as though Olivier’s experience has somehow reset the surroundings 
in light of its own integrity” (HT p.10) .  
 
Outside of the African ‘adventure’ there is an almost complete absence of any 
engagement with race, even though, as suggested above by Shephard (2016), 
race and a preoccupation with so-called primitive or ‘rude’ (Rivers, 1924) life, is 
a defining feature of the science of the era. However, mad Olivier has a rather 
telling delusion when he states “‘My skin is black.’” (HT p.525). With an other-
worldly prescience he goes on to say that “‘ A great war is coming to the world’”, 
and “‘ In his name ten million will die’” (HT p.527), seemingly predicting the two 
world wars to follow. No mention is made of the wars of conquest within the col-
onies, or the ones that bring later decolonisation to fruition. Certainly, there is an 
erasure of what Césaire referred to in chapter 2 as, Hitler’s mistake. That is, to 
do in Europe to whites, what Europeans had been doing to people of colour, for 
centuries. Thus, Olivier’s insights, otherworldly as they seem in origin, refer only 
to the concerns of Europeans. Olivier’s predictions jar somewhat with the oth-
erwise scientific preoccupation of the novel. Prior to his suicide, he had visions 
of “Arabia, brown-skinned men playing music, girls dancing with clinking cym-
bals in their fingers” (HT p.530). Faulks seems to be orientalising madness 
through a preoccupation with skin colour and identity, and a Delphic mysticism 
thus connecting the savage, the idiot and the savant. Taking a postcolonial 
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reading would also allow for the possibility that Olivier is abject through the 
madness and despair that leads to his suicide, and in such a way that writers 
like Fanon might consider as a colonial trauma. Such a reading would permit 
Olivier’s abjection through psycho-colonialism to be voiced through commen-
surability with black skin – the various colonisations meet at that juncture of 
madness and blackness. Conversations between Jacques and the Curé, his pa-
tron, raise questions early on in the novel about madness and the mystical; 
“These illnesses are desperate things”. And, the asylums are “where you feel 
the absence of God”, “There are doctors, alienists, in charge of the attendants, 
but they are powerless” (HT p.24), and that between the street and the asylum, 
“It feels as though you’ve passed into a different existence” (HT p.25) — again a 
liminal, haunted space. Not only is madness unfathomable, staff are without any 
power to alter madness. Just like the savage, the mad are godless, and the 
places they occupy are likewise, godless places. That is, until the (proto) psy-
chiatrist, a secular missionary, takes control of madness, in all the ways antici-
pated above, as great men of adventure. 
 
3.5 Misogyny as psychiatric racism. 
 
When Foucault (2003a) notes, in his Abnormal lectures in 1974-1975, 
that psychiatry operates its own racism, he does so in the context of a psychiat-
ric preoccupation with the madness of women.  It follows, that at least in part, 
such racism is tied also to misogyny, a further theme of colonisation in Human 
Traces, and the psychiatric practice of the time. The links between patriarchy 
and imperialism are made when psychiatry is described in terms of masculine 
greatness in psy-science:  “Science will provide more powerful means. Young 
men will supply a keener gaze. For the moment they remain what we might call 
bridesmaid illness, one looking for a husband.” (HT p.208). Madness is thus 
feminised, and is to be made whole when it is coupled in a heteronormative re-
lation to the male doctor, and to the masculinised discourse of science. Unlike 
the passive and tragic women of Human Traces44, Foucault (2008) refers to the 
hysterics as “the front of resistance” (p.253) and “we salute the hysterics as the 
                                                          
44
 As Khanna (2003) points out, sadly black women are also neglected, even erased, within the 
decolonising literatures reviewed in previous chapters and that misogyny is extended in the writ-
ing of figures like Fanon and Mannoni, who typify white women as more racist than white men. 
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true militants of antipsychiatry” (p.254). Likewise, McClintock (1995) sees impe-
rialism and colonisation, and resistance to both, as occurring often at the inter-
section of gender, class, madness and race (and their crossings), what Foucault 
(2004) refers to as “multiple subjugations” (p.45). Finally, this intersection of 
feminised madness, sexual and criminal deviancy is shown in the examination 
Charcot makes of a male hysteric: 
 
Paul B’ […] His family, as far as could be determined, was a Sodom of idiocy, 
drink and syphilis […] He was sexually incontinent […] Degeneration […] has 
him in its grip […] He is hysterical, usually a female illness and odd in a man not 
effeminate (HT p.252).  
 
The women in Human Traces are most often, and most clearly, mad, with the 
novel populated by mad women in far greater numbers than mad men. The mi-
sogyny of the representation of gendered madness is as evident as the 
classism and racism. For instance, writing to Sonia, Thomas says of the staff 
helpers, “many of the type washerwoman, fishwife or what Mama would call 
‘sulky shopgirl’ [and] it is not hard to see why such a poor class of person is all 
that can be employed” (HT p.121). McClintock (1995) draws attention to the 
ways in which women’s work becomes devalued within a patriarchal imperialist 
system, with particular reference to class differences. The mad women fair little 
better as they are described; “Madame Lafond obeyed with the docility of the 
chronic patient” (HT p.242), and Daisy, another patient, has a “look of bovine 
hopefulness” (HT p.119). When Thomas meets the mad women “some have no 
names at all” (HT p.100), Ruth (HT p.97) is libidinous and suggestive, and 
nearby is an otherwise silent “[…] fat girl, no more than fifteen, with mongoloid 
features” (HT p.98). Not only do the patients/inmates have no names, but also 
no story, as McLiesh says “They are not here to tell you the story of their lives, 
young man. In fact, it is because they cannot tell you the story of their lives that 
they have been sent here” (HT p.112).  
The nameless women become a project for Thomas, who thinks about 
giving identity to the inmates, but in actuality he is giving identity to their mad-
ness/illness. That this role falls to him speaks of the drive to form typologies in 
this period, and the almost obsessive preoccupation with physiognomy as the 
route to identity, and subsequently identity given through the gaze and docu-
mentation: 
 
 
126 
 
 
The question of identity. He could make small pencil sketches of each patient in 
the ledger, but it was hardly scientific […] He would have to write down brief, 
coded mnemonics to himself: red face, tremor, stench, scar; he could perhaps 
do it in Latin, in which language he would certainly escape detection by 
McLeish (HT p.114) 
 
As McClintock (1995) notes, the advent of photography expanded the means 
for imperialism at home and abroad, to capture, study and visually classify curi-
osities and the exotic. She suggests that such things as photography, sketching 
and scene setting are control frames; attempts at delineation that suggests a 
greater control than may be felt, or achievable, when dealing with the object of 
the gaze. Thomas ponders the possibilities photography offers him instead of 
sketches: 
 
Or photographs. Would Faverill permit photography? He had heard of an alien-
ist in London who took pictures of the patients in his asylum because he was an 
amateur of physiognomy, who wished to demonstrate the importance of race, 
inter-breeding and cranial phenomena in the process of morbid degeneration 
(HT p.114)  
 
Thomas is aware, therefore, of the links between race, madness, and 
eugenics. He also reveals at this point the command and ownership a psychia-
trist takes of the asylum, in “his asylum”. Later, he explains to Sonia his wish to 
make a “reference library of the patients, so we know which one is which” (HT 
p.224), reminiscent of an ‘archive fever’, wherein the library/archive is the re-
pository of law and knowledge, and embodied in the authority of the archon 
(Derrida, 1995). He reflects on how the photography shows the mad as “not 
broken”, but rather as individuals, different to the “undifferentiated mass” (HT 
p.225) on the wards. Such a mass is not dissimilar to the ‘mark of the plural’ 
applied to the “jabbering native” and their villages, nor is it far from Lieberman’s 
(2015) description of “an alienist in a country madhouse overseeing a horde of 
incurables” (p.71). Thomas sees that “each one is in fact a human with a story. 
In some ways the insanity is the least important thing about them” (ibid)45. That 
                                                          
45
 Contrast this with what is known about the asylum building which is “remarkable […] a feat of 
engineering. It contains more than ten million bricks and was built in less than two years. And 
what generous intentions it bespeaks towards the unfortunate” (HT p.101). More is known about 
the building than some patients and it stands as a monument to the patron/builder/state (but not 
the labourers). 
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this has not occurred to Thomas until he produced facsimiles of each patient, 
that fixed them in that static moment, is startling. His memory of them appears 
insufficient to render their individuality clear. The control frame enables him to 
tolerate the abjection of the mad, to be able to see their individual humanity. 
The asylum reduces the patients, on the one side, to an undifferentiated mass, 
and the other an individual only recognised through a clinical gaze, that pauses 
briefly, giving the sense of the extent to which these asylum doctors command-
ed even the idea that inmates were human. It falls to the doctors, like Thomas, 
to craft a suitable story for the inmates, that otherwise have no story, or identity, 
on their own terms. The potency of naming (and the primary naming is a diag-
nosis and ward allocation), is played out in what appears, in the first instance, to 
be an act of compassion, the patrician’s gift. What follows are Thomas’ musings 
that foreshadow his interest in what later becomes Freudian psychoanalysis; a 
psychological theory that again subjugates and rewrites the stories of women 
within a male gaze and frame, rather than an emancipatory recognition of a 
shared humanity (Showalter, 1997). 
These descriptions might be opposed to his way of referring to a male, 
who, unlike the women asylum workers, is named as a colleague and peer:  
 
My colleagues here are good men, I think. Dr Faverill, the superintendent, is a 
man of science and learning, rather grandiloquent, filled with optimism of our 
time. He is a believer in our ability to cure, to enlighten, to discover how the 
mind works (HT p.121) 
 
When Jacques is in France training as a doctor, he is first introduced as 
being “up to his elbows in the abdominal cavity of an old woman”, and that “be-
hind him, a skeleton was suspended from a hook attached by a chain to a ceil-
ing; an hour earlier it had been a fleshy young woman who had died in child-
birth. Her uterus was on the cast iron table next to Jacques”. The charnel house 
imagery continues as “The dozen bodies in the room were of different vintages” 
(HT p.129), and the bodies are “carcases” of which bits are eaten by caged 
dogs, awaiting their own vivisection (HT p.130). Likewise: 
 
Here were people twisted into bodily contortions which, however outlandish 
they appeared, remained regrettably human, so that they could not be dis-
missed as an irrelevance. Only Charcot had seen that, far from being God’s 
joke at the expense of mankind’s pathetic hope of dignity, the women repre-
sented a resource of medical study with no equal in the world, because no-
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where else was it possible to scrutinise a disease throughout its length and 
then, marry it to its precipitating lesion […] the women represented a resource 
of medical study with no equal in the world […] So useless in their lives, the 
women were at last able, in the cross sections of their brain and spinal cord, to 
donate something of interest to the existence that failed them (HT p.204, my 
emphasis)46 
 
Later, such treatment is referred to as an indignity (HT p.537) when a 
post mortem is to be carried out on Olivier following his suicide. The high regard 
given to the white male body and brain, contrasts with the treatment of the bod-
ies of Africans and women47. The woman’s uterus is exposed as the traditional 
seat of madness in women, the chains and hooks signifiers of enslavement, and 
the dogs feeding on the bodily scraps is their reduction to animal feed. The eu-
genic ethos is central in noting the otherwise uselessness of the women’s lives 
until dissection. It may well be that, as Walden’s (2005) review suggests, that 
Faulks is having “no truck with emotional correctness” (Walden, 2005, p.34), 
and that he is simply showing historical accuracy. However, historical accuracy, 
and the horror of the way in which these women are treated, need not be di-
chotomised. This point is made with reference to Morrison’s work in the next 
chapter. Her work offers historical accuracy, while questioning orthodox histori-
cising, but without the sense of distance and voyeurism of the scenes above. 
Given the different treatment of male and female colleagues, and of the bodies 
of the dead mad outlined above, Faulks might offer some indication of his own 
positioning. He does choose to intrude in some of the expositional passages, 
even to the extent of allegedly misattributing theoretical developments in psy-
                                                          
46
 A further passage constructing the mad as tragic is as follows: “In the clangourous wards 
around them the epileptics frothed and screamed, thrashing their heads on the soiled floor; the 
hysterics mounted their bizarre performances, bending their bodies into rigid hoops while tor-
rents of verbal filth poured from their mouth; but there in the quiet of the amphitheatre, the foot-
prints of the wretched beings, abandoned by life and the world, left traces of their passage – a 
claim in ink that they had been something more than transients – and with it some fragile plea 
that those who followed after them were bound to try to understand their compromised exist-
ence.” (HT p.207) 
47
 Žižek (2016) reports on a sexually violent murder trial and notes that the “[…] most disturbing 
aspect is that, acceding to the demands of the defence, the judge allowed Gladue’s [the victim, 
an indigenous woman sex worker] preserved pelvis to be admitted as evidence: brought into 
court, the lower part of her torso was displayed for the jurors […] Why would photographs of the 
wound not be enough? Does such a display not rely on the long tradition of treating indigenous 
peoples’ bodies as specimens? Could we ever imagine the opposite case, an upper-class white 
woman’s torso displayed when the accused is a black or indigenous man”. (p.34). Thus, Žižek 
demonstrates that such problems are not passed, and connect misogyny, race and deviance. 
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chiatry on the nature of auditory hallucinations (Clarke, 2008)48. During the vari-
ous autopsies, the brains of mad Olivier, the nameless tribesman guide, and the 
various women, are exposed, violated and discarded in the name of science. As 
well as the depiction of the visceral reality of pathological science, the scene is 
opening the women to the reader’s gaze, making them entirely visible. As 
McClintock (1995) suggests, this is a point of connection between the mad, 
women, and the ‘primitive’; all are available for inspection at the same level of 
examination. Her notion of ‘anachronistic time’ (that is, the idea that certain 
people and places allow a step back in time while being in the present) explains 
how the ‘throwback’, ‘subnormal’ or ‘inferior’ are thought to reveal something for 
the imperial, white male in the present. The process of pathology is inherently 
normative, as shown in Foucaults’ (1963:2010) chapter ‘Open Up a Few Corps-
es’ which describes how pathological anatomy became common practice. He 
suggests that “the only pathological fact is a comparative fact” (p.165) and how 
“alterations observed on all bodies define, if not the cause, at least the seat of 
the disease and perhaps its nature” (ibid).   
 In the same way that the sexual connection between Thomas and 
Jacques remained unexplored, so too does the revelation that Thomas hears 
voices. When the young Thomas leaves to read in his room at the family home, 
he starts to hear a voice – “Often at such moments he heard his voice. It was 
that of a narcoleptic man who had spoken to him regularly since childhood. It 
was not like hearing his own thoughts, which invariably came in fully formed 
sentences as though uttered to himself…” (HT p.53). What it means to hear the 
voice of a narcoleptic man is not explored, although it:   
 
soothed him […]offered comments of an indifferent, sometimes inconsequential 
nature on what he was doing or proposing. It did not try to interfere with his life 
and he was not frightened of it […] it was outside of him, not produced by the 
workings of his own brain but by some other being (HTp.53) 
 
The sense of the voice is further muddied by an uncertainty over whether or not 
this is the reflection of a sixteen year old Thomas, or that of Faulks, with access 
                                                          
48
In the Human Traces postscript, there is a strategically worded passage. Faulks writes “Pro-
fessor Crow considers that the concept of the genetic predisposition to schizophrenia as a com-
ponent of variation generated in the speciation event was first introduced in his papers” (HT 
p.789, my emphasis) which are then dated as published in 1995, about 85 years after the date 
Faulks places it in the novel. Crow and Faulks corresponded on this, and Crow notes “We 
agreed on the significance of the concept but to differ on its origin” (Crow, 2006, p.727). 
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to Thomas’s interior world. If it is the latter then there is a further complication. 
Faulks evokes Thomas’s voice hearing as one that is an external experience 
typical of voice hearing generally. But an author with this insight also has direct 
access to the voice, and to what is presumed to be generating the voice, which 
is something Faulks chooses not to present. As mentioned above the purpose 
of including Thomas as a voice hearer is unclear. The other characters never 
find out, there are few references to it in the novel, and the voice hearing is 
never connected to any of the events of the novel. It is possible that Faulks is 
entertaining the possibility of stigma – that Thomas is aware of the negative so-
cial meaning of voice hearing. Or it may be that Faulks is showing how psychot-
ic phenomenon can be experienced outside of a pathological discourse, even to 
the extent that some psychotic phenomena can be almost banal. He may even 
be playing, ironically, with the proposition ‘physician heal thyself’. The sympa-
thetic account of Thomas though, is not extended to the mad of the novel, and a 
further interpretation includes the possibility that for European males, educated 
and middle class, voice hearing is not madness, but a connection to brilliance 
and innovation. Thomas’ voice hearing might, in one instance, be a means to 
connect him and who he is, to the other mad of the novel. It seems equally the 
case that the effect is exactly the opposite, that is, separation in madness is at 
the juncture of gender, class and race. Perhaps unintentionally so, Faulks, in 
under-developing both the homoeroticism of Thomas and Jacques’ relationship, 
and of Thomas’ own madness, is hinting at the hybridity/instability of masculine, 
able, Eurocentric, heteronormative imperialism, while at the same time avoiding 
an actual feminising and unsettling of such ontological demands. Certainly, 
Charcot’s depiction of the male hysteric quoted above leaves no room for doubt 
about the status of the feminised male. 
 
3.6 The causes and treatment of madness 
 
Throughout the novel, Faulks uses exposition to show the thinking of 
psychiatrists with psychological, hereditary, personal vulnerability and interac-
tionist models in evidence. One psychiatrist, Faverill, who is the head of the 
English asylum in which Thomas works, suggests that what makes people mad 
is closely related to what makes them human, thus proffering an idea of ‘good 
functions gone awry’ (HT p.222). This is a nod to why it is that psychiatry might 
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illuminate the nature of what it means to be human. Also, the boundaries of psy-
science remain mobile – when Jacques and Thomas aim to advertise their clin-
ic, they are conflicted over what to say, and arrive at “something that was defi-
nite and vague, specific and inclusive” (HT p.306)49. The discussion above 
notes the ways in which the novel might metaphorically allude to colonisation 
and how it often does so through omission, which erases the Imperial context of 
the story, and shapes the idea of ‘progress’ for psychiatry.  However, it is the 
exposition of orthodox psychiatric theory and explanation that may well have the 
most colonising impact on the reader. This is not a new notion, and is consid-
ered in critical accounts of Victorian literature such as that of Showalter (1987), 
Gilbert & Gubar (2000), and, to an extent, Clarke (2009).    
Faulks’ exposition addresses the reader directly, and educates and in-
forms them on the status of ‘mental illness’, but with a contamination of con-
temporary thinking. It gives the impression, therefore, that the early psychiatrists 
resonate in ways, perhaps far greater than they did, with modern scientific ap-
proaches. This is not a device purely applied in fiction. For instance, Shorter 
(1997) suggests that “[D]uring the nineteenth century several major components 
of “madness were on the rise, in particular neurosyphillis, alcoholic psychosis, 
and apparently, though this is less certain, schizophrenia” (p.49). The problem 
here is twofold. Firstly, it is not the uncertainty about incidence, but rather the 
use of the term schizophrenia to account for something that was not thought of 
in such terms then, which is highly suggestive of a scientific bridging that be-
comes self-explanatory. In effect, Shorter is suggesting that it is only a matter of 
time before this ‘illness’ is identified as such, and so the word schizophrenia 
may be retrospectively applied. Secondly, and I believe more problematically, 
schizophrenia, which still has no biological marker, or clearly identified patho-
logical process, is strategically placed among pathologies with a clear causality. 
This communicates by association, but in subtle ways, a similar status between 
                                                          
49
 Read Thomas and Jacques’s description of what they share with potential clients alongside 
the definition promoted by NICE and the National Collaborating Centre for Mental Health (2009) 
description of schizophrenia section 1.6 of the introduction and it is striking that like Thomas’ 
and Jacques, the definition is definite (authoritative), but vague, it gives the sense of specificity 
without achieving it and is somewhat over-inclusive of what might lead to a diagnosis. 
 
 
 
132 
 
the three diagnoses, and confers on schizophrenia the status of biological ill-
ness in the absence of evidence50.  
This, then, has the function of educating the reader to a great period of 
early psychiatry. Thomas is narrated as he thinks on the history of madness: 
 
The history of the subject was shameful and brief. There had been the dark ag-
es, when wandering idiots were mocked or pilloried; there had been the super-
stitious centuries when people spoke of ‘possession’ and other devilish non-
sense; then there was the era of cruelty, of imprisonment and taunting, when 
the idle sane paid to make faces at the lunatics. This had turned into the era of 
‘restraint’, earlier in the century, when the gathering of many mentally afflicted 
people in one place for the first time had necessitated the use of manacles, 
irons and straitwaistcoats. Even before such practices had become obsolete 
under the influence of enlightened thinkers, some medical men and some, like 
the famous Tuke of the York Retreat, laymen of humane and philanthropic vi-
sion. This was, in Thomas’s view, the true beginning of his medical discipline. 
(HT p131-132) 
 
The account above provides the broad brushstrokes of the received history of 
psychiatry. The reader is invited to view the way psychiatry ‘truly’ began, at a 
certain point, after inhumane treatment had been dispensed with. The easy se-
quential nature of the story adds rationality to the growth of psy-science, within 
(and constituting) a discourse of progress. This delineation is questionable with 
mass sterilisations, genocide and mass incarceration within which psychiatry 
participated, into the twentieth century. Curiously, that part of the mid-twentieth 
century is typified, by both Shorter (1997) and Lieberman (2015), as a psychia-
try stagnating under the influence of psychoanalysis. Such histories also fail to 
account for such things as the seventeenth century witch trials, which increased 
at the same time as did the rise of secular thinking and enlightenment reason 
(Midgley, 2001). Thus, spurts in rationality can co-exist with mysticism and su-
perstition; the former does not erode the latter. 
 The scientificity of traditional, historical discourses on psychiatry lend 
themselves to the plausibility of bio-psychiatry and psychoanalysis. The heredi-
tary explanation would seem to suggest that madness would be extinguished 
                                                          
50
 Shorter is scathing of any of the critical sources linked to the antipsychiatry movement which 
produces some flaws in his work. He mocks Foucault’s notion of the grand confinement as hav-
ing never happened, then goes on to describe the not-so-much-later explosion in asylum popu-
lations well into the twentieth century. By doing so, he neglects that Foucault is often doing two 
things; writing a ‘history of the present’ and outlining the ‘conditions of possibility’. In effect Fou-
cault, in History of Madness, sets out the conditions of thinking that then permit the possibility of 
an asylum population explosion. 
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because those with dementia praecox “[…] die young. They frequently kill 
themselves. Sexual selection works against them because they are an unattrac-
tive mating proposition. They have fewer children than ordinary people. Yet, rel-
atively speaking, they have flourished.” (HT p.502). However, in evolutionary 
terms, psychosis confers an early advantage, and “‘[…] must have been en-
demic in the first humans who came out of Africa. It would suggest that it was 
related to whatever transmutations took place in Africa that first turned pre-
humans into Homo sapiens’” (HT p.504). Despite the trend in dementia praecox 
being at odds with hereditary theory, this paradoxically seems to strengthen the 
rationale for it. Certainly, this is likely to be a contributing element to ideas of 
degeneration, circulated throughout the discourses on race, madness, sexuality, 
‘imbecility’ and criminality. In fact, Africa becomes not just the originary birth-
place of Homo-sapiens, such reasoning suggests that psychosis also came out 
of Africa. Thus, human evolutionary refinement is something that happened 
away from the originary moment, elsewhere in the new world.  
Degeneration is covered in Shorter’s (1997) history, which suggests that 
“[t]here is some truth to the concept of degeneration, although the term rings 
infamously on late-twentieth-century ears tutored to its misuse in the Holocaust: 
Some diseases with psychiatric and neurological presentation do become 
worse as they are passed on.” (p.94). Shorter objects more to the political co-
option of the degeneration, than the idea itself. While he explicitly refers to the 
treatment of the Jews as a ‘degenerate people’ in the eyes of Nazi’s, he does 
not extend that to the hundreds of thousands of others, across Europe and the 
US, murdered and sterilised, with the same concern for mental and genetic hy-
giene. But then his section on early psychosurgery, held by many to be a 
shameful part of psychiatric history, is titled ‘The Lobotomy Adventure’ 
(p.225)51.  
Traditional psychiatric explanation is not unique to Human Traces. In 
Faulks’ A Week in December (2010) a young male character, Finn, develops an 
                                                          
51 Likewise Lieberman (2015) strikes a light tone with the title ‘Nothing an Ice Pick to the Eye 
Can’t Fix’, referring to the quick lobotomy method developed in the US, and how Moniz, who 
developed the original lobotomy procedure, was given a Nobel Prize. He humorously specu-
lates how messy wards must have been in the days when patients were spun in chairs and 
were constantly having their bowels evacuated with mercury based laxatives (p.63) - activities 
which would with little doubt constitute a torture if applied now. In the novel Jacques and Thom-
as seem proud of their “showers as powerful as fire brigade hoses” (HT  p.302)  
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acute psychosis that is discussed in expositional and traditional psychiatric 
terms. His sister, Jenni, has a conversation with a friend, Gabriel, who is under 
the misapprehension that schizophrenia is a split personality. She explains: 
 
[H]e has schizophrenia […] They’re trying to rechristen it, I believe. DPI. Delu-
sional Psychotic Illness or something like that. What it means is that he’s seri-
ously deluded. He hears voices which give him instructions. And these voices 
are real and loud. (Faulks, 2010, p.302)  
 
Finn’s “system of beliefs became very fierce and very structured” (p.303), and 
when asked if he can be cured, she replies:  
 
I don’t think so. Not now. But the drugs take away some of the worst of it. The 
trouble is they seem to take away something of him as well. Part of him, the 
person he was, seems to have died (Faulks, 2010, p.304).  
 
It goes on, “That’s the trouble with psychosis. It picks on ordinary people. One 
in a hundred. No other animal has it, so far as we know” (p.325) and it is equat-
ed with tragic disability: “it’s as though one in a hundred eagles was blind from 
birth. Or one in a hundred kangaroos had no hop” (p.326). In discussing heredi-
tary causal explanations of psychosis, it seems to be Gabriel who is now ex-
plaining to Jenni, who asks him: “So it’s passed on, this problem? Schizophre-
nia. It’s, like, hereditary?” and he answers “Yes. Well, mostly. If one of your par-
ents has it, you’re much more likely to. It runs in families. But it’s not completely 
hereditary […]So they figure there is something else too, what they call an “en-
vironmental factor”.” In fact “When your brain circuits finish growing and the last 
connection’s made, that’s it. You’re psychotic. Others are delicately balanced. 
The circuitry is complete but it still needs a push” (p.327). This is confirmed in a 
further scene when Finn’s mother meets with the supervising psychiatrist:  
 
We know that schizophrenia has a strong genetic component, but we also know 
that other factors can be involved. A very large number of schizophrenics are 
heavy cannabis users in their teens, but the profession is divided as to whether 
there is a causal link. It may well be that people with a schizophrenic make-up 
are just more likely to indulge in alcohol and drugs. They already feel less at-
tached to reality, they’re naturally careless of their health. In fact, that’s a ma-
jority medical belief at the moment (Faulks, 2010, p.336).  
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Using cannabis in the teen years is “definitely very dangerous because their 
neuro-development is undergoing its final, infinitely subtle changes. It’s like 
plunging a large spanner into those delicate works” (p.337). Even at the time, 
much of this ‘factual’ information was robustly challenged, which again, is infor-
mation Faulks has access to. The link between substance use and psychosis is 
made with a moralising undertone, which alludes to mental hygiene and devian-
cy, which runs through the discourse on drugs and madness for over a century 
(Hill et al 2015). Psychosis is confirmed, through somewhat stilted speech, as 
explicable through the stress-vulnerability model. Faulks links drug use to dan-
ger and a tragic ontology, like that of traditional views of disability. That is, like 
the women of Jacques’ dissection, a kangaroo without a hop and a blind eagle 
are missing their defining feature; an absence that undermines and disinte-
grates their presumed essence (but is also what Bhahba (1994:2004, p.170), 
refers to as “less than one and double”), the moment of hybridity that both ex-
emplified colonial authority and undid it). So, as Bhahba (1994:2004) notes, the 
moments of authority become “signs of the discontinuous history […] They mark 
the disturbance of its authoritative representation by the uncanny forces of race, 
sexuality, violence, cultural and even climatic differences” (p.161).  
Returning to Human Traces, Thomas pre-empts the incidence of schizo-
phrenia that is stated by Gabriel, over a hundred years later:  “And suppose that 
the incidence of this illness was roughly the same in all populations, despite dif-
ferences in climate, conditions of life, diet and so on” (HT p.501). Faulks also 
foreshadows what he writes in A Week in December by noting that “the so-
called moral treatment is certainly the best palliative that exists – until such time 
as we can establish the aetiology of the different diseases” (HT p.95)52. 
                                                          
52
 There is almost a repetition of this dialogue from Human Traces: Thomas suggests “Until 
someone could fill in the details of how heredity worked, then it seemed to him that there was 
little chance that they could understand, let alone cure, the forms of madness that had an he-
reditary taint”. Thomas believed “that the illness had entered into mankind at the moment he 
evolved into Homo sapiens”  (HT p.489). Furthermore; “And I have always thought that whatev-
er the change was, it involved a connected vulnerability. Psychosis is a human condition, as 
human as the straight toe or the arched foot we saw in the volcanic dust. No other species has 
it. Dogs do not hear voices. Cows do not imagine themselves pursued.” (HT p.578). And “Henry 
Sedgewick a few years ago found that nearly eight per cent of people today hear voices. My 
belief is that the true figure is much higher than that because people today are ashamed to ad-
mit it” (HT p.580). I consider dogs and cows to be poor examples in this case, since, in fact, 
both regularly behave like someone is chasing them and seem to perceive noises not otherwise 
heard. 
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In Human Traces such orthodox, psy-science exposition is often present, for 
instance as Thomas reviews a bookshelf with the major psychiatric works to 
date (HT p.131-137). Likewise, this occurs when Jacques attends Charcot’s lec-
tures, and hears that “[A] predisposition to hysteria is inherited” (HT p.210) and 
that “[T]hese women appear to relive a traumatic event from their past” (ibid), 
which “may in fact be a precipitating factor in the unlocking of the hereditary 
neural disposition” (ibid).  Charcot claims that: 
 
hysteria [is] not a static but a dynamic lesion, caused by an alteration in the tis-
sue of the brain brought on by metabolic or chemical change. Such process is 
quite consonant with our understanding of hereditary disease (HT p.213) 
 
The effect of such exposition, whether intended or otherwise, again, ap-
pears to be the implication of linearity and rigour in psychiatric thinking and re-
search. Causality, and the location of racist psychiatry, in Foucault’s sense, are 
seen later in a conversation between Jacques and Sonia. He explains that men-
tal illness is “Inherited, though we do not yet know quite how that works. Also 
influenced by the patient’s womb or ovaries… [that] Patients undergoing hyster-
ical attacks appear to be reliving horrible things”. Sonia exclaims ‘“Horrible 
things”? Hardly a scientific term.” To which Jacques explains that “It seems that 
such horri – traumatic events may actually set off the illness. They unlock the 
door to it’” (HT p.249). A further biological claim within modern, psychiatric sci-
ence is the notion of psychotic toxicity, that is, the idea that dementia praecox 
and schizophrenia are themselves toxic states which cause brain damage. 
Lieberman waxes on the benefits of neuroimaging and other cutting edge meth-
ods in a way that Faulks pre-empts. Such is referred to when it is reported that:  
 
In Observations on Insanity, Haslam reported how he carried out post-mortem 
inspections of twenty-nine Bethlem inmates and found that the lateral ventricles 
of the brain were noticeably larger than normal […] what might more advanced 
techniques not show? (HT p.133 – 134) 
 
This pre-emption is consonant with Lieberman’s sense of millennial success, 
when Faulks writes “in the absence of molecular proof – something that will take 
a hundred years or maybe more – the best I can do is shore up my theories by 
quoting good authorities who have thought in similar ways” (HT p.621). In one 
sense, Faulks’ own referencing between his novels gives the impression of con-
tinuity of thought in psy-science, almost to the extent of suggesting a degree of 
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focus and industry throughout. The alternative effect is actually to highlight the 
lack of progress in key areas of activity, such as the identification of a schizo-
phrenia gene, as well as his own lack of engagement with a critical literature 
from the 1960s onwards. Such a determined, pro-psychiatry discourse reso-
nates strongly with the ways in which both Shorter and Lieberman, more explic-
itly, have no truck with critical or anti-psychiatry movements, even though these 
are credited with many of the changes towards a more humane treatment of the 
mad (Rose, 1986). 
The psycho-education of the reader continues as Jacques gives a public 
lecture over sixteen pages of exposition (HT p.332-348), in which he is able to 
“deduce something that may be of universal relevance to mankind” (HT p.333). 
While Charcot is “the Napoleon of the medical sciences”, Jacques is described 
in turn as the “Napoleon of the neuroses” (HT p348). Through this lecture he 
covers early hereditary theory, the rise and fall of various key figures in psychi-
atric history, and the possibilities of dream analysis. He says: 
 
I do not believe you will ever cure severe psychiatric illness by the application of 
psychological theory and what at the Salpêtrière they now call “psychotherapy” 
– talking to the patient – however complete your model and whatever your gifts 
of understanding (HT p.361) 
 
When Jacques presents the case of his patient Fräulein Katherina (Kitty) Von A 
(HT p.379-398), this introduces the split between psychological and neurologi-
cal psy-science. This foreshadows the years under Freudian influence, which 
the traditional psychiatric histories view as a period of non-scientific stagnation. 
The status of psychoanalysis is likewise foreshadowed when it turns out that 
Jacques’ psychological explanation of his patient’s illness is a misdiagnosis, a 
psychologising view which is put right by Thomas (heralding the split in their re-
lationship), in a new write up of the case (HT p.428-434) based on his diagnosis 
of a physical problem. In this case, a bio-medical explanation wins out as true, 
hinting at the clash to come, and outcome, between bio-psychiatry and psycho-
analysis. 
 
3.7 Conclusion. 
 
Whether Faulks presents an authentic historical picture or not, the mad 
remain tragic figures who continue to “pay a price for the rest of us to be hu-
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man” (HT p.265). Human Traces is a contemporary novel that, I argue, promul-
gates certain notions of madness and psy-science, trading on the very epistem-
ic imperialism that is also its form. Colonisation and imperialism are written out 
of the period in a way that is often more uneasy for a contemporary writer.  To 
ignore the imperial/colonial period of the novel is to write without recourse to the 
lessons learned from the postcolonial field about the necessity to challenge the 
otherwise, neutral, political backdrop. Neither are feminist discourses, nor the 
experience of women in psychiatry, presented in Human Traces.  Women are 
dehumanised in such a way that suggests this is not just an historical ‘fact’, but 
a necessary one. Certainly, Lieberman, and, specifically, Shorter, want no part 
in what they view as marginal interests. Likewise, Faulks presents himself 
broadly as very much part of the English establishment, and literary establish-
ment, specifically. 
Within the context of my study, though, two significant findings should be 
drawn out. Firstly, that such popular literary novels as Human Traces offer an 
uncritical and authoritative history of psy-science – it is not simply fiction. With-
out an engagement with the growing, critical literature in the mental health field, 
the reader might be forgiven for trusting Faulks’ delivery. This is especially so 
given a cultural belief in medical beneficence. Secondly, given this, novels such 
as Human Traces and A Week in December, show a remarkable similarity to 
the ways in which cultural colonisation is identified in the previous chapter. Such 
exposure is the way that readers might come to know their own forms of mad-
ness, distance themselves from that of others, and comprehend madness pri-
marily as a sickness, with its roots in degenerate, hereditary lines and social 
deviance. 
I am arguing that there is a materiality of metaphor (Mitchell & Snyder, 
2000), that is, a real world effect of literary texts and the ideas that they purvey. 
Here, it is between what Faulks’ (and comparable literature) offers as a legiti-
mate, orthodox account of psy-science, and the material ‘facts’ of contemporary 
psychiatry. Works of fiction, of the kind discussed in this study, therefore, have 
a presence in the world beyond their literariness. The metaphoric construction 
of the proto-psychiatrists in Human Traces is linked to the civilising mission (the 
need to remediate the mad, despite themselves).  The psychiatric research of 
the time is literally ‘cleaving nature at the joints’ in the way that I noted Said 
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wrote about Conrad. Psychiatry is sustained as the much maligned, but admira-
ble venture with little relationship to its worst excesses. This psy-science is 
shown to be a break with the imprisonment of institutional care (even though 
institutional populations exploded in the late nineteenth, and early twentieth, 
centuries), distant from the quackery of mesmerism, good humouredly apolo-
getic (though, understanding of the need) for spinning people into submission, 
for conducting psychosurgery in hotel rooms, leaving all this at the advent of 
neuroimaging. If such practices and occurrences are not the mainstay of psy-
chiatric practice historically, they are the disjuncture that illustrates the condi-
tions of possibility.  
Faulks follows a realist tradition in English literature that often presents a 
linearity in its storytelling, and so produces an imposed sense of order. His psy-
chiatric history sanitises the route to psychiatric progress, while showing 
enough horror to avoid the accusation of sentimentality. But as noted above, the 
horror is never considered in anything other than the partial terms of the neces-
sity of the drive to greatness. Thomas and Jacques participate directly in impe-
rialistic travel. Their aim for the mad is curative and their terms – a civilising 
mission of the mind.   
Besides the civilising mission, there is the presumption of inherent mad-
ness (inferiority) to which male doctors respond with adventurous concern. Part 
of the concern is to arrive at a typology for the quantification of madness on the 
terms of the clinician (empowered description). Class, gender, education and 
medical prestige structure the psy-pyramid with a clear differential of who is 
looking down on who. And the story is told from that positioning also. The mad 
women and native bearers have no story, or circumstance to tell, other than that 
which is required of them for the plot, or indeed, within the story (cultural subju-
gation). None of the male doctors hold much hope for the cessation of madness 
despite pouring their energies into finding a lesion and cure, and thus, whatever 
the mad do, they will always, even at the level of their genes and potentialities, 
be mad (the advancement paradox). They hope for greatness, and the great 
men of this period make enormous gains through their material colonisation, the 
pillaging of people and natural resources. Even to the extent that the doctors in 
the novel use bodies as they see fit. The power of psychiatry to ‘arrest’ is em-
bedded in law, then and now, albeit with some checks and balances. This may 
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be on the presumption of dangerousness, or even just the likelihood of non-
compliance on the part of the mad. Most of the themes of psycho-colonisation 
are thus present in the story, and current status, of Human Traces. Faulks’ Hu-
man Traces, I suggest, presents both a history of psycho-colonisation, and is an 
act of perpetuating that history in the contemporary reader’s consciousness.  
  
 
 
141 
 
CHAPTER 4: MADNESS IN MORRISON: THE REPRESENTATION OF MAD-
NESS IN THE BLUEST EYE (1970) AND GOD HELP THE CHILD (2015). 
 
4.1 Introduction. 
 
In the first two chapters I established a rationale for engaging with psy-
science as a coloniser, and the possibilities presented by critically engaging 
with postcolonial and cultural studies. Morrison represents an otherwise hidden 
Black American history on its own terms, with racism most present. While great 
tragedy occurs, narratives of self-respect and dignity are striven for. This is not 
mawkish, but rather her stories are fraught with terrible choices and costs. 
While certain mad ways of being in the world are often at odds with the social 
world, there is a reading of The Bluest Eye and God Help the Child that equally 
permit a character’s turn to madness to be an act of personal liberation, as well 
as trauma, that deeply affects the story’s narrator. This affective dimension of 
the intellectual world has been arguably erased, and the work of Black women 
recedes in favour of Black male and White theorisations (Cooper, 2017). Morri-
son, and by extension, her female characters (especially the protagonists dis-
cussed in this chapter) put the lived, affective, subjective experience ‘center-
stage’. This is in keeping with the poly-vocal view of madness that I argue in 
chapter 1 (section 1.6). So, where madness is concerned, in its relationship to 
traditional epistemologies, and for mad people of colour, an affective dimension 
is crucial to mad knowledge and resisting psycho-colonisation. 
The Bluest Eye is set within the period of U.S. segregation, when Jim 
Crows laws made segregation the social norm; structurally embedded and insti-
tutionalised. God Help the Child has a contemporary setting and could, in many 
respects, be a sequel to The Bluest Eye. Certainly there is reference to the 
‘New Jim Crow’ laws operating through the criminalising of young black males 
(Alexander 2011). Given that The Bluest Eye is mainly a reminiscence from 
around the late 1960s, looking back to 1941, it is fair to assume that such 
‘rememorialising’ is connecting the period of Jim Crow to the latter years of the 
civil rights movement(s). God Help the Child in turn, connects the success of 
the civil rights movement for a growing black middle class to those left behind, 
what Michelle Alexander describes as a splitting of black communities on the 
basis of the rhetoric of a (mythical) meritocracy, based in the ethos of social ‘up-
lift’ (Cooper, 2017). One intention, and effect of colonisation, is to turn a people 
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against themselves – a tactic having great success in the first half of the twenti-
eth century, when solidarity between poor white and black threatened the ad-
vancement of a racist ethos (Alexander, 2011)53 and was subsequently under-
mined. 
While segregation works at the level of race in both novels, it also oper-
ates in terms of class (segregation within the black community) and psychologi-
cal alterity. Pecola and Sweetness in turn become estranged, perform their dif-
ference, and contend with madness. This is reminiscent of the earliest use of 
the word ‘idiot’, two millennia before it became a term within psy-science 
(alongside moron and imbecile to describe gradations of ‘retardation’). That is, 
the idiot is one who lives outside of social convention (Siedentop, 2015), even 
where that social convention is restrictive of a range of subjectivities, or is, in-
deed, toxic. So potent is the notion of the ‘idiot’, and its affiliates, that it not only 
connects to social exclusion, but also, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
to eugenics. In the white world, madness, disease and race were (are) inextri-
cably linked, leading to policies and actions of segregation, incarceration, con-
trol, sterilisation, and extermination, both purposefully and through inaction (e.g. 
accepting the high death tolls on indigenous populations of ‘imported’ diseases, 
and the acceptance at a policy and social of this as a resolution of the ‘indige-
nous problem’)54. Furthermore, such strategies are most effective when a given 
subordinate population can be recruited into self-governance along the lines of 
those imposed by the coloniser, what Foucault refers to as governmentality (at 
the level of the individual) and biopower (at the level of populations). During’s 
(1992) reading of Foucault’s thoughts on literature expands on the idea that one 
of the functions (or effects) of literature is to express and/or relate to ‘otherness’ 
in such a way as to resist both the ‘othering’ process (achieved by defamiliaris-
ing normative or dominating positions), and resist the location of otherness in a 
presumed exteriority, but without domesticating otherness within the category of 
                                                          
53
 Not every activist thinks so, which may reflect the specifics of a given struggle. Fanon writes; 
“In a colonial country, it used to be said, there is a community of interests between the colo-
nized people and the working class of the colonialist country. The history of the wars of libera-
tion waged by the colonized peoples is the history of the non-verification of this thesis” (Fan-
on,1967a, p.82) 
54
 Alison Bashford in Imperial Hygiene (2014) outlines a case study par excellence of this in the 
public health policy and practice of Australia both in relation to aboriginal peoples and to various 
others, often Chinese migrants. 
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the ‘same’.55 This means difference is not a pejorative, and so does not require 
alterity to become likened to.  The Bluest Eye achieves a balance of tension be-
tween othering and domesticating tendencies at the level of the author’s dis-
course, the novel with a subject/object and narrative, and at the level of charac-
terisation. The shame and humiliation felt by the community surrounding Peco-
la, and her family, can be read as directly proportional to the extent that their 
community embraced the American discourse on merit and advancement, and 
the norms that permeate such discourse. The requirement for self-governance 
in advancement (the variably problematised idea of ‘respectability’ (Cooper, 
2017) in early twentieth century Black political activism) splits people from their 
community, and leads them towards a white metric, one which admires and de-
sires (internalise and operate) the white, patriarchal, heteronormative, able, 
capitalist lead (but which is forever in slippage, unobtainable by the very action 
of placing a dubious ideal in a dubious norm’s clothing), at the cost of a sense 
of community.  
 
4.2 A return to ‘defining’ madness 
 
In this chapter I argue that madness is a recurring theme in Toni Morri-
son’s writing that is rarely written about on its own terms in the critical scholar-
ship about her work. Where this is the case it tends to be on the basis of trau-
ma, and with a psychoanalytic frame of reference. Unlike Morrison herself, who 
avoids reducing the madness of her characters to psychiatric tropes, it is the 
case that critics and scholars are drawn into the mental health, psychological 
and psychiatric world for her, to varying degrees, and thus return the experience 
that Morrison articulates back into a dominant discourse. It is not insignificant 
here that “[p]ower for Morrison is largely the power to name, to define reality 
and perception” (Davis, 1990, p.8), power felt most readily in psy-science.  It is 
                                                          
55
 This point is made in full awareness that critiques such as those of Sardar (1998) problema-
tize postmodern perspectives as on the one hand attempting to destabilise the totalising effects 
of modernist imperialism while potentially not understanding its own Euro-American roots and 
interests. Donaldson (1992) suggests colonialism needs to be understood as occurring also 
within nation states in relation to certain subject positions (as do McClintock (1995) and San 
Juan (1998)) in her case, gender. Both these points are important to my study of the colonisa-
tion of madness within the Global North and elsewhere using postmodern theory. I think a 
slightly different point is what Baudrillard (2010) is raising when he writes “[…] this new hege-
monic configuration (which is no longer the configuration of capitalism at all) has itself absorbed 
the negative and used it for a leap forward through the meanders of cynical reasoning or tricks 
of history.” (p.60) - that is, that postmodern critique has an intellectual mobility employed as 
much by hegemony as it is by critics. 
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a curious phenomenon that although African-American writing is part of the 
postcolonial field (Madsen, 1999)56, a field that refuses and resists dominant 
white, heteronormative, able-bodied patriarchy; post-colonial writing is often ac-
cepting, without question, of such patriarchy in psy-science. And so we might 
accept that Morrison’s “representation of trauma is an attempt to bring to con-
sciousness what has been repressed and sealed off, both in literary and fictive 
representation and in historical narrative. Literature, then, becomes an im-
portant means to resurrecting the witness, and important form of cultural 
memory” (hooks, 1990, p.30). As previously argued, psychoanalytic concepts 
may be variably accepted into post-colonial work on the basis that they can be 
used to mobilise subversive and resistant accounts.  
There is a tension in conflating the terms ‘madness’ and ‘trauma’ as the-
se may refer to different experiences, and conversely, by separating these 
terms entirely I would fail to see their overlap in favour of artificially discrete cat-
egories (a problem for diagnosticians). For the purpose of this chapter, there-
fore, and within the context of Morrison’s works, I will treat ‘trauma’ as referring 
to the catastrophes, insults and injuries, great and small, singly or aggregate, be 
they physical, psychological, emotional, social and cultural, that may be perpe-
trated upon someone with or without a turn to madness. Such trauma, however, 
does transform the person (and in keeping with Césaire, Memmi and Fanon’s 
views, both the perpetrator and the victim) and leaves its mark. This is suffi-
ciently accounting for the range and scope of traumas inflicted within the coloni-
al space without recourse to madness in every case. 
This problem of definition, and the slippage of what madness can come 
to mean, is qualified usefully by Megill’s (1992) reading of Foucault’s work on 
madness (and echoed by During, 1992), particularly Histore de la Folie.  Megill 
suggests that:  
 
[…] Foucault’s concern with ‘structural study’ can be read, not as a denial of the 
search for ‘madness itself’, but as a move from a substantive definition of mad-
ness to a structural definition (and thus to a definition that is necessarily plural, 
since different situations will generate […] different experiences of madness.  
(Megill ,1992, p.97) 
                                                          
56
 Madsen (1999) argues that post-colonial literature has tended to privilege the writing in Eng-
lish from former British colonies at the exclusion of native and indigenous populations. In the 
same volume Rice (1999) contributes to the setting of Morrison’s work within the postcolonial 
field, and Hutcheon (1988) locates Morrison’s novels within a postmodern arena. 
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Furthermore, Foucault writes that “madness forged a relationship with moral 
and social guilt that it is still perhaps not ready to break” (Foucault, 1954:2011, 
p.115). In sum, these positions suggest is that madness defies definition outside 
of the mores of a given time, which does not simply reflect a teleology of mad-
ness, that is, an understanding that moves from lesser to more sophisticated, 
but rather, just a different understanding at different times. But the institutional 
roots of societal responses to madness continue to identify whatever becomes 
known as mad with those people who are most undesirable and most peripheral 
– by definition. Here, madness will be treated as a state, or subjectivity, that is 
overdetermined57. Given this, in my reading of Morrison, madness, even more 
so than previous readings of trauma, offers a frame for understanding Pecola 
and Bride, their alterity, and their abjection.  
This chapter will take up the theme of madness in Morrison’s novels and 
will deal particularly with The Bluest Eye (1970), her first novel, and God Help 
the Child (2015), her most recent. Within the context of my project, these novels 
will be analysed with the intention of addressing whether post-colonial literature 
can contribute to an understanding of madness, and furthermore to assess how 
methods and thinking within the humanities field may contribute to the study of 
madness. As such, I show that if the problems reviewed in the critical psy-
science literature in chapter 2 do hold, then literary works, as described in the 
post-colonial field, can be considered as both a means to regulate disciplinary 
dominance (as in Faulks’ work), and to resist it. Morrison’s work is viewed here 
as resistant literature because of the way in which she forgoes dominant psy-
chiatric narratives when presenting madness. She presents madness as an un-
derstandable contingency within certain circumstances. Morrison does not fix 
madness as polarised, she does not construe madness as romantically desira-
ble, nor pathological, but she gives ‘voice’ to madness. This is significant be-
cause logos58, a persistent and underpinning characteristic of Western thought, 
                                                          
57
 Overdetermined is understood as referring to the circumstances of an event “if there exist more than one 
antecedent events, any of which would be a sufficient condition for the event [madness, in this case] oc-
curring” (Blackburn, 2008, p.263) and is a term used in such areas as Foucauldian discourse, Fanon’s 
notions of the roots and effects of racism (Hudis, 2015) and psychoanalysis.  
58
 Thiher (2004) suggests that logos, an Ancient Greek idea, have been linked to a variety of meanings 
including that of “language, reason, harmony, proportion” (p.14). Such meanings become, Thiher argues, 
essential to Western thinking on the self and by extension alterity which influences all ontological concerns 
that follow. The closest possibilities of departure from logos in contemporary thinking as those 
presented outside of Western contexts and those of the post-modern movement. 
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is considered to be also the means by which madness has been formulated 
(Thiher, 2004). This usually refers to an understanding of madness that is a ‘fall 
from language’, which places the mad experience beyond articulation. Such 
thinking, as is seen in that of traditional bio-psychiatry, has within it an unre-
solved paradox. That is, that anything that can therefore be ‘inside’ language 
cannot, by definition, be madness and true madness is without the means of 
articulation59. Taking the critique one step further into the logos which Derrida 
unsettles, that is the privilege of speech over writing, I suggest Morrison’s ac-
counts provide four destabilisations of the dominant discourse on madness. 
Firstly, she accounts for madness without recourse to a dominant psy-science. 
Secondly, she gives madness a voice in such a way as to place it within lan-
guage, but still recalling it in its alterity. Thirdly, Morrison presents madness in 
the written form, but moves between narrated positions, and so, in effect, mad-
ness ‘speaks’ directly to the reader, only from the page. By doing so she offers 
a process of dealienation, a term used by Fanon (Hudis, 2015), to describe the 
redress of racist and misogynistic alienation, which I argue here, Morrison 
achieves, and which I argued in chapter 2, undergirds the mad experience. Fi-
nally, Morrison makes the connection between racism and madness thus de-
stabilising biomedical explanations that decontextualize madness. 
Davis (1990) takes the view that Morrison’s novels “[…] have attracted 
both popular and critical attention for their inventive blend of realism and fanta-
sy, unsparing social analysis, and passionate philosophical concerns” (p.7). 
While on the whole this statement can be accepted, the idea of realism and fan-
tasy become problematic. Madness, in a literary context, may well be prone to 
being transformed into a literary trope of fantasy and magical realism. This is 
problematic because this transformation could be the means by which the au-
thenticity of the mad experience is questioned, meaning that a character such 
as Pecola in The Bluest Eye becomes considered as an example of ‘if madness 
could speak it would say’, rather than a character that has a ‘real’ voice. Also, 
                                                          
59
 There is an explicit reprise of logos in contemporary psychological therapies such as cogni-
tive behavioural therapy (CBT) which often paraphrase Epictetus along the lines that ‘man is not 
disturbed by things but by his view of things’. Where madness, as psychosis, is concerned this 
has taken a curious turn since the late 1990s as CBT was developed for psychosis (CBTp) on 
the basis that psychosis is an experience that does make sense within the context of a person’s 
life, the psychotic has access to their thinking with training and it is amenable to reason. Fur-
thermore, psychosis is increasingly seen, certainly within such areas as Mad Studies, a normal 
experience within the total range of human experience. 
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as Linton (1999) suggests, the reading and critical practices of a dominant cul-
ture reduce cultural difference in ‘ethnic’ literatures to metaphor and analogy. 
So, lived experience in one culture of hauntings, traditional healing, and simul-
taneity (rather than standard measures of time), become understood as not the 
thing they are literally in the text, but are representative of something else 
through metaphorical signification. However, Davis does acknowledge that Mor-
rison’s concern with blackness centrally, most often to the exclusion of white 
characters and geography, allows for a full consideration of material and ‘psy-
chic violence’ (Davis, 1990, p.7), placing madness back into the realm of ‘real’ 
possibilities. In one of Miner’s (1990) footnotes there is reference to the possibil-
ity of a further intersection that complicates the centrality of blackness. Rea-
son/madness, speech/silence, men/women, are paired in corresponding dichot-
omies, and so “[…] masculine reason thus constitutes a scheme to capture and 
master, indeed, metaphorically RAPE the woman” (Miner, 1990, p.98). By giv-
ing ‘voice’ at, and to, the intersection of race, gender and madness, Morrison is 
unfixing masculine reason, and returning the possibility of knowing beyond that 
of white, uni-gendered reason. Matus (1998) offers a perspective that places 
Morrison’s evocation of madness even further outside of psy-science’s domi-
nance. Matus suggests that Morrison, to a large degree, draws on autobio-
graphical and biographical sources within her own life. This comes, in part, from 
Morrison’s own view that recorded history has little account of the black experi-
ence from within the black community. This suggests that certainly, within Mor-
rison’s life, and that of her family and community, that psy-science was periph-
eral, if present at all, in the “reconstruction, revisioning and revisiting of the past” 
(Matus, 1998, p.2)60. Towards the end of this chapter I will turn to Morrison’s 
own afterword to The Bluest Eye, added in 1993, which adds some further qual-
ification to the critique here. 
Before considering the novels, I will discuss Morrison’s non-fiction text, 
Playing in the Dark (1992), because it sheds some light on where madness 
might be positioned in her work. Taking Morrison’s account is important, given 
the status of marginalised fictions in the literary canon. Peach (2000) notes that 
much recent critical, literary work has been influenced by the postmodern 
                                                          
60
 Morrison’s contemporary, Alice Walker, seems to draw attention to the distance and irrele-
vance, of psy-science to the black community, certainly in the 1960s. Truman, a Black male is 
talking to his white ex-girlfriend; “You always needed a shrink,” he said. “It’s symptomatic of 
your race.” (Walker, 1976, p.148). 
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‘schools’, and her concern is that at the point at which women, and people of 
colour, have or are building a body literature, that identity and authorship are 
destabilised as reference points. Peach, quite rightly, is concerned that the 
erasure of any originary point, such as the author, could further obscure those 
people who have not been permitted a literature, or one worthy of regard61.  
Morrison’s Playing in the Dark questions the omission of blackness from 
the American literary canon and also notes the terms under which it is admitted, 
albeit sparingly. She makes a close reading of a number of authors such as 
Poe, Twain and Hemingway, to illustrate the ways in which blackness becomes 
a tool within novels, much along the lines of Snyder and Mitchell’s (2006) notion 
of ‘materiality of metaphor’ in disability. Morrison argues that blackness does 
not exist in novels of the American canon in and of itself, but is a trope, meta-
phor or device with which to relate to whiteness. So, even where ideas of race 
or whiteness are problematised, blackness is the route to that – colour becomes 
the benchmark of otherness. This is in keeping with how Carter (2007) de-
scribes the neutrality of whiteness in US society, discussed earlier. In my view, 
madness often has a similar ‘materiality of metaphor’ for forms of psychological 
and emotional normativity. Furthermore, Morrison’s own journey into exploring 
this relationship of race in literature begins with madness. Morrison discusses 
Marie Cardinal’s The Words To Say It and writes: 
 
I was persuaded by the title: five words taken from Bolieau that spoke the full 
agenda and unequivocal goal of a novelist. Cardinal’s project was not fictional, 
however; it was to document her madness, her therapy, and the complicated 
process of healing in language as exact and as evocative as possible in order 
to make both her experience and her understanding of it accessible to a 
stranger. (Morrison, 1992, p.VII) 
 
For Morrison, her start is an account of madness made accessible, and 
while initially ‘skeptical’ of its status as autobiography, she subsequently agrees 
to place it in the autobiographical genre, as ‘accurate’. Morrison is trying to lo-
cate an originary moment for Cardinal’s madness and (“when precisely did the 
author know she was in trouble? What was the narrative moment, the specular 
even spectacular scene that convinced her that she was in danger of collapse?” 
                                                          
61
 Morrison puts it like this “Criticism as a form of knowledge is capable of robbing literature not 
only of its own implicit and explicit ideology but of its ideas as well; it can dismiss the difficult, 
arduous work writers do to make an art that becomes and remains part of and significant within 
a human landscape” (Morrison, 1992, p.9).  
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(Morrison, 1992, p.VIII)) is doing so while finding an originary moment for her 
own experience of the problem of race in literature. The initial doubt about 
where and how to place Cardinal’s account is reminiscent of Oyebode, who, in 
the medical humanities field, distrusts the accounts of the mad; and reminiscent 
of the orthodox psy-historians, that relegate such accounts to the margins.  Mor-
rison relays how Cardinal describes the intense anxiety experienced in seeing 
Louis Armstrong’s live performance, which drives her further into a moment of 
madness. Morrison reworks this as being an exemplar of the way blackness, 
and what blackness signifies in white literature, is articulated. It is linked to sex-
uality, madness, and criminality (and equally innocence, desirability and benev-
olence); in fact, in the ways white literature regards and constructs the Other 
(and the ways Kovel (1970) suggests underpins psychosocial and cultural sub-
strates of racism).  
In Black Matters, the first of the three essays in the volume, Morrison 
builds a sense of blackness as being inherent to the creation of a Western, 
white, literary canon. In canon formation, blackness is simultaneously written 
out of the canon, or written in only partially, and then, at the edges. She refers 
to American literature as “knowledge” that grows with an essentialism, tapping a 
sense of “Americanness”, which again is not a quality clearly defined, other than 
it seems to evoke a set of characteristics arising out of white, male authorship. 
Such authorship is typified by “individualism, masculinity, social engagement 
versus historical isolation; acute and ambiguous moral problematics; the the-
matics of innocence coupled with an obsession with figurations of death and 
hell” (Morrison, 1992, p.5). The “Africanists”, as Morrison terms them, are an 
“unsettled and unsettling population” (Morrison, 1992, p.6), which, I argue, ap-
plies equally to the mad. 
 
4.3 Madness in The Bluest Eye (BE) 
 
Looking back from the late 1960s, The Bluest Eye (BE) is the narrated 
story of Pecola Breedlove, an eleven year old black girl that tells of how she is 
driven mad in a racist America of 1941. The story recounts her abuse and rejec-
tion by children and adults alike, in her own community, and more broadly within 
the domination of white cultural expectations, including her rape by her father 
(Miner, 1990). As the review of postcolonial writing in chapter 2 has shown, col-
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onisation leads to cultural and self-alienation, which puts the colonised at odds 
with both themselves and their community.  
Pecola’s madness has been variably addressed in the critical literature 
on The Bluest Eye. For some, her madness, like I argue, is a result of alienation 
and a splitting from her family, community and ultimately herself. But this split-
ting requires cautious handling because if, as I argue in my introduction, a poly-
vocal and intersectional perspective permits certain subjectivities to have a 
voice they would not otherwise have, then assumptions that there is a fully inte-
grated, continuous, cohesive, bounded self that is the result or effect of a 
healthy psyche, might be questioned. For others, Pecola’s madness is psycho-
pathology in the medicalised/psychiatric sense, albeit understood within the 
context of trauma and poverty. Here I give a brief review of how critics and 
scholars have engaged with Pecola’s madness and in a broad sense I offer a 
less and more ‘forgiving’ reading of their perspectives. Less forgiving in the 
sense that madness is still articulated in a pejorative sense as a fall or disinte-
gration to be entirely avoided, and that Pecola’s madness is a terminal point 
from which there appears to be no return. More forgiving in that well before the 
social and psychological correlates of madness are accepted in the psy-science 
writings, Morrison and her critics engage with the ways in which trauma, exclu-
sion and poverty drive distress and madness, and how this is an inter-
generational phenomena (again before the field of epigenetics staked claims in 
this phenomena).  
Willis’s (1982) widely cited paper on ‘funk’ explores The Bluest Eye both 
generically, and with a specific eye on funk. Funk is understood as “really noth-
ing more than the intrusion of the past in the present” (Willis, 1982, p.41) with a 
power for “estranging fetishized relationships” (ibid) with funk emerging as a 
mythical form as well as a social opposition. Beyond this, there begins some 
indications of problems in how difference – physically and psycho-emotionally – 
is presented. When discussing the Song of Solomon (Morrison, 1977) in the 
same article, she reflects that “bodily deformity is another metaphor for the ex-
perience of social difference” (Willis, 1982, p.39). The possibility that deformity 
(disability) is not a metaphor at all but in fact a bona fide social difference, is 
overlooked. So, while funk is extended as a means to conceptualise and articu-
late gender, racism and poverty, both mythically and socially, madness and dis-
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ability are relegated to the symbolic. Ramίrez (2013) goes further still, but from 
a different angle, to diagnose Pecola with schizophrenia. As does Roye (2012) 
when she writes about Pecola and Sorrow, from A Mercy, that they are “two ev-
ident cases of schizophrenia” (p.221) (although in a footnote Roye does 
acknowledge that the word schizophrenia is to an extent unsatisfactory). For 
her, Pecola is suffering a mental illness that exists in the world and it is a result 
of trauma inflicted in her ‘tender years’ when their subjectivity is still emerging 
(although when this is complete is unclear – without recourse to psychological 
theory where would the milestone of protective maturation be?)and again 
“Pecola […] symbolize[s] the difficulties that being a woman and racially marked 
entail” (Ramίrez, 2013, p.77). Most of her article is underpinned by loose psy-
chologising of Pecola and other Morrison characters. Initially, the problems for 
Willis and Ramίrez look to be different, but they are in fact remarkably conso-
nant. Both emphasize and show a comfort with subjectivities primarily orientat-
ed to gender and race: neither race nor gender are metaphors to be unpacked. 
Where other embodied subjectivity is encountered there is a shift to either met-
aphor or a concretization of the subjectivity into a psychologized diagnosis. Nei-
ther writer can suspend, and place in discourse, madness and disability in the 
way they do for gender and racism. My reading in this chapter is accommodat-
ing of the possibility of a symbolic and metaphorical reasoning, but equally of a 
situated account of actual madness. In a way I am suggesting that if a critic 
claimed that Morrisons’s Beloved (1987) was a metaphorical story about slav-
ery, it would be seen as an absurd way of engaging with the novel – it is about 
slavery. Likewise, The Bluest Eye is about madness as much as it is about any-
thing else. 
It is the neat resolution of the reading of Pecola’s madness with which I 
struggle. Sadehi & Nia’s (2011) account suffers similarly when they state that “if 
a child does not enter the symbolic realm, s/he will not have a unified subjectivi-
ty” (Sadehi & Nia 2011, p. 15) (again that singular, unified self) and that “[o]ne 
can consider Toni Morrison as the melancholic writer who suffers from the pain 
of racial discrimination and now intends to cure herself through writing the nov-
els” (ibid). The Bluest Eye is also a means, following this point through, for Mor-
rison herself to gain coherence and unity. This is not the same as Morrison’s 
own account that is “the urge to find a “person”, a “black” like herself in literature 
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that sculpted Toni Morrison into a writer” (Roye, 2012, p.212).   For Pecola 
“when her wish is fulfilled, she loses her mind and talks to herself” (Sadehi & 
Nia, 2011, p.17). Rosenberg (1987) suggests that Pecola’s madness results 
from  her “surrender to Western values” (p.440) and not for Claudia, the narra-
tor, whose “ability to survive intact and to consolidate an identity derives from 
her vigorous opposition to the colorist attitudes of her community” (ibid). Mad-
ness, in such an account, remains an absence and submission, and psychosis 
as a variably culturally appraised altered state. Likewise, Ishimoto’s (2005) ac-
count, pre-occupied with absence, and  with violent metaphors, suggests: 
“Soaphead Church ignites the bomb of racial self-loathing that are embedded 
within the body of Pecola and helps it explode leaving only her madness” (p.77, 
my emphasis). But, as I read it, Pecola experiences no absence, even though it 
is a troubling presence, and Morrison is not negating Pecola but providing an 
account of psychosis as a presence, and maybe even a route to a special sight. 
The above account is curious because while there are the limitations I 
suggest in the extant literature, many of the sources reflect on the psycho-social 
correlates of madness and invoke a causality that takes, by implication, inter-
vention into the political realm. By that I mean that the remedy for driving little 
girls to psychosis lies in the discarding of racism and misogyny, and the col-
lapse of commodity capitalism and how these things come to structure social 
relationships, as well as the interaction between all these areas (Kuenz, 1993). 
Likewise noting the deleterious effects of traumatic shame which “takes on the 
intense form of racial humiliation or the numbing form of pervasive daily racism, 
resulting in trauma or chronic discrimination” (Woodward ,2000, p.213), mad-
ness is (re-)contextualised.  
While I cite and develop my reading of The Bluest Eye and God Help the 
Child as alternatives to the psycho-colonising accounts of Faulks, some com-
mentators on her work are drawn into psycho-colonising analyses wherein psy-
chosis and madness reflect, what I would consider, the somewhat troubled psy-
chiatric knowledge that comes to domesticate psychic crisis and altered states. 
As such, I find the cited works above to be insightful as to Morrison’s work for 
intersectional issues of gender, race and poverty, and the value of historicising 
these subjectivities. However, the failure to engage with madness as a further 
subjectivity, not simply an absence that emerges to disrupt and erase the co-
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herent subject, speaks to how critics fail to engage in interdisciplinary thought. It 
is Bryant (1990) who gets closest to what I argue here in her own Foucauldian 
informed analysis of Morrison’s novel Sula; an account that keeps the problem-
atics of madness close by in the textual analysis. To articulate the horror of 
marginality and alienation, but then to turn to the very psy-discourses that have 
enacted and enabled it, is a substantial oversight. It speaks to the way that psy-
science can and does become the naturalised, ‘neutral’ lexicon by which mad-
ness is clinically enunciated. 
In The Bluest Eye, alienation is taken to the extent that social scape-
goats, such as Pecola, are expected to be invisible while serving their scape-
goated function. The novel’s structure tells Pecola’s story in a non-linear man-
ner, and with multiple voices. There are at least three narrators; one unidenti-
fied, briefly Pauline Breedlove (Pecola’s mother) and Claudia, a local black girl 
around Pecola’s age who knows her at the time that the story takes place. To-
wards the end of the novel the reader has access to Pecola’s interior world and 
there is an unattributed recital of an extract from a children’s book, which exem-
plifies a white cultural mythology. Claudia, the main narrator, is an adult looking 
back, and it is not clear why she recalls Pecola, or her story. Thus, it is in know-
ing the problems of memory, and how meaning changes over time, that we en-
gage with the story. Indeed, Claudia notes the problems of memory when she is 
recalling the conversations of adults in her own childhood; “the edge, the curl, 
the thrust of their emotions is always clear to Frieda and me. We do not, cannot, 
know the meanings of all their words, for we are nine and ten years old … so 
we listen for truth in their timbre” (BE p. 9-10). Morrison’s writing during the late 
1960s is significant to Claudia, because it is the time of the ‘black is beautiful’ 
movement, and Pecola would be memorable as the child that is thought to be 
ugly by most of the novel’s characters.   
Pecola is given no narrative agency, although towards the close of the 
novel we have access to her thoughts, and the dialogue she has with an hallu-
cinated voice. Mostly though, Pecola is narrated, and this suggests a further 
possibility beyond Pecola’s madness, which is that Claudia, and the unknown 
narrator, identify and project their own anticipation of madness onto Pecola. 
This is most true for Claudia, who can have no reasonable access to Pecola’s 
interiority, and who does not talk directly to Pecola about her madness, but only 
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sees the surface markers in her behaviour. By writing the novel around Pecola, 
and through the eyes of a narrator and Claudia, Morrison does two things. First-
ly, she parallels the trope of the gaze throughout the novel, both in Pecola’s 
drive to acquire blue eyes, and the recurrence of eyes, sight, witnessing, and 
the observation others make of Pecola’s life. Secondly, Morrison entertains the 
possibility that while not all black girls and women go mad in a patriarchal, 
deeply racist society, the identification and projection of the narrator (possibly 
Morrison herself) and Claudia, suggests that those that do not go mad, can still 
know of its possibility, and its significance. These possibilities become more 
likely with the frequent references to madness throughout the novel, but without 
recourse to a psychiatric frame of reference, even though segregated asylums 
did exist in 1941. Watters (2011), in his account of the ways in which western 
psy-science is imposed on other cultures, applies the idea of a ‘symptom pool’, 
which accounts for changes in the expressions of distress over time, and geo-
graphically. He suggests that symptom pools are unconsciously tapped as a 
means to express distress in ways that are both culturally relevant, and unset-
tling. For a girl in Pecola’s position, the symptom pool may be limited, and psy-
chosis (diagnosed as schizophrenia), was thought to be a white woman’s dis-
ease, with symptoms of passivity, and a listless refusal to undertake one’s gen-
dered, social role (Metzl, 2009). Pecola’s madness transgresses the racialised 
norms of the symptom pool and foreshadows what will become a ‘disease’ at-
tached to black activism from the 1960s onwards. 
While Pecola is denied a voice inside the story, Morrison’s writing of her 
interiority is significant in two ways. The first is that it sufficiently ‘captures’62 
madness without transforming it, and so makes it accessible. Secondly, it calls 
into question the nature of madness as being something that is a ‘fall from lan-
guage’, and so something that is beyond comprehension (Thigher, 2004). Clau-
dia cannot narrate the why, but she can narrate the how, of the events in the 
novel (BE p.3) because otherness can be known if it is engaged with at the level 
of description, rather than explained and marginalised. Rigny (1991) entertains 
these points at least in part: 
 
                                                          
62
 Capturing madness is critical term associated with Foucauldian critiques of the disciplinary 
gaze which results in madness being domesticated. I am suggesting here that Morrison cap-
tures madness to the extent that it becomes possible to articulate it, but the capture falls short of 
domestication. 
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Pecola’s silence, broken only in her insane discourse with an imaginary friend 
who reassures her that in fact her eyes are blue and therefore beautiful, surely 
is intended to represent the muted condition of all women as well as the power-
lessness of children in the face of cruelty and neglect, and to indict a dominant 
culture that values speech over silence and presence over absence. (Rigny, 
1991, p.21) 
 
I disagree that Pecola’s madness is merely metaphorical within the novel. Cru-
cially, Claudia, and the narrator, do offer a voice to madness (and Pecola), even 
articulating Pecola’s story as some kind shared socio-cultural experience (rac-
ism, misogyny, madness). In the final clause of the quotation above, there are 
hints of Derridean perspectives on the way voice is privileged, and how this is 
associated with a proximity to truth, and rational thought. Noting Pecola’s si-
lence is to note the broad relationship of a black girl’s voice within a cultural 
frame that constructs it as of less consequence than any other voice (a concern 
that Cooper (2017) aims to rectify by charting the intellectual contributions of 
early U.S. black women activists and intellectuals). To then give ‘voice’, through 
textuality, questions the potency of presence. Even Pecola’s madness, which is 
a silence in the world, and absence from the world, is given a presence in her 
dialogue with her hallucinated voice. The switches between silence and voice, 
absence and presence, interior and exterior, prevent the ease and settling of a 
singular, dominant discourse. While avoiding a romantic view of madness, there 
is the possibility that “One who accepts the external definition of the self gives 
up spontaneous feeling and choice [and] this ontological problem is vastly com-
plicated in the context of a society based on coercive power relation” (Davis, 
1990, p.9). Madness becomes a means towards resolving alienation  through 
‘transcendence’ (ibid) (not dissimilar to Nandy’s view, in chapter 2, that post-
colonial resistance might be engaged through feminised and passive means). 
Davis suggests that Morrison would be cautious about the idea that scapegoats 
are cultural catalysts, but does entertain the possibility that freedoms, even dis-
torted ones, can arise out of traumatic circumstances (Davis, 1990, p.15). In 
Pecola’s case, her freedom is a madness that allows her to ‘attain’ blue eyes 
(Miner, 1990). While not necessarily desirable, Pecola’s madness, allows her to 
transcend the social scapegoating, to attain the blue eyes she desires, a simu-
lacra of self-definition, and to form a relationship with a hallucinated voice that 
fully knows of her circumstances. Pecola is both a victim of white cultural 
norms, and an escapee from black community scapegoating. For women, mad-
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ness thus becomes a means to subvert and resist rational male dominance 
(Thiher, 2004), and is not just the outcome of adverse and traumatic circum-
stances63. In this sense, madness is never merely tragic, nor is it entirely eman-
cipatory, but rather an excess that both subverts and confirms dominant dis-
course (Penson, 2011). 
Matus (1998) offers a view which takes this treatment of trauma and 
madness a step further in its subversion of masculine logos; “post-structuralist 
discourse marks a turn to the acknowledgement of the unresolved, the discon-
tinuous and the disruptive, which may call into question the emphasis in trauma 
theory and treatment on the continuous, sequential and integrated narrative as 
a sign of health” (ibid p.26). Not only does madness offer a voice for girls and 
women in Morrison’s work, and a subversion of male rationality, it calls into 
question the way in which logos undergirds constructions of self, and even the 
practices that remediate the traumatised back into wholeness, certainly into the 
surface markers of wholeness64. As Mills (2014b) suggests, ‘passing’ for nor-
mal, is both a survival strategy and an act of subversion. Morrison’s structure 
parallels this ‘mobility of self’, by recounting the same events or people, from 
different narrating positions – and so The Bluest Eye is not one story, but is pol-
yphonic. 
It follows that one possible reading of The Bluest Eye would be that 
Pecola has a descent into madness, and so loses herself in a tragic way, and 
that her character is written with little agency, thus making her the scapegoat 
and victim of her family, her community and the broader social context (Davis, 
1990).This is true in one sense, that there is an ‘uplift’ position in Pecola’s 
community along the lines of “a quasi-religious belief in the power of the individ-
ual to overcome their own problems [that] is embedded deeply in Anglo-
American culture [and] has long been used by the powerful as a justification for 
disciplining the poor” (The Midlands Psychology Group, 2014, p.234). So by not 
                                                          
63
 This is reminiscent of Foucault (2008) crediting female hysterics as the original anti-
psychiatrists: “The hysteric has magnificent symptoms, but at the same time she sidesteps the 
reality of her illness; she goes against the current asylum game and, to that extent, we salute 
the hysterics as the true militants of antipsychiatry” (ibid p.254). The hysteric manages anti-
psychiatric militancy by both being simultaneously within the clinical gaze and slipping aside 
from it in the performativity of her madness. 
64
 Cooper (2017) describes the life of Pauli Murray for whom madness, homosocialibility, lesbi-
anism gender and race passing were all significant points of shift and destabilisation for both 
identity and social connection in her activism. Murray, like Pecola, navigates a troublesome 
route through socially and psychologically regulated identities and experiences. 
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taking herself ‘in hand’, Pecola becomes undeserving. I take a different position, 
which is that Pecola, or rather the two narrators and Pecola, have agency in 
their gaze. Pecola may be a victim, but this does not prevent her from being 
much more also. Pecola sees clearly that to be white is to be at an advantage, 
and certainly it appears to her that to not be black, and barely human in the 
eyes of white people in dominant positions, is preferable. She has not the facili-
ty at this point to consciously know that to be ‘whitened’, or whiter, and gaining 
blue eyes, is a further step towards self-alienation, not emancipation. To be 
black but whiter, to be ‘mixed’, is to court suspicion from both black and white 
communities (Caplan, 2001; Heinze, 1993); the problematic side of ‘passing’. 
Pecola sees most clearly what is happening in the racist and misogynist dynam-
ic, but at a cost. This is familiar to Morrison’s novels where “to be other […] is to 
have privileged insights, access to “special knowledge”” (Rigney, 1991, p.2).  
Taking this position holds two possibilities. Firstly, that Pecola (and Claudia) do 
what Morrison says is an essential part of healing from slavery and racism, that 
is, to bear witness and commit suffering and restitution to memory. Pecola does 
this by taking cultural injunctions and living them out to their logical conclusion 
(i.e. value whiteness even if it requires delusion). The worst of racist society, 
and the subjugation of women and girls, is witnessed by Pecola, and by exten-
sion, Claudia. The content of Pecola’s dialogue with her hallucinated voice sug-
gests that she is fully in possession of her memory. Morrison writes at the inter-
section of race and gender as forms of otherness for sure (Rigny, 1991), and I, 
therefore, argue a further intersection for a subject position of madness. Sec-
ondly, in entertaining the potency of Pecola’s gaze, and indeed the presence of 
the novel itself as a cultural product, the gaze (in the way Foucault formulates it) 
is turned back onto the oppressor (in the way that post-colonial scholars have 
suggested that ‘writing back’ is a strategy for resistance (Ashcroft et al (1989)). 
The usual distant appraisal of the object is reversed, allowing an assessment in 
turn of the circumstances of Pecola’s life and that of her community — what 
Claudia narrates is often what Pecola, a silent observer, witnesses. 
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4.4 Madness, racism, poverty and trauma through the narrative of The Bluest 
Eye 
 
The novel opens with what turns out to be an idealised white family set-
ting such as would be found in a children’s story or educational book. The sen-
tences are simple, direct and descriptive: “Here is a house. It is green and 
white. It has a red door” (BE p.1). The tone is one of happiness in simplicity; 
mother, father, Dick and Jane live in the house and have a dog with which the 
children play. The ‘Dick and Jane’ books, in the period of the 1930s to 1960s, 
were a cultural vector within education that presents white, domesticated work-
ing middle class normality. Such books induct child readers into white norms 
and culture (Klotman, 1979) – here evoking a sense of both what the wider con-
text of cultural and racial subordination and situating the Pecola’s madness to 
come within her schooling. Jane is much like the white girl on Mary Janes re-
ferred to later in the novel, which has a certain iconic whiteness for Pecola. The 
passage is repeated without punctuation and again without spacing or punctua-
tion. As the structure disintegrates, the passage gains speed and insistence, but 
loses coherence. It looks to be a foreshadowing of Pecola’s madness, and her 
fascination with white living and family. Although the reader does not know this 
at the first reading, there is a sense of this ideal family image being one that is 
linked to something frenetic and insistent. 
From this point onwards the novel is organised in seasons starting with 
autumn, which take the story through the year preceding Pecola’s madness. 
“Autumn” opens with a brief passage, attributed to the adult Claudia, that con-
textualises the story as being in 1941 and Claudia reveals the outcome of the 
story. Pecola is “having her father’s baby” (BE p.4), and so the reader knows 
that incest will occur during the course of the story. The younger Claudia, and 
her sister Frieda, plants marigolds that did not grow as a childish attempt to in-
fluence and foretell the future (would they grow?). They alone want Pecola’s 
baby to live, which the adults do not. The marigolds become a natural indicator 
of a blight in that year felt by Pecola, Claudia and Frieda, and in the shame of 
the community of Cholly Breedlove’s (Pecola’s father) sex with his daughter. It 
is shame because within the community doubt is cast entirely over the possibil-
ity of rape and Pecola is seen not as a victim but as a willing participant, and 
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thus her status as scapegoat is total. In describing the marigolds, Claudia refers 
to the time it took for her and Frieda to pass their guilt, presumably this refers to 
the silence surrounding what happened to Pecola, their rejection of her as a 
friend, and their rejection of her in madness. The term “little plot of black dirt” 
(BE p.4, italics in original) refers to the soil that the seeds were planted in, and 
to Pecola, whose “father had dropped his seeds in his own plot of black dirt” 
(ibid), confirming how Pecola was viewed. The passage ends with “there is real-
ly nothing more to say”, and that this “is difficult to handle” and then “one must 
take refuge in how” (ibid), signalling that while the outcome is known, this is the 
beginning of a story. 
The hostility that Claudia feels towards whiteness and, in particular, white 
girls as avatars of whiteness, is soon established. She and Frieda want to beat 
up a white girl, Rosemary Villanucci, who takes a superior attitude towards 
them, and tells them they cannot go into the café that her father owns. Claudia 
and Frieda feel what Morrison herself felt when she recalls how a black girl-
friend was jealous of white beauty (Morrison, 1993; Peach, 200065). There is a 
levelling, though, in Rosemary’s response as she cries and asks the sisters if 
they want her to pull down her pants suggesting that Rosemary, as a fellow girl, 
equates domination with being sexually humiliated and passive, something that 
occurs for a number of the girls and women in the novel. In these first few pag-
es the reader comes across references to melancholy, being crazy, and guilt; 
“Miss Della Jones [being] too addled now to keep up” (BE p.7), an “old crazy 
nigger” (BE p.8) who does not know who people are. Miss Jones was left by her 
husband for a younger woman, one of “Old Slack Bessie’s girls” (BE p.8), a 
family described as being almost all mad: 
 
none of them girls wasn’t too bright. Remember that grinning Hattie. She wasn’t 
never right. And their Auntie Julia is still trotting up and down Sixteenth Street 
talking to herself (BE p.8) 
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 Peach (2000) argues at length that Morrison’s (auto)biographical presence is connected to a 
broader project wherein the novel “contributes to the way history is made and remade” (p.22), 
“affirms relationships between individuals and community histories” (p.23) and therefore acts as 
and connects “agents in the rewriting of particular versions of history” (p.23). Drawing on Derr i-
da’s notion of the ‘unfolding of presence’, Peach formulates the past as never present, subject 
to construction, and so typically a history that is deferred and partial, and open to rewriting. 
Claudia and the other narrators, including Morrison, therefore construct a past as valid as any 
other, and one which carries with it a cultural and personal history. Peach is also clear that 
postmodern theorising should not be a “sleight of hand” (p.1) that robs the former subaltern of 
certainty in their resistance and voice at the moment it is gained.  
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Julia, though, is never “put away” because “county [hospital] wouldn’t take her. 
Said she wasn’t harming anybody” (ibid). And so while madness is about in the 
community, there is no easy linkage made, like the one broadly in European 
contexts, between madness and dangerousness, that is, that danger is inherent 
to madness. Her incarceration would only be considered if she went from being 
what amounts to a local curiosity and occasional nuisance, to being harmful. In 
fact, the nuisance of Julia, occasionally startling people at odd hours, is laughed 
off. However, the conversation among these adults leave no doubt about the 
otherness in madness, as one responds to the other “I hope don’t nobody let 
me roam around like that when I get senile. It’s a shame”(BE p.9). Although the 
adults seem to be suggesting that a Mr Henry had some romantic relation to 
Miss Jones, no expectation is made of him to stay and care for her – he can le-
gitimately leave – and a sister from North Carolina is instead due to arrive to 
care for her (and is cynically viewed as being after the house). 
Miss Jones’ deterioration brings Mr Henry into the lives of Claudia and 
Frieda and this leads to the earliest moment in the story of abuse. His opening 
greeting to the sisters is, “Hello there. You must be Greta Garbo, and you must 
be Ginger Rogers” (BEp.10) which alerts the reader to how he conflates adult 
women who are idols (Garbo particularly, is a ‘sex symbol’) with the girls. Also it 
is a reference to transforming the girls into white women (there are no black 
equivalents on screen) and finally, due to this, his words seem flirtatious rather 
than charming. He hides a penny and the girls search him under the watch of 
their parents. Curiously, while Pecola’s continued contact with her father follow-
ing the rapes is viewed as complicity on her part, this is not the case for Claudia 
and Frieda when the former muses that “We loved him [Mr Henry]. Even after 
what came later there was no bitterness in our memory of him” (BE p.10). There 
is a sense of disconnection, an effect of epistemic colonialism66 (Race Reflec-
tions, 2017), in that while Claudia is aware of, and hostile towards the privilege 
of white girls, she seems not to know that they grow up to be white women who 
should be equally worthy of her hostility. Also, while Mr Henry betrays the trust 
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of the girls and their parents, for the sisters there is no sense of harm in 
memory. Morrison is a writer who eschews easy Manichean formulas and there 
is a discomfort in knowing Claudia holds no bitterness, but rather a fondness for 
Mr Henry. In effect, this suggests how male privilege was so naturalised, and 
that there may be greater qualities at stake in relationships than the abuse of 
trust in one area.  The sisters’ parents drive Mr Henry out of the house when his 
abuse becomes known, and maybe this intolerance is the protective quality that 
lets Claudia and Frieda separate themselves from Mr Henry, and suffer no 
shame as a result. 
The Breedloves, however, become a case study in abjection, with Clau-
dia as a somewhat superior storyteller, reminiscent of Memmi’s little colonial; 
one who knows their place in the pyramid and looks down on those less well off. 
For a start the Breedloves were ‘renters’, a state that seems to cause paranoid 
jealousy – “renting blacks cast furtive glances at these owned yards” (BE p.12) 
with a feeling for the temporary nature of their home life. The fullest description 
of the Breedlove rental is prefixed by the insistent recalling of the home from a 
‘Dick and Jane’ book, not at all like that of the Breedloves (BE p.24).  Their 
home is a former store gone to ruin, and is sparse, unwelcoming and steeped in 
misery; “the only living thing in the Breedlove’s house was the coal stove” (BE 
p.27). The name Breedlove itself is both ironic (it is a family that does exactly 
the opposite to breeding love) and disconcerting; love can be grown, made, 
shared but to breed love sounds somehow wrong. Other emotions, such as 
hate, contempt and anger, fit better with breeding. What Davis (1990) refers to 
in Morrison’s books as a purposeful “misnaming” (Davis,1990, p.8) is evident in 
the Breedloves’ family name. Cholly conflates in one person all the worst of the 
stereotypes of the subordinate67 but dangerous black male – he is a renter, a 
criminal in jail, a wife-beater, a rapist and an incestuous child abuser – all of 
which become part of his summative self – not until later is he understood within 
the context of his life. It is not so much that Cholly did not do awful things – he 
was a drunk, he beat his wife and raped his daughter – it is the sense that there 
is an inevitable trajectory for Cholly within the circumstances of his life, to be 
increasingly lost to himself, his family and community and that there were plenty 
of people who chose to watch and not intervene when the Breedloves fracture 
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 As Cooper (2017) points out, black male activism was preoccupied with emasculation and the 
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and descended into poverty. For Cholly, his ugliness was “the result of despair, 
dissipation, and violence directed toward petty things and weak people” (BE 
p.28). Such a stereotype remains a potent one and is at the heart of what Alex-
ander (2011) calls the ‘new Jim Crow laws’ or a ‘new caste system’ in the U.S 
which demonises young black men to the point that they are almost entirely ex-
cluded from society, physically in prison, and through the totalising stigma of the 
‘felon’ identity which is what Foucault refers to as achieving an exteriority (one 
that is paradoxically interior to the society by other measures such as physical 
location).  
So, the Breedloves come to represent ‘throwbacks’68 in their community, 
wearing the markers of inferiority reminiscent of late nineteenth century phre-
nology and other growing human sciences looking for the physiognomies of de-
viance.  The Breedloves:  
 
wore their ugliness, put it on, so to speak, although it did not belong to them. The eyes, 
the small eyes set closely together under narrow foreheads. The low irregular hairlines, 
which seemed even more irregular in contrast to the straight, heavy eyebrows which 
nearly met. Keen but crooked noses, with insolent nostrils. They had high cheekbones, 
and their ears turned forward. Shapely lips which called attention not to themselves but 
to the rest of the face (BE p.28).  
 
Mrs. Breedlove (she is most often referred to in this way, apart from the part of 
the novel about her story she becomes ‘Pauline’. ‘Mrs Breedlove’ seems to be 
her name when she has become upstanding and superior in her martyrdom with 
Cholly) completes her alterity by also being ‘crippled’. The apparent signs of the 
deviance were insufficient; Claudia goes further to speculate on why the Breed-
loves were so ugly and an ugliness which was not their own:  
 
Then you realised it came from some conviction, their conviction. It was as 
though some mysterious all-knowing master [perhaps the big other or white cul-
ture] had given each one a cloak of ugliness to wear, and they had accepted it 
without question. The master had said, “You are ugly people” … “Yes,” they had 
said (BE p.28).  
 
Not only is their deviance worn as physiognomy, but Claudia is mythologising 
the Breedloves as connected to the arcane, accepting of, and complicit, in their 
ugliness and dark magic. For Claudia, and the community, ugliness is a sign of 
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their deviance that predicts their outcome, not an artefact of the gaze the com-
munity operates, which in turn shapes the future for the Breedloves, collectively 
and individually.  
Each family member ‘uses’ their ugliness in a different way; Cholly’s de-
scent into abuse and drunkenness is described in some detail, as is Mrs Breed-
love’s love of ‘martyrdom’. Sammy, Pecola’s brother, seems to take his ugliness 
and:  
used his as a weapon to cause others pain. He adjusted his behaviour to it, 
chose his companions on the basis of it: people who could be fascinated, even 
intimidated by it (BE p.29) 
 
Pecola “hid behind hers. Concealed, veiled, eclipsed – peeping out from behind 
the shroud very seldom, and then only to yearn for the return of her mask” (BE 
p.29). The narrator is suggesting at this point that their ugliness becomes lived 
out, which for community scapegoats is sufficient to prove the reasoning behind 
the scapegoating, with little consideration for the way contingencies and cir-
cumstances fulfil such prophecies. This has some resonance with accounts of 
disability such as Higashida’s (2013) The Reason I Jump mentioned in chapter 
2.  Higashida confirms that for him impairment was not an originary moment, 
but rather it was the social response towards him which that confirmed his pre-
sumed impairment, and began his knowledge of difference. While there are no 
‘formal’ diagnostics for the Breedloves, there is a social classification that identi-
fies and notes the markers of deviance. There is self-belief on the part of the 
community in the necessity and correctness of their judgement. Such classifica-
tion fails to consider how the othering gaze brings the ‘diagnosis’ into being. 
Pecola, though, hides behind her ugliness which variably draws unwelcome at-
tention and paradoxically provides invisibility. For instance, in her experience 
with Mr Yacobowski, the shopkeeper she has “[t]he total absence of human 
recognition” (BE p.36), when she goes to buy sweets. Rice (2003) notes “his 
look is strong enough to be a controlling look, for it is a look which undermines 
Pecola’s humanity” (p.223). A white man looking right through a black girl, and I 
suggest that her ugliness and being a child further voids her of presence in his 
eyes. Her ugliness is also a shield and I think this is as a result of the collective 
attributes of ugly, child and black – these are factors that would conceal her 
from the attention of any combination of peers, whites and adults. In some re-
spects this makes Pecola the perfect observer, certainly at least the canvas for 
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the projections of all those around her – her mother’s self-loathing, her father’s 
lust and anger, Claudia and Frieda’s hope, Mr. Yacobowski and her teacher’s 
indifference, and finally the narration of the novel (given Pecola’s lack of direct 
voice). Her occasional notice is with discomfort, and she returns to her “shroud” 
which foreshadows her social death; a shroud being a garment to cover the 
dead to preserve the needs of the living for respectful discretion. Being invisible 
and withdrawing is how Pecola copes with the impending violence (her “aware-
ness, supported by ample evidence from the past” (BE p.29)), when Cholly re-
turns home drunk. The writing gives a sense of the intense fear at what is likely 
to follow; there is an perceptual sharpening (“[t]he noises in the kitchen became 
louder and less hollow” (ibid)) she reads her mother’s change in activity antici-
pating Cholly’s return (“There was direction and purpose in Mrs. Breedlove’s 
movements that had nothing to do with the preparation of breakfast.” (ibid)) and 
Pecola braces (the anticipation “tightens her stomach muscles and ration her 
breath” (ibid)). Pecola is living in fear within a hostile home, witnessing violence 
first hand, and is feeling utterly without agency or escape. While the eventual 
rape may take her into madness, some of the necessary conditions are in the 
terrible every day. 
Pecola comes into Claudia’s life when she is taken in as a “case” by her 
family, placed there by “the county” (BE p.11) in foster care. The process is ad-
ministered by an anonymous white woman, who delivers Pecola and leaves. 
The extent of a white presence is purely bureaucratic, placing Pecola with ‘her 
own’. Cholly ‘Dog’ Breedlove, her father, had burned down their house, and as-
saulted Pecola’s mother, leaving the family destitute  and “outdoors”, a term 
which signifies a highly stigmatised homelessness (“there is no place to go”, 
ibid), and the status of outsider. Claudia reflects on the outdoors being some-
thing faced by many families, and a regular worry for all, but what is special 
about the ‘outside’ of the Breedloves, is the self-inflicted nature of it. Claudia of-
fers insight into the process of outside, as a material fact, and as something that 
was culturally intolerable as a consequence. However, being subordinate and 
marginal was “something we had learned to deal with – probably because it was 
abstract” (ibid). Such abstraction could be repressed, or thought away, in a way 
that destitution could not. It is from this point that the stigma and scapegoating 
of Pecola is revealed as a role extended to the whole Breedlove family. Such a 
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circumstance was not uncommon in the Reconstructruction era. While it was 
illegal to own slaves, servitude was imposed on the Black working class through 
spurious arrests and laws that punished with indebted labour. It conferred the 
identity of felon, drawing the person into abjection through debts accrued 
through fines, and being unemployed (which was itself a marker of felony) (Al-
exander, 2011). 
Pecola’s preoccupation with whiteness becomes apparent when she is 
with the sisters (Frieda and Claudia), a preoccupation shared by Frieda. Claudia 
is a little younger than them both, and when they drink milk from a Shirley Tem-
ple cup, Claudia “had not yet arrived at the turning point in the development of 
[her] psyche which would allow [her] to love her. What [she] felt at the time was 
unsullied hatred.” (BE p.13). There is a religiosity, a communion, to this scene; 
Frieda brings crackers (the body), and milk (white blood, something that Pecola 
(BE p.16-17) cannot get enough of), in a single cup which becomes a shared 
experience of ‘adoration’. Shirley Temple dances with Bojangles and Claudia is 
angry because Bojangles is “my friend, my uncle, my daddy” (p.13, italics in the 
original), which Temple poaches from Claudia. Such religiosity is associated, in 
Reich’s (1946:1972) political critiques, with processes of mystification that pro-
duce and maintain a compliant docility in subordination (which Claudia is resist-
ing).  
While the first reading of this communion might be seen in terms of race 
(the black girls in relationship to Shirley Temple), it is equally one in which the 
girls are finding each other and sharing, and so can be read along the lines of 
gender. Shirley Temple is also a girl, one exploited by Hollywood towards some 
unreal image of purity and innocence. It becomes possible then, that when 
Pecola desires the blue eyes of white girls, like those of Temple, she is not only 
wishing for the adoration of others (white being more beautiful than black), but 
the power to see the world in much the way a white girl of relative privilege 
(Miner, 1990) might see it, and to regain the innocence that such characterisa-
tions of white, young femininity hold. While the discourse of material privilege 
and class (“being a minority in both caste and class, we moved about anyway 
on the hem of life, struggling to consolidate our weaknesses” (BE p.11)) is evi-
dent, Morrison’s work is deeply gendered. While the focus is on black girls in 
the story, there would be many white girls in poverty, also drawn into idealising 
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movie stars at odds with their lives.  The psychological turning point that Clau-
dia refers to is the tipping point after which the inferiority produced by white cul-
ture, in black children (Fanon, 1952:2008), takes hold. Any sense of disjuncture 
is experienced as alienation of/from oneself, rather than anger towards an op-
pressor. Given that Pecola and Frieda are only a year older, this is shortly to be 
the case for Claudia. The older Claudia’s position as narrator also shows how 
the events of 1941 are reattributed, albeit nearly twenty years on, to cultural 
colonisation and alienation. Claudia’s own recovery thus depends on demystifi-
cation and rememorialisation, which, likewise, corrects the false view of what 
was happening to Pecola (a mad, ugly and unwanted girl). 
The Shirley Temple communion prompts Claudia to reflect on the nature 
of her awareness and her hostility towards white cultural signs. She recalls that 
at Christmas adults gave the black children white dolls and “clucked” over them 
in such a way that she knew “that the doll represented what they thought was 
my fondest wish” (BE p.13), and by implication theirs too. Claudia finds this gift 
absurd, not least because it induces her towards a role of motherhood, with 
which she does not identify. The giving of a white baby doll commodifies child-
hood, lays out her gendered future and introduces the notion of service to a 
white child, much like that found in the role of Pecola’s mother, working as a 
maid to a white family. Claudia was to “rock it, fabricate storied situations 
around it, even sleep with it. Picture books were full of little girls sleeping with 
their dolls.” (ibid). Claudia refuses to make the white doll central in her life, re-
jecting at this point, the otherwise dominant white centrality – “all the world had 
agreed that a blue-eyed, yellow-hard, pink-skinned doll was what every girl child 
treasured” (BE p.14). This puts Claudia at odds with the world around her, 
which may have been a protection against self-alienation. Girls receiving the 
white doll have their worth attached to it by adults, who give the message 
““Here”, they said, “this is beautiful, and if you are on this day ‘worthy’ you may 
have it” (ibid). Claudia places ‘worthy’ in inverted commas to distance herself 
from the idea that a (black) child’s worth is held in signification by the doll itself. 
In her resistance, (she takes the dolls apart), she risks the adult’s “outrage”. 
Fanon (1952:2008), Boal (1979:2000), and Dorfman (1983), all suggest that 
self-alienation begins early, in what may otherwise be innocuous play involving 
white cultural tropes, which actually acculturates children in dominant, adult 
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ideologies. When the dolls are dismembered, this outrages the adults to an ex-
tent, but the anger is undone by “tears [that] threaten to erase the aloofness of 
their authority. The emotion of years of unfulfilled longing preened in their voic-
es” (BE p.14). Whether this up-swelling is due to remembered material depriva-
tions, or to a moment of clarity in the alienation suffered, is unclear. Pecola’s 
narrative is that she shares the same wish for the blue eyes that the adults do, 
and at least part of her stigma is attached to the proximity she creates in the 
adults to their own self-rejection. This is not least due to the fact that Pecola 
takes steps towards gaining blue eyes, and entering the self-delusion that the 
women have themselves entertained. This places Pecola and Claudia not as 
rivals, but in a polarity. The former, in a role that desires blue eyes to the point 
of madness, and the latter, that rejects this incoherent ideal. Between the two, 
the landscape of the story plays out.   The dolls are things of horror and discom-
fort, physically hard and psychologically unsettling, and there is a hint, again, at 
the psychological otherness permeating the novel as the dolls have “moronic 
eyes” (BE p.13), that frighten Claudia. Not only are the eyes attached to white-
ness, blue eyes become the transitional state attached to a disturbing psycho-
logical alterity. 
Claudia’s violence transfers to little white girls. This is within a context 
wherein black adults look at white girls, “and say, “Awwwww,” but not for me 
[Claudia]? The eye slide of black women as they approached them on the 
street, and the possessive gentleness of their touch as they handled them” (BE 
p.15). Claudia is jealous, and feels the slight of the adults, who have a greater 
appreciation for white girls. Mrs Breedlove, Pecola’s mother, is no different 
when she scolds Pecola, in the presence of her white employer’s little girl, for 
dropping a pie and Mrs Breedlove refuses to acknowledge the black girls as 
children she knows (including her daughter) (BE p.84-85). A hierarchy is pre-
sent, shown in how the black girls call Pecola’s mother ‘Mrs Breedlove’, where-
as the white girl calls her ‘Polly’, a name bestowed by the white family. In this 
short passage are the colonising pyramid, the including desire not to upset 
one’s place in it, and also the act of naming as that of empowered description – 
Mrs Breedlove is Polly to the white family. The shame of the black community 
shows in how the mothers of these black girls, expressed in an unambiguous 
favour for the white girls, signifies simultaneously their own daughters, the un-
 
 
168 
 
obtainable ideal. Thus, it is an invitation into the self-abjection for mother and 
daughter alike. Claudia’s jealous anger graduates to ‘pinching’ real white girls, 
but hurting them becomes shameful for her. To escape the shame she starts to 
love them, becoming like the adults, at least until she recounts this story. As 
Claudia reflects:  
 
Thus the conversion from pristine sadism to fabricated hatred, to fraudulent 
love. It was a small step to Shirley Temple. I learned much later to worship her, 
just as I learned to delight in cleanliness69, knowing, even as I learned, that the 
change was adjustment without improvement. (BE p.16).  
 
To an extent, Claudia’s anger protects her for a while, but acculturation to the 
black communities’ white aspirations prevails. It is perhaps in the relationship of 
worship, one of deification, as seen in the Shirley Temple communion, that 
Claudia and other girls avoid madness. By placing themselves at a subordinate 
distance internalises the dichotomy of inferiority/superiority, without ever having 
the expectation of attaining the latter. Claudia’s anger places her otherwise at 
odds with the values being lived out, albeit a toxic set of values. Pecola, by 
comparison, transgresses both black and white expectations by wanting to be 
within the white experience of knowing, and to be adored for her blue eyes. Her 
delusion is not the desire for blue eyes, but rather, the conviction that this is 
possible. It is by taking the ideal of attaining blue eyes to its logical conclusion 
that Pecola shows its illogicality. 
Near the close of the novel, Pecola talks to her hallucinated voice about 
her new blue eyes, and how they were acquired. She had visited Soaphead 
Church, a local man who claimed mystical powers, special sight and healing 
skills. But, by his own admission, Soaphead was a “misanthrope” (BE p.130).  
His disdain for others, and his judgemental and intolerant attitude, led him to 
have “dallied with the priesthood [which he] abandoned to become a casework-
er [before he] became a “Reader, Adviser, and Interpreter of Dreams [a] profes-
sion that suited him well” (BE p.130-131). While misanthropic, Soaphead para-
doxically seeks others out but only in roles that seem to appeal to his grandiosi-
ty, and ones which mediate the contact with others along the lines of certain ex-
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signifier of blackness in racist discourse. As already noted in previous chapters, notions of hy-
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pectations. His role in society, one that is peripheral but significant in the lives of 
those he advises, allows him to fulfil both his need for distance from people and 
his obsession and attachment to ‘things’ especially the “residue of the human 
spirit smeared on inanimate objects” (BE p.131). Soaphead, though, is a char-
acter also marked by his deviance: “All in all, his personality was an arabesque: 
intricate, symmetrical, balanced, and tightly constructed – except for one flaw. 
The careful design was marred occasionally by rare but keen sexual cravings” 
(BE p.131). His sexual cravings move in the same way as his shiftlessness in 
career does: he lacked courage for homosexuality; he was “disquieted” by the 
bodily details of adults, he found little boys to be “insulting, scary, and stubborn” 
(BE p.132), and so he settles on the “patronage of little girls” (ibid). 
Unlike Pecola, Soaphead is an example of how someone in his commu-
nity might be marginalised, but without being scapegoated. He is superior in 
part due to his “mixed blood”, that is, his genealogy is ‘mixed’. “A Sir Whitcomb, 
some decaying British nobleman, who chose to disintegrate under a sun more 
easeful than England’s, had introduced the white strain into the family in the 
early 1800’s” (BE p.132). Soaphead’s misanthropy, and sexual proclivities, are 
described in ways suggestive of a heritage of ‘decay’ and ‘disintegration’, and 
he is the inheritor of a ‘strain’, a term most associated with disease. The Whit-
comb’s could not “maintain their whiteness” (BE p.133), and began to show 
marked “weakening of faculties and a disposition towards eccentricity in some 
of the children” (ibid). Morrison is in part turning back the race hygiene and eu-
genic thinking of the period, by suggesting that the ‘miscegenation’ actually be-
gan with the presence of whites, who could not maintain their sexual distance. It 
is suggested that it is the “old maids” and “gardener boys” that express the 
flawed white “genes of the decaying lord” (ibid), rather than what the Europeans 
would have supposed was the reverse. The Whitcombs were “corrupt in public 
and private practice, both lecherous and lascivious” (ibid) and “dangerous be-
cause more powerful” (ibid). Having contextualised Cholly’s abuse and rape of 
his daughter within a life of rejection, trauma and poverty, Morrison refuses this 
qualification for Soaphead (despite his misanthropy and decayed roots he still 
has some privilege and opportunity). 
Soaphead’s previous name was Elihue Micha Whitcomb, and his father 
was a schoolmaster who married an “indolent half-Chinese girl” (BE p.134), who 
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dies. Elihue is a project for his father, who “worked out his theories of education, 
discipline [his father took a belt to him] and the good life” (BE p.134), on him. In 
effect, Soaphead’s heritage is further mixed. After a failed relationship, from 
which he never recovers, Elihue/Soaphead heads to America, “to study the then 
budding field of psychiatry. But the subject required too much truth, too many 
confrontations, and offered too little support to a failing ego. He drifted into soci-
ology, then physical therapy” (ibid). In one of the few direct references to psy-
chiatry in Morrison’s work, she connects it to decaying European interests, and 
its import into the American context. At this point psychiatry was deeply psy-
choanalytic in its theorising of psychopathology, and in 1941 it was connected 
to the eugenic movement70, which had gained ground since the 1930s. Perhaps 
Elihue would have had his own deviance, drawn from his European heritage, 
psychopathologised, and then exposed, had he remained in the field. Mirroring 
both the hereditary expression of madness, and the psychodynamic process, 
Morrison’s writing drills slowly backwards into Soaphead’s history, exposing its 
dynamics and events, making sense of his current circumstance, but in doing 
so, also construing it somewhat differently to Cholly and Mr Henry. Morrison is 
exposing how men abuse their adulthood and position with regard to girls in 
their care and trust, perhaps for different reasons and to different ends (like Mr. 
Henry, Soaphead appears to be viewed in relatively benign terms), but the im-
pact is great for those traumatised by it. Even within a colonised, subordinate 
community, class and gender operate to build further hierarchies and privileges. 
While the women are complicit, to an extent, in their scapegoating of Pecola, 
there are moments when adults do intervene and protect children. For instance, 
when Frieda and Claudia’s parent’s throw Mr Henry out after his sexual abuse 
of the girls is realised. The theme of adults meeting their own needs at the ex-
pense of children’s wellbeing is returned to below, in God Help the Child (2015). 
Returning to the themes of colonisation in the previous chapter, The Bluest Eye 
presents a society ingrained with a dichotomy of inferior/superior, with black 
people holding a segregated, subordinate place, to whites.  The standards of 
black, cultural life are those imposed by white society, an epistemic violence, 
which insists on an aspiration to white ideals of beauty, which are simultaneous-
ly unachievable, and questionable. One purpose of such segregation, beyond 
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 A number of authors, for instance Whitaker (2002), outline the relationship between European 
and American eugenicists and how this played out in real terms on both continents. 
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keeping the other at bay, was to permit advancement within the black communi-
ty to the extent it was possible, which was assumed to be less than that of white 
Americans. Strategies creating social strata, turns the community against its 
own, shown as snobbishness towards the Breedloves, and a further segrega-
tion along the emerging lines of class. The turning is also against oneself, and a 
number of the novel’s characters are acting with self-loathing, not least Pecola, 
who aspires to having blue eyes to the extent of psychosis. Likewise, Claudia, 
reflects on 1941, with the benefit of the ‘Black is beautiful’ movement, and 
draws attention to the internalised effect of the wrongs at the time. In the com-
munity, in child rearing, and in servicing the homes of whites, black women 
know their place, and at the time, doing anything to challenge that place would 
result in unemployment, a loss of face and all that follows. This is so potent as 
to bring Mrs Breedlove to the point of favouring a white child in a family she 
serves, over Pecola, her daughter. In turn, this further erodes community, self 
and culture, in preference to that which is imposed. Pecola, I suggest, becomes 
one of the girls who performs the madness of the situation. While not all of the 
colonisation themes in chapter 2 are present in the novel, they are implied 
through the broader context, which includes a prevailing sense of racist vio-
lence, as well as its actuality. 
In the afterword to The Bluest Eye Morrison confirms the autobiograph-
ical roots of the novel, which are important to her engagement with rememorial-
isation. She recalls that an elementary school-friend had wanted, like Pecola, 
blue eyes and Morrison sees that:  
 
implicit in her desire was racial self-loathing. And twenty years later I was still 
wondering about how one learns that. Who told her? Who made her feel that it 
was better to be a freak than what she was? (BE p.167).  
 
She confirms “the damaging internalization of assumptions of immutable inferi-
ority originating in an outside gaze” (BE p.168). While acknowledging that Peco-
la’s family was an extreme example, she “believed some aspects of her wound-
ability were lodged in all young girls” (ibid). It would be curious to know whether 
or not, having written God Help the Child, and the extent to which she repre-
sents abuse and neglect in that novel, she would now consider Pecola’s family 
to be so extreme. In presenting Pecola, Morrison was sensitive to scapegoating, 
and wanted to “avoid complicity in the demonization process” (ibid), and in the 
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narration, she felt the challenge of “holding the despising glance while sabotag-
ing it” (ibid). Finally, Morrison reflects on Pecola’s madness; “She is not seen by 
herself until she hallucinates a self. And the fact of her hallucinations becomes 
a kind of outside-the-book conversation” (BE p.171)71. Exactly where this hallu-
cinated conversation takes place remains ambiguous. 
 
 
4.5 Madness and alterity in God Help the Child 2015.  
 
In God Help the Child (GHTC) there is a sense, perhaps more than any 
other of Morrison’s novels, of returning to the world occupied by Claudia and the 
Breedloves (a view shared also in Evaristo’s (2015) review)72. Morrison weaves 
madness throughout the novel, in the ways that alterity shows itself and in the 
preconditions by which madness emerges. I will discuss the novel’s narrative 
and characterisation to draw attention to how madness has a presence, and 
where this is less evident, has a trace, and how again Morrison eschews a psy-
science frame of reference within which to present madness. Bride, the main 
character, says; “So this is what insanity is. Not goofy behaviour, but watching a 
sudden change in the world you used to know” (GHTC p.52), drawing our atten-
tion to the dislocations she experiences. The novel is contemporary, around six-
ty years after Pecola’s madness, and forty since Claudia’s retrospective. Alt-
hough none of the characters return from The Bluest Eye, there are echoes of 
their times which can be heard in the perspectives of the older characters (es-
pecially Sweetness and Queen Olive).  Six characters (Sweetness, Bride, 
Booker, Brooklyn, Sofia, Olive) narrate the story, with a further unknown narra-
tor appearing later in the novel. Bride is the central character, and as her story 
emerges, she becomes the touchstone for the lives of people who know her. In 
constructing the novel in such a way, Morrison employs what could be called a 
textual ‘mirror stage’, that is, the notion that we are known to ourselves through 
the ways we become/are reflected in the views and experiences of others. So, 
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 I think the quality and implications of these reflections also call back to the missed opportunity 
presented by Faulks’ Human Traces. His afterword is concerned with the authority and extent of 
his sourcing, not with questioning about the nature of madness (he seems to do so but arrives 
at the traditional psychiatric view, so questioning is a device) or the experiences of colonialism, 
empire, Charcot’s women patients etc. 
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 As the themes of GHTC are explored below the subject of child molestation, abuse and trau-
ma are seen as connecting BE and GHTC in reviews by Nurse (2015) and Walker (2015). 
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while Bride is of central concern to the narrative, the other characters become 
known to us by their construction of Bride. At one point Bride entertains this 
very possibility when she wonders that “Booker was the one person she was 
able to confront – which was the same as confronting herself, standing up for 
herself. Wasn’t she worth something? Anything?” (GHTC p.98, my emphasis). 
The unknown narrator inducts the reader into a further observational position in 
the lives of the characters by stepping outside of their self-authored interiority.  
Bride is at a turning point in her life as a woman around the age of twenty one 
who is considered to be of uncanny beauty, and who is about to launch her own 
product line as a regional executive in a cosmetics company. She is also at a 
turning point because she has a met Booker, a man who appears to have few 
ties, and so to a large extent is a mystery. Furthermore, a woman convicted of 
abusing Bride and other children, is being released from prison.  
Each chapter stays with a narrator and aside from the ones with a third 
person/unknown narrator, each moves Bride’s story on, with an account narrat-
ed by that character. The style is confessional and intimate, and as mentioned 
above, this achieves two things – movement within the narrative, and a reveal-
ing access to each character’s own subjectivity. God Help the Child is a book 
about madness in the same vein that The Bluest Eye is, in the sense that 
Bride’s self-dislocation, a lack of authenticity towards her own experience and 
background is her route to delusion. Brides inauthenticity leads Booker to 
‘curse’ her and leave her. After that point Bride experiences profound physical 
changes, which it seems are unnoticed by other characters. The reader is thus 
left to speculate as to whether this is an instance of magical realism on Morri-
son’s part, or indeed, Bride’s delusion. One of the effects of the different narra-
tive viewpoints is to accentuate, through omission, this unresolved position on 
Bride’s physiognomy – none of the characters notice that her ears lose their 
holes for piercings and that her breasts and her pubic hair disappear.  Bride’s 
transformation can be understood to be a physical metaphor which confers a 
‘materiality of metaphor’ by which “the same process embeds the body within a 
limiting array of symbolic meanings […] deformity represents malevolent moti-
vation” (Mitchell & Snyder, 2000, p.63). It remains unclear as to what the physi-
cal change (or indeed, the step into delusion) might signify other than its dis-
concerting presence, and if left uninterrupted, whether the process would pro-
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gress like a Benjamin Button, a switch to living a life backwards. However, 
whatever the regression might mean physically, Bride does not similarly regress 
psychologically or emotionally – I come back later to the effect this appears to 
have for Bride in producing a subjective duality in response to trauma. Like The 
Bluest Eye, Bride’s alterity is not psychologised nor psychiatrized, although 
there are points of reference to psy-science, these do not become the frame of 
reference within which to understand the story.  
A critical review of GHTC notes the magical realism more in terms of a 
‘gothic fantasia’ as Sandhu suggests: 
What a strange book this is. Sometimes, as when Bride's pubic hair and breasts 
disappear and she appears to be morphing into a child, it toys with Gothic fan-
tasia. Its litany of molest-ation, body shame and infanticides recalls the grinding 
dysfunctionalism peddled by misery memoirists and daytime television. Its for-
ays into chick-lit territory feel half-baked. At best a camp calabash, it's hard to 
believe the author is not only a Nobel laureate but one of the most beloved 
American writers of her generation. (Sandhu, 2015, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1681205871?pq-origsite=summon  accessed 
1/11/15 at 1452) 
As previously raised, this requires careful qualification when reading 
writers from different cultural backgrounds. Linton (1999), as previously men-
tioned, argues that Euro-American readers might relate to ‘ethnic texts’ as being 
rich in metaphor when in fact the reader is responding to ‘alien’ concepts - the 
reader in effect fits the reading into a framework already extant to them, a form 
of literary orientalism.  She writes “it may be easier for readers enculturated in a 
different world view to read ‘as if’ when the text says ‘is’” (Linton, 1999, p.29).  
Linton goes on to suggest that this ‘is’, that is a literal not metaphorical 
event/quality, may be an intention of an author in the sense that ethnic and 
postcolonial knowledge appeals privately to their community.  An ‘ethnic’ au-
thor’s work is not necessarily written for a Western, Euro-American readership, 
and this may be particularly so in the Western enculturated form of the novel.  
Linton is therefore drawing on the notion of an identifiable, essential quality that 
is a referent for those readers from a certain cultural position. She argues this 
as being about “certain kinds of social difference [which] are irreducible” (Linton, 
1999, p.33).  The implications of Linton’s argument are twofold: first, that a 
reader may be influenced and shaped in their reading practices that are coloni-
ally derived even including those who are otherwise well informed, postcolonial 
readers and critics.  Secondly, voice or subjectivity in the text may then be ap-
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propriated in the unintentional, but nonetheless, colonising reading and as a re-
sult there is a fixing of the meaning, presence or significance of the novel, that 
is, that “signs are failed to be read” and so “mainstream readers cannot pro-
ceed” (Linton, 1999, p.32). Linton thus provides a cautionary note to critics, 
scholars and researchers alike, including me, that there is a partiality and provi-
sional status to critical writing that will benefit from both dialogue within a com-
munity of practice and also reflexivity. Morrison (1992), as mentioned earlier 
(see footnote 61), makes the point herself that critical reading practices can un-
erringly enact a violence on a text that tears it away from the ‘faithful’ rendition, 
a problem for texts with an express political presence, position or, more clumsi-
ly, a message. 
Perhaps more present than any other recurring theme is Morrison’s con-
cern with how the adult world treats children and, more specifically, how adults 
use children to compensate for their own inadequacies, perform their own toxici-
ties and salve their emotional fractures. In such a fashion, madness is conveyed 
not through genetic expression but rather the repetition, thematically, of wrongs 
perpetrated on and by adults; a sort of inter-generational communication that 
has its basis in the utility of children to adults, rather than simply damaged so-
cialisation. By this I mean that, certainly for Bride and her best friend Brooklyn 
(Brooklyn feigns illness to escape the abusive attentions of her uncle (GHTC 
p.139)), that they are instrumentally used. In meeting Sweetness (Bride’s moth-
er) and Queen (Booker’s aunt), the reader is exposed to their own self-
consciousness of the abuse in their mothering, the self-interest that drove it, 
and variably, the extent to which they reflect on and regret it. It is within a con-
text of racism and misogyny, and in this novel, the colonisation of black women 
as commodities, that the inter-generational harm is done – the story seems to 
suggest that while the rules of racism and colonisation may change superficial-
ly, the dynamic remains. This is what Kovel (1970:1988) refers to as ‘meta-
racism’; that which is part of the very fabric of society, and as such, will not be 
remediated by diversity practices and multicultural politics.  It is no surprise 
therefore that Sweetness opens and closes the novel, to expand and justify her 
stern and cold treatment of Bride (when she was using her given name of Lula 
Ann). Sweetness treated Bride terribly because Bride was of such a blackness 
that she did not look like her own (Sweetness’ husband, Louis, leaves because 
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he believes the child to be from another father) and so systematically under-
mines any chance for Sweetness to ‘pass’. She fears undue attention from 
blacks and white alike, and restricts Bride’s life and expectations as a result. In 
closing the novel Sweetness is having the final word and Morrison leaves the 
reader with a close that is chilling – Sweetness, kept peripheral in Bride’s life, 
notes Bride’s pregnancy to Booker, and predicts that motherhood will take its 
toll. Sweetness’ tone is embittered, caustic and mocking, showing no repent-
ance for how she brought up her own daughter. 
 
 
4.6 Driving Bride mad. 
 
Sweetness opens the novel describing Lula Ann/Bride as born “Really 
wrong. She was so black she scared me. Midnight black, Sudanese” (GHTC 
p.3) which is most noticeable due to Sweetness ‘passing’ as “high yellow” 
(GHTC p.3) — her grandmother passed for white, and her mother Lula Mae, 
could have. Lula Ann is said to be “a throwback”, but to what is unclear. The 
word throwback is a reference to heredity, a previous, primitive atavism. The 
idea of a throwback has been a central idea in influential theories of criminality, 
such as that of Lombroso’s work in the late eighteenth century, which linked 
“criminals, savages and apes” (Pick, 1989, p.122). Such a ‘theory of atavism’ 
equates, and then taxonomises delinquency, racial difference and “anatomical 
difference” (ibid), a process seen in Bride’s transformation, and also in relation 
to Booker.  
As mentioned above, Sweetness is aware of the experiences of previous 
generations, their concern for passing in a white dominated society, and the 
value of being light skinned which offers the choice of passing. While Morrison’s 
ideas of rememorialisation are often viewed in terms of a positive writing into 
existence of an otherwise occluded history, Sweetness shows how rememorial-
isation is also the process of carrying forward the subjugations. Her values, and 
the lack of a temporal marker in the opening chapter, conflates the time of The 
Bluest Eye with God Help the Child, and this comes with an sub-textual warn-
ing; that the outcomes of the two stories may not be so different, even with what 
turns out to be over forty years between the times of the two novels. Sweetness 
feels more than embarrassment (that is her word); it runs to shame and not long 
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after Lula Ann’s birth Sweetness recalls “I know I went crazy for a minute once 
– just for a few seconds – I held a blanket over her face and pressed. But I 
couldn’t do that, no matter how I wished she hadn’t been born with that terrible 
color. I even thought of giving her away to an orphanage someplace.” (GHTC 
p.5). Her madness was brief, but nonetheless memorable due to the intensity 
and the action she had taken, and the craziness continued when Louis, Sweet-
ness’ husband saw the baby and “looked at me like I was crazy” (ibid). Madness 
(“craziness”) becomes the term most fitting for the otherness and disparity of 
their child, and so the seed of Bride’s extraordinariness is sown albeit, it in re-
jection and horror. When other people see Lula Ann in the pram, they “give a 
start or jump back before frowning” (GHTC p.6). It is not long before Lula Ann 
herself is attributed with qualities beyond her colour – Sweetness thinks “she 
has funny-colored eyes, crow black with a blue tint, something witchy about 
them too.” (ibid). There is a long standing connection to be made between fe-
male alterity and witchery, and the occult powers to make physical transfor-
mations (her own re-naming as Bride is but one), showing that not only does 
Sweetness hold internalised schemas of race and inferiority, but also of gender 
and strangeness. By the end of the chapter Sweetness thinks of Lula Ann’s col-
our as “a cross she will always carry” (ibid) and then goes on to repeat “[…] it’s 
not my fault” (ibid), which in the context of the temporal uncertainty, displaces 
Sweetness as being both in the past of the story and looking back from future of 
its close. Her repetition is one of needing to convince herself of her innocence, 
and reads like a counter-charm foreshadowing Booker’s curse and the general 
strangeness of Lula Ann.  
Given the theme of how adults use children, Sweetness opens the novel 
and has the first and last word. While the story looks to be Bride’s, Sweetness 
bookends it in such a way as to almost put Bride in parentheses. Sweetness 
repeats a number of times how her harsh treatment of her daughter was a ne-
cessity, to teach survival to Lula Anne/Bride and to survive in her own world. 
What is terrible is that Sweetness is both wrong and correct in thinking this – 
she suggests that “her black skin would scare white people or make them laugh 
and trick her” (GHTC p.41). Brooklyn, her best (white) friend, in fact tries to se-
duce Booker and is opportunistically working on the cosmetic line when Bride 
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absents herself to find Booker73. Sweetness recounts the cruelty of a group of 
white boys to a black girl which she witnesses from a bus – had she not been 
on the bus she would have intervened. It is the writing of Sweetness’s character 
that captures that sense of a hostile world shaping the person (as with Cholly), 
and problems of the choices a person makes, which may even make them cul-
pable within a subjugating context. Fanon’s writing illustrates how colo-
nised/subjugated people are set against themselves and set against others. 
Additionally, Foucault’s (1975:1991) notion of ‘dividing practices’ shows how 
that the tools of subjugation (in his words ‘docility’) include actual practices of 
division – in time, order, location, identity, activity – that is, a structural segrega-
tion. Life has taught Sweetness certain things, and her resistance to adversity is 
in bringing up a daughter to survive a hostile environment, even to the extent of 
providing an unloving home. She has used the horror she felt at Lula Ann’s 
birth, and in anticipation, used it as a measure of the horror of others.  
During Sofia’s trial, and those also accused of child abuse, Sweetness 
reflects on how proud she was of Lula Ann’s “performance” (GHTC p.42). In her 
account Sweetness seems to recall it with a disconnection from the abuse of 
her daughter, who shows a marked difference to how other children respond to 
be being a witness. There is no sense of Sweetness being moved or disturbed, 
or concerned directly for Lula Ann/Bride. The word ‘performance’ construes Lula 
Ann’s testimony as orchestrated, and maybe at some level the connection is 
absent because Lula Ann was, as it is later revealed, never abused. Her ac-
count is pivotal though in the ensuing conviction. Nowhere in the novel is it sug-
gested that the abuse did not happen to some children, or even Lula Ann by the 
other adults, just not Lula Ann by Sofia. Sweetness concludes that she “may 
have done some hurtful things to [her] child because [she] had to protect her. 
Had to. All because of skin privileges” (GHTC p.43). But she also knows that it 
“Taught me a lesson I should have known all along. What you do to children 
matters. And they might never forget” (ibid). The sentence “What you do to chil-
dren matters” could almost be a subtitle to the novel it so evokes a central 
theme. Bride recollects her mother’s complicity in the abuse of a boy by their 
landlord. Sweetness is not “interested in tiny fists or big hairy thighs; she was 
interested in keeping our apartment. She said, “Don’t you say a word about it. 
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 The narrator in part three of the novel sees Brooklyn for who she is to Bride describing her as 
the “obnoxious pseudo-friend” (GHTC p.134). 
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Not to anybody, you hear me, Lula?” (GHTC p.54). Perhaps Sweetness was in 
no position to do anything without significant risk to herself and Lula-Ann, and if 
so, the pervasive culture of silence and the fear of racist expulsion (in the 
1970s) is the backdrop. It is Booker who takes her tale and upset seriously, and 
says “Come on, baby, you’re not responsible for other folks’ evil” (GHTC p.55), 
and who offers the broader remedy “now five people know. The boy, the freak, 
your mother, you and me. Five is better than two but it should be five thousand” 
(GHTC p.55).  In its totality, the children referred to are used by the adults even 
in the process of a court, and Sweetness, for a time, is proud to be seen with 
Lula Ann, and associated with her daughter’s bravery.  
After Sweetness, Bride has the second word, and her first chapter con-
firms the confessional style of the novel. Each of the chapters titled after a 
character is written like an oral account being taken, and Bride’s begins with 
Booker’s curse (which reverses Sweetness’ gendered view of witchery). He 
says ““You not the woman I want.”” and Bride responds ““Neither am I.”” (GHTC 
p.8). When Bride recognises this as a curse (“his curse”, GHTC p.95) she for-
gets her acceptance of it. In this phrase Bride has accepted the power of Book-
er’s statement over her, internalised it and thus begins her transformation. 
Bride’s first chapter places the novel temporally – it is at a time that a young 
black woman can have a successful independent career, it is post Whitney 
Houston (Bride refers to the song “I Want to Dance with Somebody”) and they 
drink Pinot Grigio (a signifier of middle class success, access and refinement), 
and her cosmetic line, YOU,GIRL, is a “Cosmetics for Your Personal Millenni-
um” (GHTC, p.10). The cosmetic line is for “girls and women of all complexions 
from ebony to lemonade to milk” (ibid), connecting skin colour to commodifica-
tion and the market. Milk returns as a signifier of whiteness, with an commodify-
ing interpellation alongside ebony, via another consumable, lemonade (which is 
a motif that recurs throughout the novel). 
Booker leaves Bride, and she ponders what little she knows of him. In 
the way that Alexander (2011) notes how the black male is already in the popu-
lar consciousness for criminality; Bride fictionalises his backstory:  
 
No more dallying with a mystery man with no visible means of support. An ex-
felon if ever there was one […] Idle? Roaming? Or meeting someone? He said 
his Saturday afternoon trips downtown were not reports to a probation officer or 
drug rehab counsellor.(GHTC p.11)  
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This is a flippant revision in that she says she does not care, but in this forced 
neutrality there is nothing but judgement. Brooklyn, Bride’s best friend, tries to 
seduce Booker to establish his poor character (which he refuses), and even that 
reflects poorly on him (but not at all on her, although Bride does not know). 
Even more so than the trajectory Sweetness has for Bride, Booker’s destiny 
seems entirely set even where this conflicts with the reality (it turns out that his 
means is from an inheritance, he writes poetry, plays the horn, reads).  
Bride and Booker break-up over Sofia Luxley, the teacher who has 
served a fifteen year sentence for child abuse alongside two other teachers, 
and who is due for release. Bride has been planning to give Sofia cash, air tick-
ets and free cosmetics; Booker cannot understand why Bride would do this. The 
extent of the hurt felt by Booker is only really understood later in the novel when 
it is revealed that he has for many years lived in the shadow of his older broth-
er’s rape and murder by a serial murderer. Elsewhere, Brooklyn also reveals 
how she was abused as a child and later Rain (a child that Bride meets), was 
prostituted by her mother. The overwhelming sense is one of the instrumental 
use and abuse of children, that it is endemic, and that by and large the children 
are damaged but survive their ordeals. Morrison is highlighting, alongside the 
politics of race and gender, a further dynamic that subsumes the others, one of 
power, which Booker comes to reflect upon later.  Again, what is done to a child 
matters. 
In the case of Sofia, Bride notes that the:  
 
Decagon Women’s Correctional Centre, right outside Norristown, owned by a 
private company, is worshipped by the locals for the work it provides: serving 
visitors, guards, clerical workers, health care folks and most of all construction 
labourers […] adding wing after wing to house the increasing flood of violent, 
sinful women committing bloody female crimes. Luck for the state, crime does 
pay (GHTC, p.13).  
 
Here in the Decagon, is the contemporary relationship between commerce, im-
prisonment and race. It is what Alexander (2011) and Ben-Moshe et al (2014) 
typify as a contemporary trope-cum-reality, and how Harper (2001) sees incar-
ceration and race as the product of a few centuries worth of tradition. Sofia ex-
plains “We worked in the sewing shop, making uniforms for a medical company 
that paid us twelve cents an hour” (GHTC p.67) thus connecting a captive la-
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bour force within the carceral and the money to be made in the medical indus-
try. In a way reminiscent of Foucault’s (1975:1991) docile bodies, one that truly 
establishes docility as being more than obedience and compliance through a 
state of utter passivity, the prison requires ‘bodies’ which in turn produce the 
range of desired economic activity even if (especially, perhaps) those impris-
oned are inactive. While the Decagon is correctional, none of the listed staff ap-
pear to have a role in rehabilitation or correction. Sofia notes that as a child 
abuser she was “at the bottom of the heap of murderers, arsonists, drug deal-
ers, bomb-throwing revolutionaries and the mentally ill.” (GHTC p.66), with the 
mentally ill coming just above her, but close to the bottom. 
Looking back on Sofia’s trial, Bride recalls how “The social worker and 
psychologist who coached us put their arms around them, whispering “You’ll be 
fine. You did great”. Neither one hugged me but they smiled at me” (GHTC 
p.30). It is through the criminal justice process that educational and psychology 
professionals are noted as the mediators, and carriers, of the child witnesses’ 
induction into judiciary and clinical discourse. Lula Ann/Bride is perhaps unnerv-
ing to the court professionals, or maybe the composure described by her moth-
er is the result of her mother’s shaping – to be distant and hidden to the world. 
Either way, it is their role to navigate the justice system with and on behalf of 
the child witnesses. Bride recalls how, with the trial, she received some recogni-
tion from her mother. This absence had, in the past, been to the extent she had 
purposely invited punishment to gain some maternal attention (bearing in mind 
she was eight at the time of the trial). For Sweetness, the courtroom profes-
sionals were something to look up to and she was worried Lula Ann/Bride 
“would stumble getting up to the stand, or stutter, for forget what the psycholo-
gists said and put me to shame” (GHTC p.42). On each occasion it is as if 
Sweetness cannot dwell on her daughter’s needs, or show maternal loyalty, or 
acknowledge experiences beyond the extent to which they reflect her own 
needs and views. It would be easy to condemn Sweetness as a cruel and dis-
tant mother but the challenge here is in fact to any adult around children, includ-
ing any parent. Morrison, I think, is hinting at the double bind of parenthood, that 
is the notion of unconditional love and regard for one’s child while for many, the 
bearing of the child was for one’s own purpose – to continue the family, have 
something of one’s own creation, a legacy or heir. Even the gift of unconditional 
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love, should it be possible, is offered with the expectation of living, growth and 
maturation. This is reminiscent of Mauss’ text The Gift (1954:2002) described in 
the foreword by Mary Douglas (1990:2002) who writes, The Gift:  
 
[…] starts with describing the North American potlatch as an extreme form of an institu-
tion that is found in every region of the world. The potlatch is an example of a total sys-
tem of giving […] Spelt out it means that each gift is part of a system of reciprocity in 
which the honour of the giver and the recipient are engaged. It is a total system in that 
every item of status or of spiritual or material possession is implicated for everyone in 
the whole community. The system is quite simple; just the rule that every gift has to be 
returned in some specified way […] The cycling gift system is the society. (Douglas, 
1990:2002) 
 
When recalling the trial, Bride has her first physical transformation: “Eve-
ry bit of my pubic hair was gone. Not gone as in shaved or waxed, but gone as 
in erased, as in never having been there is the first place” (GHTC p.13). While 
Bride is waiting for Sofia to appear outside the prison on her release, she recalls 
the court case where Sofia was convicted, and as the novel progresses, it turns 
out that Bride’s testimony compensated for her colour in the eyes of her mother 
and the local community. She was held up as brave and was a key figure in ex-
posing the “lady monster” (GHTC p.14), “filthy freak”, “snake”, “devil”, “bitch” 
(GHTC p.16), “the Monster” (GHTC p.50), and even Sweetness shows an un-
precedented pride and closeness to Bride/Lula Ann as a result. It turns out later 
in the novel while confessing to Booker, that Sofia was innocent and Lula Ann 
had lied just because of the way it brought her mother closer. This reveal rede-
fines the gifts on Sofia’s release as assuaging Bride’s own guilt at costing Sofia 
fifteen years, and the breaking of her spirit therein. Furthermore, the conse-
quence of the distortion that her mother’s rejection forced on to Lula Ann/Bride, 
arising from a blackness that emblemizes a focal point of the rejection of her 
community (just as in The Bluest Eye and Pecola’s ugliness, rape and mad-
ness) is seen here to have enormous implications. Sweetness has endeavoured 
to bring Lula Ann up in a way that faces the reality of being very black but in-
stead of hardening her daughter, she had made her even more prone to seek-
ing the maternal intimacy that she needs, even where it involves lying in court 
and the destruction of Sofia’s life.  
The reader does not know about Lula Ann’s/Bride courtroom lies until 
later in the novel, when she confesses to Booker and so when Bride catches up 
with Sofia earlier in the book to offer her the cash, tickets and cosmetics, Sofia’s 
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reaction, to become enraged and to beat Bride out of the room, looks like an-
other violent act by the ‘lady monster’, and one that jeopardises her parole. For 
Booker, Bride and Sofia in particular, the gradual reveal of their stories re-
contextualises their current behaviour which is otherwise open to wide interpre-
tation, and usually, the most negative interpretation. Morrison is perhaps re-
minding us about how terrible circumstances drive people to extreme behaviour 
and that even madness (for Pecola and Bride) becomes understandable within 
a story and a context. She is also drawing the reader into complicity in the 
myths surrounding these characters only to be corrected later. So, both the no-
tion of conditional gifts, be they through parenthood, or an act of repentance, 
and the idea that we can be drawn towards negative interpretation without con-
text, highlights a further theme alongside that of adult power, one of contingen-
cy, indeed what is done to a child does matter in that it has consequence. 
Unlike many of Morrison’s novels there is a fairly central white character, 
Brooklyn, who is Bride’s best friend, although her moments of confession and 
commentary suggest she is anything but loyal. After Sofia beats Bride, Bride 
turns to Brooklyn and tells her she has been assaulted as part of an attempted 
rape which Brooklyn figures out quickly to be a lie. Brooklyn is white with dread-
locks and, as is occasionally fashionable, she is named after a place, ironically 
a former poor area of New York which was predominantly black and working 
class. Besides another viewpoint on Bride, Brooklyn is offering a white perspec-
tive (although with dreadlocks and close black friends, Brooklyn is almost at-
tempting a passing from the white perspective to the black) but just like Sweet-
ness, she experiences Bride as someone who has eyes that “spooked every-
body with their strangeness – large, slanted, slightly hooded and funny col-
oured, considering how black her skin is. Alien eyes I call them [...]” (GHTC 
p.23). Brooklyn, and later a designer, Jeri, who moulds Bride’s image, experi-
ence her as strange, as did Sweetness, and furthermore, they experience Bride 
as alluring and exotic through a process of ‘orientalisation’, as Said (1978:2003) 
put it. As with the orientalising gaze, Bride is projected upon by people around 
her who note her otherness and need to capture it in the exotic. Jeri, her “total 
person” (GHTC p.33) design consultant tells her she should wear only white be-
cause of her name and “because of what it does to your liquorice skin […] 
you’re more Hershey’s syrup than liquorice. Makes people think of whipped 
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cream and chocolate soufflé every time they see you” (ibid). Bride suggests 
Oreos, but Jeri says “Never. Something classy. Bonbons. Hand-dipped.” 
(ibid)74. Jeri takes a totalising view, suggesting that others who see Bride do so 
too, and that this is to be desired and shaped (akin to Foucault’s notion of gov-
ernmentality). What comes with such a view is more than a look, but rather an 
incitement to self-regulate, referred to as an ethic (an idea developed across the 
second and third parts of Foucault’s histories of sexuality - 1985:1992 and 
1986:1990 respectively), towards being the best one can. This is understood 
not to be about fulfilling potential as much as being self-monitoring and self-
adjusting, most likely with reference to some kind of internalised cultural parent 
or ‘big other’. Jeri’s clipped responses brook no discussion, he defines Bride at 
the level of sensuality and commodity – she is a luxury to be consumed, be that 
visually or otherwise – and this is a positioning she accepts for the moment. The 
gaze however is turned back, and while there is a potency assumed from Jeri’s 
direction, Bride also notes “At first it was boring shopping for white-only clothes 
until I learned how many shades of white there were: ivory, oyster, alabaster, 
paper white, snow, cream, ecru, Champagne, ghost, bone.” (ibid). Bride is 
achieving two things here; firstly, she is taking a starting point of not differentiat-
ing whiteness and finding it of little interest, and secondly, she is entering into a 
typology of whiteness. This typifies and reverses the white gaze that had done 
the same to her – to place her firstly in a broad, bland category of black which 
might be a choice to see her as unremarkably ambient within a broad racial cat-
egory. The second action is to further objectify her blackness through categori-
sation with white as a neutral benchmark, like that suggested by Carter (2007) 
in relation to American ideas of normality and sexuality. Bride’s reversal of the 
dynamic is a subtle resistance to the ‘bland/of interest’ and ‘single/multiple’ di-
chotomies of colonisation (that is, to work in broad brush strokes where it ad-
vantageous, while working out and fine tuning systems of classification when it 
is necessary).   
Bride’s appearance, in the eyes of other characters, is more than just the 
human exotic – she is regularly evoked with animalistic adjectives reminiscent 
in their reference back to a time when black meant primitive and primitive sat 
alongside mad, criminal and deviant as subordinate in the eyes of ‘superior’ 
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 Rice (2003) discusses the important role that consumption, including myths of cannibalism, 
take in racist discourses during the North Atlantic slave trade. 
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whites. Brooklyn, after Bride’s beating by Sofia, notes “Worse than anything is 
her nose – nostrils wide as an orangutan’s” (GHTC p.26). Sofia in her criminal 
deviance changes “from obedient ex-con to raging alligator” (GHTC p.29). Jeri 
refers to Bride as “All sable and ice. A panther in snow…And those wolverine 
eyes” (GHTC p.34). Her exotic, animalistic sensuality, plus her conflation with 
consumables, reflects that “Black sells. It’s the hottest commodity in the civilised 
world” (GHTC p.36). Black bodies are put to work to serving the commodity 
needs of consumers – a subjectivization or thingification. Like Sweetness’ refer-
ence to Bride as a throwback and witchy, a continuation of the idea of what 
Bhabha considers is the lived subjectivity of ‘the same but not quite’ can be 
seen in the field of primatology, a study of non-human primates. Rice (2003) re-
calls also the racist discourse, seated in the thinking of David Hume and Thom-
as Jefferson, that black bestiality was reflected in their “ourang-outang” (p.180) 
appearance. Research in primatology has been used as a means to under-
standing a range of human aspects, even to undergird an ontology of human-
ness, as well as human problems well into the twentieth century, including hu-
man reproduction, disease, sexuality, race, territoriality (Haraway, 1992). Such 
discourse is exercised as a means of bolstering the dominant, ‘advanced’ posi-
tion – by extension there may even be further throwbacks between non-human 
primates and the human – a space occupied by those othered into subjugation 
and inferiority.  This is reminiscent of “Darwin’s use of race and disabled people 
as evolutionary throwbacks”, and to “theories [which] moved toward support of 
the growing eugenics movement that would equate racialized and disabled bod-
ies with undesirable deviances” (Snyder & Mitchell 2006, p.13). Bride in fact 
names both these motifs, those of being degenerate and owned in referring to 
the break up with Booker, and the beating from Sofia. Bride is “[…] not sure 
which is worse, being dumped like trash or whipped like a slave” (GHTC p.38) 
and is doing so while reading a magazine; “[…] I turn the pages of Elle and scan 
the pictures of the young and eatable” (GHTC p.39). Elle signifies what Sardar 
(1998) suggests is a concern with postmodern cultural studies; that it does not 
offer the freedoms it is thought to, with resultant pastiche, parody and consump-
tion which still bind to modernist, totalising discourse. There is a tone reminis-
cent of Baudrillardian simulacra in which the process of mimesis is folded and 
repeated, a mass media where commodity and consumption are ever in motion 
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reversing and redrawing the relationship between the two75. In effect, the means 
of resistance in much of the postcolonial frame of reference (hybridity, mimicry 
and sly civility, for instance) can be turned to perform new forms of subjugation 
that here reduce blackness to a ‘new’ commodity while freedoms are gained 
through offering consumer choice in cosmetic ranges. This evokes Bauman’s 
(2000, 2007) writing on ‘liquid modernity’ wherein a postmodern state of instan-
taneity, persistent shift and impermanence, typify a fluidity that is sensuous and 
engaging in the first instance, but is destabilising and unnerving on further ex-
amination – in effect Bride can be all the things that are attributed to her and 
any one of them singly, depending on the medium, desired effect and the needs 
of the consumer. Liquidity is in the commodity (Bride), who is consuming a 
commodity (Elle), which presents a further commodity (young eatable people) 
without irony. A “woman could be cobra-thin and starving, but if she had grape-
fruit boobs and racoon eyes, she was deliriously happy” (GHTC p.80). As 
Baudrillard puts it: 
 
After voluntary servitude, which was the secret key to exercising domination, one could 
now speak instead of involuntary complicity, consensus and connivance with the World 
Order by everything that seems to oppose it. Images, even radical-critical ones, are still 
part of the crime they denounce, albeit an involuntary one. What is the impact of a film 
like Darwin’s Nightmare, which denounces racial discrimination in Tanzania? It will tour 
the Western world and reinforce the endogamy, the cultural and political autarky of this 
separate world through images and consumption of images (Baudrillard, 2010, p.60) 
 
Bride’s response to Sofia’s assault is twofold. Firstly, she tells Brooklyn 
that it was an attempted rape by an unknown attacker (a story which Brooklyn 
sees through), and secondly she wants to escape on to a cruise holiday or 
equivalent. Bride describes Brooklyn as dragging her out of a “classic [thereby 
essential and knowable] post-rape depression [a reference back into the psy 
index]” (GHTC p.43), and likely to insist “I see a rape therapist or attend victim 
fests” (GHTC p.44). Bride’s casual description of these responses to rape sug-
gests a familiarity – rape is present even though it has not happened this time. 
The idea of a ‘classic post-rape depression’ has the sound of predictability 
which fails to question depression as the most classic response or even that it is 
a response.  It is evocative of what Watters (2011) objects to – that trauma, 
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Baudrillard (2010) writes a “general masquerade” with the “excessive use of every sign” that 
“mocks its own values”, a “symbolic liquidation of every possible value” and eventually “[a]ll 
meaning is abolished in its own sign and the profusion of signs parodies a now indiscoverable 
reality” (p.35). Hutcheon (1988) calls the “simulacrum, the final destruction of meaning” (p.223). 
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such as that experienced through rape – has a universal presence for vic-
tims/survivors and the response is likewise prescribed. Rape therapy manualis-
es the response to the act and makes it unitary – again like a consumable, and 
the consumer might be the trauma patient (Matus, 1998), a further description 
that; sanitises the act, inducts the wronged person into patienthood, makes their 
identity summative, and occludes the perpetrator. Knowing that ‘rape therapy’ is 
something she does not need Bride refers to ‘victim fests’ with a suggestion of 
indulgence on the part of attendees. Brooklyn refers to the (fictional) rape as 
something that needs to “wear off” (GHTC p.45).  
Much is made of Morrison’s rememorialising of trauma in the critical liter-
ature (see the introduction to this chapter) and here she presents a contempo-
rary limit to memory. Brooklyn and Bride view rape as a given within their lives; 
Bride’s use of rape as a plausible account for the injuries arising from Sofia’s 
assault attests to its commonality. Their experiences as children (while it ap-
pears Bride is not directly sexually assaulted as a child, she witnesses the 
abuse of a child by her landlord) tell them the role sexual violence takes in life, 
and how the endemic presence seems to naturalise it. Whichever direction the 
novel takes, the violence and mistreatment of children forms the backdrop and 
often the foreground, and it is within this context that I advance two things in re-
lation to madness. Firstly, that such a past derealises one’s experience of one’s 
body, hence the physical changes that only Bride notices, and so transforms a 
person, becoming, in this case, de-familiarised to herself. Her body is telling her 
something, as if her body was no longer hers (“she was changing into a little 
black girl” (GHTC p.97); not even a young Bride, but an anonymous black girl). 
Secondly, that the trauma, be it an assault or the ambient, pervasive neglect of 
a child by their caregiver (again, Bride brought up by Sweetness) actually 
changes a person’s relationship to their body. This is complex in that it invokes 
a dualism (Bride experiences her body as someone who occupies it) that is cap-
tured in the sentiment ‘I am not myself’, the kind of alienation that a number of 
postcolonial authors, including Fanon, would recognise. At their extreme clinical 
language refers to these as body dysmorphias, eating disorders and self-harm. 
If Bride’s physical transformation signifies a ‘quiet madness’ (Leader, 2012), 
that is, a madness that might go unnoticed by others, then alienation through 
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the life she has led, and what she has learned, is the process by which she has 
arrived there. Bride, at the moment her breasts have gone, self-talks:  
 
Stay still, she thought; her brain wobbly but she would straighten it, go about as 
if everything was normal. No-one must know and no-one must see […] Acting 
normal was important, she thought. It might even restore the body changes – or 
halt them. (GHTC p.94).  
 
While the relationship to delusion is different, Pecola and Bride are both 
preoccupied with passing for normal (and is the origin of Sweetness’ ambiva-
lence to Bride who will never be able to pass like previous generations had). As 
Mills (2014b) describes, passing for normal becomes a survival strategy in men-
tal health services and society broadly through camouflage. Furthermore, just 
like madness: 
 
Nothing hurt; her organs worked as usual except for a strangely delayed men-
strual period. So what kind of illness was she suffering? One that was both visi-
ble [signified] and invisible [without the signs usually required by medicine]. 
(GHTC p.95).   
 
Alterity that is noticed by others can therefore be dangerous, as seen in a 
brief aside within Sofia’s story, her cellmate, Julie, “was serving time for smoth-
ering her disabled daughter76” (GHTC p.67)77. For Bride the changes signify a 
physical regression and her confusion is that she is becoming her young self, 
certainly a young black girl, and this seems to become necessary before the 
possibility of regaining her adult self. When she retraces her steps towards 
Booker (who offers authenticity even though he too is damaged by the murder 
of his brother), and meets Rain (a girl of about eleven again abandoned and 
abused, and for whom a recovery involved what is technically a kidnapping by a 
more loving couple who find her) her alienation is reversed. As in madness and 
discourses of primitivism, a presumed regression (or having never developed) 
signifies the rationale, almost a plea, for a patriarchal response – those that 
cannot think for themselves needs to be thought for. What Bride’s transfor-
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 Molly, Julie’s disabled, murdered daughter’s photograph is described as having “the loveliest 
blue eyes in the world” (GHTC p.67). This is  a call-back to Percola and also shows how her 
delusion is not in fact protective for some lives – blues eyes or not, some lives are ‘not worth 
living’ in the view of others. 
77
 In the conclusion of this chapter I will return to Morrison’s own reading of disabled characters 
in Playing in the Dark. While she has much to offer the critical reader around alterity and other-
ness, she reveals her own, problematic placing of disability in a register of otherness. For her, 
disability and whiteness become linked in decay just as ‘inverted’ sexuality does for Fanon. 
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mation represents is a regression without the loss of adulthood, perhaps an ear-
lier need that until addressed remains a hindrance.  
It is during this dialogue between Brooklyn and Bride, told from Bride’s 
perspective, that there are hints that Bride’s participation in the trial of Sofia is 
dubious. On first reading this is easily construed as ambivalence in talking 
about one’s abuse and the personal cost of testifying as a child. In the telling, 
Brooklyn “closes her eyes like a nun faced with porn” (GHTC p.46), which gives 
a sense of distance and disapproval, lending itself further to religiosity and con-
fession. A subtext and parallel becomes apparent and when Bride says “You’re 
not hearing me” and thinks “This is going nowhere. How can I expect her to un-
derstand” (ibid). At that point neither Brooklyn, nor the reader, understands. On-
ly a second reading of the novel makes clear what is happening at this point. 
So, while Bride mocks the idea of a victim fest, she also needs the opportunity 
to talk without judgement, and unencumbered by Brooklyn’s loyal view that So-
fia got her just desserts, without question. It is at such moments when it be-
comes apparent that one of the ‘inherited’ qualities that Bride uses is a capacity 
for self-deception and for the limits of that to be felt. Brooklyn asks her directly 
“Say, Bride, did she molest you?” (GHTC p.48) and Bride evades this internally 
(“What does she think? That I’m a secret lesbian?”(ibid), conflating same gen-
der abuse with lesbianism) before thinking “What’s the point of closets these 
days?” (ibid), while using a form of closet to compartmentalise her guilt. Her 
mother’s presence in herself is revealed when Bride “shoot[s] her [Brooklyn] the 
look Sweetness always put on when I spilled the Kool-Aid or tripped on the rug.” 
(GHTC p.48-49). 
The omniscient narrator who turns up in later parts of the novel confirms 
much of what can be taken from the accounts previously mentioned.  In tracking 
Booker into unknown territory Bride feels “safe, colonized somehow” (GHTC 
p.78), a phrasing that is pairing safety with colonisation, like Friere (1970:1996) 
who writes “[f]ear of freedom, of which its possessor is not necessarily aware, 
make him see ghosts. Such an individual is actually taking refuge in an attempt 
to achieve security, which he or she prefers to the risks of liberty” (p.18). The 
narrator reflects on the ways in which the impoverished security of Sweetness’ 
touch was without maternal affection or warmth which for Bride “confirmed her 
helplessness in the presence of confounding cruelty” (GHTC p.79). 
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Booker’s past is narrated in part 2 of the novel, as is his theorising of the 
relationship of economics and power and racism. In taking courses as a student 
in African American studies, he remains with the question why? Booker draws 
the following conclusion;  
 
He suspected most of the real answers concerning slavery, lynching, forced labor, 
sharecropping, racism, Reconstruction, Jim Crow, prison labor, migration, civil rights 
and black revolution movements were all about money. Money withheld, money stolen, 
money as power, as war. Where was the lecture on how slavery alone catapulted the 
whole country from agriculture into the industrial age in two decades?” (GHTC p.111) 
 
This passage is important for a number of reasons. It refers back to Morrison’s 
Playing in the Dark asking the same questions she had in 1992 about the ab-
sence of blackness, and black history, in the discourse on country building and 
the culture of America. The passage links the occlusion of blackness in Ameri-
can scholarship and an avoidance of the most testing and challenging of possi-
bilities in the academy, to the extent of complicity. Intertextually there is a refer-
ence to Reich’s (1946:1972) The Mass Psychology of Fascism, a text influential 
for Fanon (Hudis, 2015), but unlike Fanon’s critique and synthesis of Marxism78 
and psychoanalysis, with no consideration of racism. Reich is suggesting that 
fascism arises through a blend of capitalist and imperialist tendencies, and psy-
chosexual repression mobilised through the mystifying presence of religion. In 
Booker’s story, as it is revealed, the murder and abuse of his brother, plus 
Booker’s own analysis of power, puts race back into the blend of money, power 
and sexuality. Booker goes on “to learn how money shaped every single op-
pression in the world and created all the empires, nations, colonies with God 
and His enemies employed to reap, then veil, the riches” (GHTC p.111). From 
Wilkinson & Pickett’s (2010) work on the relationship between inequality and a 
range of social and health outcomes, to the myriad critiques of neo-colonialism 
(Mills, 2014a) and  neo-liberalism (for instance Chomsky & Achar, 2008; Jensen 
2006), Booker’s account (and perhaps more inclusively, Morrison’s oeuvre) 
crystallises the alienating problematic. That is, alienation both in the Marxist 
sense of being disenfranchised from one’s work and activity, and the psy-
cho/sexual/social alienation of being unable to recognise oneself (is at odds 
with oneself) and to forgo ‘mutual recognition’ (Hudis, 2015) among others. 
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Booker, like Fanon and other race activists, postcolonial scholars and cultural 
studies critics knows  
 
Scientifically there’s no such thing as race […] so racism without race is a 
choice. Taught of course, by those who need it, but still a choice. Folks who 
practice it would be nothing without it (GHTC p.143).  
 
Booker’s intellect had been formed within a ‘dis-alienated’ family, one 
that came together and learned together in warmth and support before Adam 
(his brother) was abducted and murdered – an event that split the family. Oth-
erwise “[he] had been shaped by talk in the flesh and text on paper” (GHTC 
p.112). Besides the loss of Adam, Booker’s growing awareness of the condi-
tions of his world take a toll as “his mild cynicism morphed into depression” 
(GHTC p.121) and he became bored and listless, unlike the lack of seriousness 
evident on the part of his peers. Perhaps Booker’s poetry reveals the cost of his 
thinking “Trying to understand racist malignancy only feeds it […] I refuse to be 
ashamed of my shame, you know, the one assigned to me” (GHTC p.150, em-
phasis in the original).  
Racism and madness are shown in their overdetermined nature in that 
Booker and Bride have different backgrounds, and their shame and humiliation 
came from different experiences (hers in maternal rejection, his in a loving fami-
ly sundered by violence) but arrive in similar places – a powerlessness that is 
felt to the extent in Bride that she physically morphs, and in Booker, that he is 
arrested at the point of Adam’s body being discovered (this Queen Olive, his 
Aunt confirms). Both are trapped in different pasts that limit their present, and 
both feel echoes of that past in a society which remains infused with racism and 
colonisation. Towards the end of the novel, both Olive79 and Sweetness wonder 
separately about the hurt that still remains for Bride and Booker in their life to-
gether. As does the narrator looking on at Bride’s pregnancy: 
 
A child. New life. Immune to evil or illness, protected from kidnap, beatings, 
rape, racism, insult, hurt, self-loathing, abandonment. Error-free. All goodness. 
Minus wrath. So they believe. (GHTC p.175) 
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  Olive reflects; “They will blow it, she thought. Each will cling to a sad little story of hurt and 
sorrow – some long ago trouble and pain life dumped on their pure and innocent selves. And 
each one will rewrite that story forever, knowing the plot, guessing the theme, inventing its 
meaning and dismissing its origin. What waste.” (GHTC p.158) 
 
 
192 
 
There is, however, sufficient mutual recognition between them to ‘dis-alienate’, 
and to entertain a future with less hurt — Bride’s body signifies this by returning 
to her adult state (or resolving her delusion) and becoming pregnant. Booker 
experiences “the disintegration of the haunt and gloom in which for years Ad-
am’s death had clouded him…[he] became as emotionally content as he had 
been before Adam had skated into the sunset” (GHTC p.132). In a typically 
Morrison way this resolution is not sentimental, because as already mentioned, 
Sweetness has the final word, and it is one that is cynical about the extent to 
which Bride can be happy, and the extent to which a child will make her so. 
With a nod to Mauss, a ‘gift’ of a baby is not without its costs. Perhaps Sweet-
ness is looking for redemption not through forgiveness, but through vindication 
of her own mothering repeated through Bride’s. 
 
4.7 Conclusion. 
 
During the course of the two novels discussed here, it has become evi-
dent that one of the challenges of literary contributions to the mental health field 
is how a novel comes to be known as one about madness. Conventions that 
psychologise and psychiatrize experience make some novels more readily 
amenable to critical discourse and as such become ‘mental health stories’. Mor-
rison’s novels have an uneasy relationship to such a field – they do not speak to 
a psy agenda on madness even though they are deeply psychological novels. 
Madness is presented as overdetermined, not easily represented, nor domesti-
cated for consumption. She avoids a simplistic pop psychology that singles out 
a single index for madness. In her novels madness becomes understandable 
but still indicative of otherness. I have argued that such a way of writing mad-
ness is crucial to understanding the colonisation of madness, and Morrison 
shows that madness can be written about and engaged with without recourse to 
dominant models and discourse. The plurality that is the necessary dynamic of 
the other, that is, the presumed and constructed not-sameness that comes to 
define otherness, is retained making a richer evocation of the lived subjectivity, 
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possible. It is at the level of personal story essential for the disalienation80  
which is itself part of decolonisation. 
Morrison’s work, however, is not without its problems, not least of which 
is the less enraptured reception of her novels (see Sandhu’s (2015) review of 
God Help the Child). And the critique here also has tensions – I have put to 
work the scholarship of a number of white Europeans in critiquing Morrison 
which is open to the accusation that I have made sense of her work through a 
certain, arguably non-applicable, Eurocentric (often male) lens.  
Troubles in her own work arise in how Morrison makes use of disability. 
In Playing in the Dark, the first essay ‘black matters’, presents a critique of Willa 
Cather’s Sapphira and the Slave Girl. That novel is the not the concern here, 
but rather Morrison’s development of the problems with it. Sapphira is the name 
of a disabled governess on a slave owning plantation who is jealous that a 
young slave woman will entice her husband. She is “an invalid confined to her 
chair and dependent on slaves for the most intimate services” (p.19). Morrison 
suggests the novel is about “the interdependent working of power, race, and 
sexuality in a white woman’s battle for coherence” (p.20), and certain themes 
show “bizarre and disturbing deformations of reality” (p.23). Sapphira is showing 
“the unabated power of a white woman gathering identity unto herself from the 
wholly available and serviceable lives of Africanist others” (p.25). Furthermore, 
“This novel is not the story of a mean, vindictive mistress; it is the story of a 
desperate one. It concerns a troubled, disappointed woman confined to the 
prison of her defeated flesh” (p.25, my emphasis).  Sapphira “escapes the ne-
cessity of inhabiting her own body by dwelling on the young” and “escapes her 
illness, decay, confinement, anonymity, and physical powerlessness” (p.26), 
and she uses black bodies to “construct a self” and to “exercise power without 
risk” (p.28).  
There is an irony to Morrison’s critique in that the very problems she 
raises for blackness, the invisible but essential presence of it (and the ways in 
which race is put to use), are the problems she creates in using disability in her 
critique. Disability and moral failings on Sapphira’s part are conflated, her phys-
ical state is one of decay and imprisonment which mirrors her spiritual limitation, 
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 Hudis (2015) recalls this as being to do with Fanon’s humanism based in Hegelian thought, that is: the 
move from specific, then to particular, and to the general, and how such a process underpins decolonisa-
tion for Fanon. 
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and she is dependent even to the extent of using those she feels are inferior in 
her everyday routine, and to hold an identity. There is a moment when Morrison 
is sympathetic to her powerlessness (not mean or vindictive) but this evokes 
pity rather than understanding. What this tells us is that even a highly regarded 
author and Nobel laureate can fall foul of the very dynamic she objects to. It al-
so shows two other things; that physical and psychological alterity remain sub-
ordinate subjectivities in a hierarchisation, emerging from supposed patholo-
gies. The conflation of moral, mental and physical difference and limitations can 
be as much a trope of postcolonial scholarship as it is eugenics. Very swiftly, 
undesirable ways of being become undesirable summative identities that then 
become amenable to all the socio-political, culture, literary and human science 
disciplinary gazes. The urgency of Pecola and Bride’s circumstance becomes 
clearer, because if to be white and disabled is to be powerless and decayed, 
what would it mean to be black and mad, or black and physically morphing? 
Secondly, Morrison’s ‘materiality of metaphor’ shows the dangerousness of 
metaphor and how easily it becomes serviceable to the othering process even 
while it looks to be erudite and sharp in its delivery (there is nothing sharp about 
a disfigured but piteous villain. Such Gothic exaggeration as the Beast (re-
deemed through Beauty), Darth Vader and many James Bond villains, show 
how popular a trope/cliché this is).  
The critique above is not to knock Morrison’s politic and problematic but 
rather to see the engagement with a lived subjectivity as an on-going project 
that is imperfect, necessarily parochial and subject to problematisation. The fact 
that Morrison’s writing avoids over generalizations and cultural metanarratives, 
or on the whole a reliance on dubious essentialisms, means that her work is re-
deemable – the distance to engaging alterity is shorter.     
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION. 
 
5.1 Psycho-colonisation – the scholarly process 
 
When I began this project one of my initial tasks was noting the sources 
in which psychiatry and its affiliates were referred to as colonisers and/or impe-
rialists.  At the time the word ‘colonisation’ and its variations acted as suitable 
place markers in the anticipation that these were referents for what may be pro-
cesses and events elucidated later in those texts. Throughout this project, I con-
tinued to find such examples and after a while, certainly after the first two chap-
ters had been written, I noted the reference but did not amend the chapters fur-
ther. This highlights the regularity with which the words ‘colonising’ and ‘imperi-
alism’ are used in documents critical of psychiatry. At the opening of this con-
cluding chapter I want to return to this phenomenon as a means to drawing to a 
close the thesis I have presented, before moving on to discussing some implica-
tions for literary criticism, research and mental health practice. I will also return 
to my research questions from chapter 1. 
The process went like this; I would note a critical remark by a given au-
thor about the way in which psychiatry, or psy-science, was a coloniser or impe-
rialistic, and then I would read on to see how this train of thought was devel-
oped. With few, excellent exceptions, the train of thought was not developed, 
explained or expanded upon. I considered this a gap in the intellectual ‘working 
out’ underpinning accusations of colonisation. These were often highly regarded 
writers, in well-reviewed books, whose use of powerful expressions cannot be 
overlooked as inconsequential. Conversely, the problems highlighted in some 
texts as ones of colonisation, are problems elucidated by other writers but not in 
such terms (like Johnstone (2000) which outlines many of the problems of mis-
ogynistic, racist and classist psy-science without recalling it as a coloniser). This 
might mean that either colonisation is a term of variable utility and appropriate-
ness, or that the issues of psycho-colonisation remain an unrecognised seam of 
problems. The most recent example I have read81, while preparing this final 
chapter, helps to illustrate this phenomenon and the problem (and opportunity) 
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 Also Davies’ Cracked: Why Psychiatry is Doing More Harm Than Good (2013) which has a 
chapter titled ‘Psychiatric Imperialism’. The chapter draws heavily on Watters (2011) but also 
extends beyond it, but without fully developing the ways in which the imperialism occurs. 
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it presents. In addition, by examining this example I reiterate the main themes of 
this thesis. 
In the twenty-fifth anniversary edition of the highly regarded book Women 
and Madness (1972:1997), Phyllis Chesler, the author, provides a new introduc-
tion. She begins by listing the patriarchal crimes psychiatry has perpetrated 
against women including misogynistic theory (penis envy, inferiority etc.), the 
obscuring of oppression as a causal factor for madness and distress, diagnos-
tics that subdue and demonise, an array of pathologising practices and victim 
blaming. To sum this up in a one sentence paragraph, intended to add empha-
sis, she writes “I still think of this as psychiatric imperialism” (Chesler, 1997, 
p.1). Three pages later after describing further the problems women face in con-
tact with psychiatry she writes; “I was trying to understand what a struggle for 
freedom might entail, psychologically, when the colonized group was female” 
(ibid, p.4). The use of the words ‘imperialism’ and ‘colonized’ are not explained 
further. There are some interpretative possibilities open to the reader, and first-
ly, that these are thoughtless terms written for emotional impact but without 
qualification. While this is possible, this is a regularity in the critical literature, as 
shown in chapters 1 and 2. These are potent terms and given their emphasis, I 
think otherwise. Chesler seems to be inviting the reader to understand process-
es of psychiatry, when seen in the context of misogyny, to be colonising (or mi-
sogyny read within the context of psychiatry). Which came first, and what psy-
chiatry brings, that makes misogyny in its practices colonising (as opposed to all 
misogyny being colonising), is unclear. Perhaps all misogyny is colonising, and 
this is true when applied equivalently to practices on the basis race, ethnicity, 
class, sexuality, gender fluidity and disability. And therein lies the problem; col-
onisation is a word that has a historical and geopolitical meaning, and has been 
used specifically within certain historical contexts. Its meaning is either specific 
to a set of circumstances or it is a broad, catch-all term for references to domi-
nation and subjugation. The lack of development in thinking about colonisation 
in the context of madness and mental health leaves these two possibilities in 
play, and I believe unhelpfully so, given the potency of the words. It is unlikely 
that colonisation is a term applied to subjugation broadly because while it is ap-
plied with regularity, it is not ubiquitous. Also, for the texts that do expand on its 
meaning within a psy-context, they are referring to a far more qualified use. 
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Chesler’s choice of words highlights another dilemma taken up in this 
thesis. That is, where does colonisation, or rather ‘psycho-colonisation’, take 
place? Of the critical positions I reviewed in chapters 1 and 2, the ones that 
most consistently engage in a thoughtful way with psycho-colonisation do so as 
a critique of western psychiatry and ‘big pharma’ in the global south. The prob-
lem outlined here is along the lines of geopolitical concerns about how western 
culture, or rather the parts of western culture that are for sale, find their ways 
into other parts of the world, which are viewed as new markets, and pushed 
with a highly dubious rationale and effect. ‘West is best’ is the strapline that un-
derpins such activity and this is propped up by relationships with the World 
Health Organisation, who are pleading for parity of psychiatric access and care 
with the industry standard being what is on offer in the global north. This is gen-
erally without recourse to the robust concerns of a critical minority within the 
mental health field that are less enamoured of the industry standard.  
Returning to Chesler; there is a different problem that she alludes to but 
one that is left implicit. Her concern is for ‘psychiatrized’ women of the global 
north and for women as a colonised population. This idea that the problem of 
colonisation for the global south may in fact be equal to, if not exactly, the prob-
lem for the global north, has received relatively little attention. It raises the ques-
tion of how a segment of a population might be colonised within its own nation, 
boundaries or community – what has been referred to as an ‘internal colony’82. 
Even more curiously, and as I showed in chapter three, even critics of the men-
tal health ‘imperium’ subscribe to its clinical concepts. Chesler argues that men-
tal illness is real, that “Depression is real too, and has a neurochemical basis 
[…]” (Chesler, 1972:1997, p.10). Presumably she is viewing this in terms of ac-
cess to health care, and she does challenge how women’s distress has often 
been dismissed as being ‘all in the head’. Her argument resembles the cam-
paign around health care access for HIV/AIDS where a real disease state is be-
ing overlooked, or systematically ignored, because of the prejudice towards 
whom it mainly affects; black sub-Saharan Africans and gay men. The differ-
ence is, however, the neurochemical basis of depression, even twenty years on, 
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 While not referring to the ‘internal colony’ directly, Kutchins & Kirk (1997) review racism and 
psychiatry from the late 1700s up to publication in the U.S.A., documenting a long history of 
connection between the two. This is typified by the practices already reviewed in this thesis 
such as certain diagnostic practices as applied to the Black population (before, during and after 
abolition), theories of vulnerability and inferiority, segregation and intrusive treatment. 
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remains highly questionable. The oversight I believe Chesler makes is to ques-
tion the immediate processes and claims of psychiatry as being paternalistic 
and patriarchal, without questioning the social and cultural context of knowledge 
production that sits around psychiatry. She is prepared to accept the (mostly 
funded by Big Pharma) research on the neurochemistry of misery, but goes on 
to question its application with ‘clinical populations’, who will have been the very 
people taking part in the studies. I discuss something similar regarding the so-
cial model of disability (Penson, 2015), wherein the adoption of the social model 
within mental health activism may, without awareness, draw on an assumption 
of impairment that does not travel quite so easily from physical and sensory 
disability activism. While she is not mistaken in her assessment of misogynistic 
clinical practice, she has viewed only part of the cycle of misogyny, missing the 
structures and frameworks that make psychiatric colonisation possible. Chesler 
takes the first person experience of women in distress as a primary source of 
knowledge, she understands the effects of social stratification and class on the 
experience of mental health services, and she sees trauma and rape culture as 
experiences that underpin and make sense of much of women’s madness and 
distress. But she does not situate the knowledge she relies on in thinking about 
mental illness within the same context. This trust in science, and those who 
practice it, is one of the very characteristics that psycho-colonisation exploits. 
Dwelling on Chesler’s book has enabled me to succinctly explain the ne-
cessity of my project. My aims and research questions have taken this regular 
accusation of psycho-colonisation, and treated it as serious enough to warrant 
further consideration. But in beginning to do so I encountered gaps in the re-
search rationale, and the underpinning scholarship, that in turn required atten-
tion and thought. To arrive at this conclusion chapter I have taken the following 
steps which I represent for ease here, in reverse, from the claim that psy-
science is colonising. Lastly, I would need to show an example of where psy-
cho-colonisation can be found and contrast it to a place where it is mostly ab-
sent, otherwise I arrive at the same point as Chesler and others, with a broad 
brush stroke claim. To say psychiatry is totally colonising all the time, overlooks 
the periods and points of resistance within the discipline and by its allies. This is 
especially so given that much of the critical literature is written by people within 
the field, including now, myself. Additionally, if colonisation is to be seen as 
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growth of influence or presence, then it is of little worth to look into the psychiat-
ric ‘imperial centre’ – in effect I would be asking ‘do I find a disciplinary intensity 
where it is most concentrated?’ – this is at best a tautological piece of reasoning 
and of course I would answer it ‘yes’. That is why I selected a cultural vector 
within which colonisation could be discerned, outside of the imperial center, 
hence my treatment of novels. Novels about madness and psychiatry are suffi-
ciently related to the field of interest to be relevant, and are sufficiently accessi-
ble as to carry meaning beyond the strict psy-disciplinary area. Film, theatre, 
reportage or popular media would and could be equally fruitful in such a re-
search project, however, when I take my next step back and draw on postcolo-
nial theory, the novel has a special place. 
Selecting the novels of Faulks and Morrison provided the exemplars that 
I needed to see psy-science just beyond its centre. Faulks’ work, especially, but 
not exclusively, Human Traces, presents a literary orthodoxy of psychiatry 
which shows partisanship in his sourcing.  The effect, I argue, is that Human 
Traces becomes a plausible backstory to psychiatry developing in the late nine-
teenth century, a key period in its growth and establishment. Faulks writes 
mostly in a dispassionate tone presenting an account sufficiently factual to be 
educative, and in not sparing the reader the ugly reality of the necessities of the 
development of psychiatric clinical science, he evokes authenticity. However, he 
avoids calling into question any of the excessive and inhumane practices other 
than those that can be made exempt – Faulks separates for the reader the tra-
dition of institutional care from the hopes of psychiatry as a fledgling discipline. 
He avoids the notion, rather, that these were the very conditions necessary for 
modern psychiatry to emerge and that medical paternalism remains one of the 
main concerns of contemporary critics. Faulks is also prone to a modernist tele-
ology of psychiatry by presenting a linear scientific succession depicting a 
steady development in its contribution to medicine and society, despite (he, and 
others, would suggest) the ‘wilderness years’ of psychoanalytic dominance.   
Morrison on the other hand contextualises madness, not a discipline, and 
she does so by linking madness, racism, misogyny and poverty. She arrives at 
the point that madness is real and understandable within the context of its expe-
rience, within its history, but without reducing it or celebrating it. Placed along-
side each other as authoritative sources on madness, we might draw forward 
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into the implications of each writer’s work for ‘mental health practise’ – to drive 
research to find the elusive neurological basis of madness (Faulks), or to 
change the conditions of living that means that rape, abuse, racism, poverty, 
misogyny and cruelty are no longer permissible experiences to expose people 
to (Morrison). As Newman (1991) questions it – why does therapy and treat-
ment try to alter people to live in a world that is crazy? Is it indeed ethical to help 
people to adapt to, and accommodate, inhumane conditions, when they could 
alternatively be active in changing them? 
Before selecting novels as a means to assessing psycho-colonisation, I 
found it necessary to bridge two intellectual gaps. The first was in the use of 
novels as a research area when appraising a social science area and the se-
cond was in the frame of reference by which the novels might be discussed. 
Taking the latter first; given the concern was colonisation, it made sense to ap-
proach the literary work, and indeed the assessment of psycho-colonisation, 
through a lens of postcolonial theory. Unfortunately, there was no pre-existing 
schema for postcolonial theory in the way that I required, and there are also a 
number of tensions, not least, the accusation that postcolonial theorists repre-
sent a Western accommodated intelligentsia. In tackling both of these I turned 
to postcolonial writing from anti-colonial activism, mostly around the mid-
twentieth century. By drawing on later work, born in the academy, I could sup-
plement and nuance my understanding of the earlier activist writings. Such ac-
tivity might also extend beyond this project. This allowed the formation of a 
schematic for colonisation; nine themes emerged that capture a sense of the 
processes of colonisation. Importantly, cultural colonisation and epistemic vio-
lence featured prominently, which further supports the worth of looking at novels 
in the cultural penetration of psychiatric ideas and practices. That colonisers 
treat their own epistemological claims as having the greatest worth was clear, 
as was the idea that once the means for dissemination are established (like 
schools), then Milton and Shakespeare ought to be taught, alongside Christiani-
ty. This holds the possibility that intentionally or otherwise, the cultural vectors 
that carry orthodox psy-science, supported by a tremendous pharmaceutical 
stake and professional prestige, might be most potent in their ordinariness; what 
could be more banal, and powerful, than an array of books and websites for 
self-diagnosis, advice on how to get the most from your medical practitioner, 
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what to look for in a relative going mad, how to self-advocate for treatment, pop-
neuroscience, pop-psychology, self-improvement, resilience training and so 
forth. Postcolonial theory offered a starting point to assess and theorise the lit-
erary vector of colonisation as a response to madness in the global north. How-
ever, while my preoccupation was ‘colonisation’ because that is the term used 
by the critics that began my thinking in the area, a further step would be to go 
beyond this into the theorising of ‘neo-colonisation’. Neo-colonisation relies less 
on military might and occupation, and more on persuasion, the shift from identi-
fication that is one of ‘citizen’ to one of ‘consumer’, and towards the promise of 
relief from suffering that comes with certain, ‘permissible’ (desired) cultural hy-
bridisation. What critics refer to as colonisation may, on reflection, be more ac-
curately referred to as neo-colonisation given that psychiatry sits within a 
broader context of western capitalist expansion, and makes use of cultural vec-
tors and the vulnerability of parities of health. 
In continuing to work backwards through my steps I return now to the is-
sue of literary sources as the grounding here, for critical engagement with psy-
science. This very suggestion reveals the tension, that is, there is disciplinary 
polarisation that necessitates science is critiqued by scientific means. However, 
one of the most consistent criticisms of psychiatry and ‘big pharma’ is that they 
practice ‘bad science’. The conceptual building blocks of psy-science have been 
shown to be wanting, and despite what would be an invitation to return and re-
examine those blocks, criticism is treated in traditional psy-science circles as a 
marginal gripe. Thus, I found it necessary to consider and expand on the way in 
which literary sources, cultural studies and political activism, like that found in 
postcolonial theory, might be legitimately employed as an equivalent knowledge 
when considering madness. My earlier point, that medical humanities may, 
when engaged with psy-science, without realising, accept psychiatry as medi-
cine, when that reflects its disciplinary location rather than its actual relationship 
to disease and illness, further supports the idea of humanities that go beyond a 
medical adjunct. Synthesising across the work of Derrida, Latour, Geertz, Fou-
cault and Feyerabend allowed for the questioning of disciplinary polarity and a 
challenge to the hierarchy of knowledge in an area such as mental health and 
madness. At its extent, such work goes beyond a ‘sociology of science’, and 
goes further towards Mannheim’s iteration that explodes the myths surrounding 
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and perpetuating a body of thought (see section 1.8). Critiquing psycho-
colonisation is not just a critical exercise, but rather brings into the frame the 
possibility that literary, artistic engagement with madness and distress is an 
equivalent knowledge, not an adjunct, and a key element of the process of de-
colonisation. 
This arrives at the idea that literary sources and cultural studies research 
offer a route to addressing the concerns of psycho-colonisation83. Having built 
this rationale, I have arrived at a schematic for assessing colonising processes, 
a number of which are evident in international psychiatry. When looking towards 
the global north, psycho-colonisation is evident in the ways by which psy-
science transmits its thinking and practice, here I select just one vector which is 
the novel. Psycho-colonisation is not a fait accompli, however, because the col-
onising processes can be, and have been, resisted, often by a similar the 
means. Juxtaposing the relative contribution of the novels of Faulks and Morri-
son shows how psycho-colonisation need not be the only response to madness 
and distress, and that such experiences can be helpfully contextualised. I turn 
now to my research questions, taking each in turn. 
 
5.2  Revisiting the research questions 
 
What does comparing the knowledge, practices, structures and processes of 
the mental health field, to perspectives advanced by postcolonial scholars and 
activists contribute to critical mental health discourse? 
 
The critical literature that I reviewed in chapters 1 and 2 (see 1.5, 1.6, 
1.7, 2.3, 2.4, 2.6) problematises the whole process of psychiatry: identification 
of clinical problems (at the level of individuals and populations), diagnosis, 
treatment, prognosis, aftercare. Likewise, the problems extend into the delivery 
of care, especially in the use of legal powers to detain and treat a patient with-
out their consent. It follows therefore, that given I am arguing that there is evi-
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 In her novel The Pure Gold Baby (2014), Margaret Drabble’s narrator at one point equates 
colonisation and psychiatric models of delivery. The narrator, reflecting on the types of commu-
nity psychiatric provision explains they fall in to two camps: “It depends on whether you are a 
Wordworthian or a Benthamite. On whether you are Mungo Park, essentially a Wordworthian of 
the Enlightenment, or Dr Livingstone, an obsessed Darwinian Victorian” (Drabble,2014, p.77). 
The discussion of psychiatric thinking and provision continue throughout the novel alongside 
references to Africa, race and anthropology. 
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dence of psycho-colonisation in the psychiatric and mental health fields, I also 
argue that what comes into view is that the whole process of psychiatric ‘care’ 
as psycho-colonising. This assertion sounds bold until it is placed alongside 
race activism that argues that the very fabric of Western society is racist, and 
for feminists that society is patriarchal through and through. My conclusion re-
fers therefore to the premise of psychiatric thinking, as aptly demonstrated by 
Human Traces. That is, psychiatry has, since it’s earliest modern days, been 
preoccupied with illness and disease models, even now, despite the relatively 
poor scientific development for the thinking that underpins hypotheses of func-
tional mental illnesses (clearly diseases such as dementias are far better, alt-
hough not entirely, understood than schizophrenia or depression). The mental 
illness paradigm is thus self-sustaining, as the argument goes, the basis of 
mental illness needs to be found but it is complex and elusive and so it must be 
found. What is significant, however, and particular to this thesis, is that this pre-
occupation and its socio-political stake grew during a period of European ex-
pansion in empire, as a discourse within the empire that made use of hierar-
chies of man and normality, and was (is) a discipline that travelled throughout 
that empire. This was a period within which axes delineating superiori-
ty/inferiority and normality/deviance were drawn up along the lines of race, cul-
ture, gender, sexuality, madness, disability, class. These axes are both at the 
root of the problems of psycho-colonisation, and also symptoms of it (that is, for 
instance, diagnostics that both undergird and exemplify certain power relations 
based in what critics consider to be pseudo-science). Psy-science did not break 
with empire, nor with racist practice, a criticism as relevant today as it was in the 
era of protest psychosis. The missing population though, one which I want to 
see brought into view, is the mad as colonised. What comes into view most 
acutely is that the practices of psy-science that are geo-politically colonising in 
the Global South do not have a naturalised existence in the Global North – they 
are colonising practices here too. 
 Snyder & Mitchell (2006) suggest a ‘cultural model of disability’, that is, a 
model for the ways disability serves a purpose and has a presence in cultural 
products. The cultural model draws attention to how literary (and other) forms 
create and perpetuate certain ideas about disability. By accepting certain psy-
sciences premises (for instance, that there is mental illness, a medical con-
 
 
204 
 
struct, that can be identified etc.), novels play a role in the cultural penetration of 
psy-science, which I suggest results in a false consciousness of madness. The 
cultural model therefore, is one that describes a particular vector within a 
broader relationship of psycho-colonisation. The themes that I developed to 
identify and assess psycho-colonisation in chapter 2 might be shown in such 
cultural products as novels even if their mode of action is just along the one 
theme. Put differently, Human Traces has a role in epistemic violence, but in 
itself cannot invade a mad person’s life, make a deal with big pharma or violent-
ly intervene. However, it can, as part of its epistemic violence provide the back-
drop to why these psychiatric choices are natural and necessary, it can support 
the idea of vulnerability (inferiority), the importance of disciplinary dominance in 
finding cures (the civilising mission), even to the extent that other countries 
which do not see madness for what it is (a biological event) need educating and 
access to the ‘industry standard’ of Western psychiatry. Cultural studies schol-
ars, such as Stuart Hall, argue that these (novels) are not passive, superficial 
forms but ones that are essential to cultural and social formations. Hall and oth-
ers see novels as active cultural agents which might endorse the incarceration 
of distressed mad people, as part of a social contract, that presents incarcera-
tion as the only possibility available and one that is palatable because doctors 
and nurses are present. In the same way that I would argue that asking a popu-
lation to accept austerity measures is to ask them to condone poverty while 
others live in wealth, asking them to accept incarceration of the mad, unwittingly 
is an acceptance of all the presumptions that underpin that act. Literature that 
presents psychiatry as a humane discipline that has the interests of an ill popu-
lation at heart neglects its links to eugenics, racism, imperialism, big business, 
preventable deaths in treatment and care, and the whole host of other iatrogen-
ic effects. It also neglects the robust and sustained questioning of psychiatry’s 
epistemological foundations. Of all the critical psychiatrists that I have met, or 
work I have read, only one has in their argument arrived at the point that, in the 
rehabilitation of psychiatry, there is the redundancy of psychiatry (Lewis, 2006). 
The remainder see a role for a recuperated psychiatry which is culturally aware, 
that understands poor practice in terms of ‘this is now, that was then’, is an in-
clusive, collaborative approach, but one that still seeks the old premise of a 
mental illness.  
 
 
205 
 
 That is not to say that recuperation is unwelcome and somewhat antici-
pated. While the impact of the United Nations (UN) report (Mendez, 2013) char-
acterising non-consensual treatment for psycho-social disability as torture 
seems not to have had a discernible impact, this trend is nonetheless on-going. 
The most recent report UN report on mental health suggests that “[f]orgotten 
issues beget forgotten people. The history of psychiatry and mental health care 
is marked by egregious rights violations [not heroic], such as lobotomy, per-
formed in the name of medicine”(Human Rights Council, 2017, p.4), before go-
ing on to state: 
  
A growing research base has produced evidence indicating that the status quo, 
pre-occupied with biomedical interventions, including psychotropic medications and 
non-consensual measures, is no longer defensible in the context of improving men-
tal health. (ibid) 
 
Literature can present madness in its diversity and in doing so it avoids a 
bio-medically univocal positionality. As with Morrison, and more recently with 
shifts in mental health discourse towards the importance of context and trauma 
in understanding madness, there is a complexity to madness. While Pecola’s 
‘meaning making’ within her circumstance is a psychological process, it is never 
divorced from an oppressive and abusive context. Pecola’s wish for blue eyes is 
both a personal ambition and an entirely plausible cultural story of how to attain 
beauty and equivalence. It is also a cautionary allegory for the dangers of cul-
tural assimilation in unequal relations – as Pecola’s community adopts white, 
working and middle class aspirations and standards, it runs the risk of alienation 
and thingification. As such, Morrison reveals an alternative story for mad ac-
counts, one that does not sacrifice the human core of the mad experience and 
its place in the world, for the sake of the appearances of generalisability (if 
Latour’s accounts of scientific procedure are considered, this is as much to do 
with processes of purification and sanitisation within a disciplinary discourse as 
the ‘real’ discovery of knowledge). As the social determinants of ‘mental ill-
health’ become increasingly understood as central to madness and distress, 
likewise the role of trauma, then novels like The Bluest Eye, become more than 
works of fiction to be mined by casual interdisciplinary interests. Rather, they 
become points of intensification, where madness might be better understood 
and accepted on its own terms. Accepting that the view now includes psycho-
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colonisation, and that at least some of its processes can be uncovered should 
have implications for the everyday responses to madness called mental health 
services. 
 
What are the implications/possibilities of considering mental health disciplines 
and their activities as colonising?  
 
Any act of colonisation, like Foucault’s formulation of power relationships, 
implies the opposite response through resistance. Decolonisation at the level of 
nation states was touched on in chapter 2, although my focus was primarily col-
onisation. Psycho-colonisation implies therefore, as a relation of power, a de-
colonising response which, again turning to Foucault, can be seen in the per-
formance of hysterics (what he termed the original anti-psychiatrists). There is a 
history of resistance in the ‘internal colony’ that speaks to the resistance of psy-
cho-colonisation in the global north. The first question therefore, is about 
whether there is sufficient will to decolonise psy-science. In part, the difficulties 
of mobilising a decolonising resistance reflect the activities of psychiatric treat-
ment; assessment that casts doubt upon rational credibility, uses sedation, di-
viding practices, coercion through detention and recall to hospital, co-opting of 
families into relapse surveillance, to name but a few. Service users, survivors 
and patients are forced down a legalistic route which is fraught with problems 
(as Alexander (2011) argues for black rights in the US, a legalistic framework is 
at best a partial solution and not least because it accepts the terms of engage-
ment of the racist coloniser), and as is shown both in the UK and US, equality 
rights legislation does not eradicate abuse, domination, prejudice and violence. 
So, decolonisation, should it happen, will not be an armed revolt in the case of 
psycho-colonisation. Burstow (2014) suggests, in the absence of a revolution in 
psychiatric thinking and practice, that a model of attrition is most realistic. This 
piece-by-piece resistance that subverts and transforms psychiatry and psychiat-
ric practise, is also the most applicable for a hegemonic, neo-colonial subjuga-
tion. By that I mean, psychiatric practice and thinking is diffused with multiple 
sites of application and growth, recently in areas such as wellness and resili-
ence, it is not a singular ‘enemy’ to challenge. 
 There has been a steadily growing critique of psy-science that will impact 
on the processes of psycho-colonisation. Foucault offers a useful qualification of 
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his ideas on power in an interview just before his death in 1984, which help to 
navigate the nature of the critiques and problems I discuss. He suggests: 
 
[…] in human relations, whatever they are – whether it be a question of com-
municating verbally […] or a question of a love relationship, an institutional or 
economic relationship – power is always present: I mean the relationship in 
which one wishes to direct the behaviour of another. These are the relation-
ships that one can find at different levels, under different forms: these relation-
ships of power are changeable relations, i.e. they can modify themselves, they 
are not given once and for all (Fornet-Betancourt et al, 1984, p.1) 
 
He goes on to suggest that at least some level of freedom must exist in a power 
relationship (otherwise there is no relationship), and that with even a tiny liberty 
there is the potential for resistance. Foucault suggests that the problem there-
fore is not the presence of power relations, or in fact the imbalance within it, but 
rather the problem is an issue of extent and ethics. He explains, for instance, 
that a teacher who exercises power through the position of ‘knowing more’ than 
a learner is thus not problematic until the exercise exceeds that lesson, and the 
intended outcome. It is presumed that in not exceeding this relation a certain 
level of consent or mutuality is present. This is significant to my thesis because 
disciplinary power is without doubt being exercised in the mental health field, 
and at the heart of psycho-colonisation is this excess that takes the form of 
epistemological demands (psychiatric models) through to treatment (including 
without consent). The nature of the power imbalance in a process of colonisa-
tion also refers to the cultural and social priming that inducts, even mystifies, a 
given population about the nature of distress and psychological variation. This is 
both a damning and a hopeful conclusion because a power relation can remain 
and be decolonised.  
In thinking back to psycho-colonisation and the themes emerging out of 
chapter 2; a professional body and discipline, with dense connections to other 
professional disciplines acts on behalf of the state to diagnose illnesses with 
dubious validity with the possibility of acts of social control (arrest and treatment 
without consent). These intense moments sit within an expanding framework of 
self-diagnosis and surveillance that draw on models of vulnerability and suscep-
tibility that require careful calibration in treatment and maintenance. There are 
multiple examples of sufferers claiming depression, for instance, as an illness 
which is theirs and which has real effects. The upshot of this is unclear – as de-
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pression is claimed in this way will it demand better treatment from psy-science 
or will it facilitate psy-diffusion widely and broadly and the adoption of illness 
models consistently for periods of misery and distress. Reich’s synthesis of 
Marxist false consciousness with psychoanalytic theory to explain the rise of 
fascism gives a model for how a pervasive splitting of misery from circumstance 
might be achieved with a population who are keen to accept more the causality 
of neurotransmitters than those of intolerable life conditions. In such a climate 
clinical models trump personal or socio-political explanations, although the latter 
might be integrated to an extent. Those people lost to states of resistance or 
deep damage are to be contained and expelled variably (as in the case with 
personality disorder), and are often criminalised and incarcerated (or killed84). 
All good citizens are implored to self-monitor, seek help, comply and continue. 
 
How do the Humanities offer both methodological and epistemological insights 
into the mental health field? In answering this question the study will assess the 
value of postcolonial theory for the disability studies and mental health fields. 
 
In chapter 1, I outlined my rationale for engaging with the postcolonial and 
cultural studies fields, and also for literary sources as a means to assessing 
psycho-colonisation. I suggested that given that the concern here was one of 
colonisation, that the most appropriate course of action was to employ post-
colonial theory. I also suggested that the somewhat contrived nature of discipli-
nary purification means such interdisciplinary work was most often accommo-
dated within the medical humanities field. While humanities orientated theory, 
such as that of Deleuze and Foucault, does cross over into qualitative research, 
the use of novels seemed to engender further disciplinary purification. Even in a 
field such as psychiatry, with its well critiqued paucity of scientificity, literary re-
search is viewed as an adjunct that complements the clinician’s knowledge; and 
as an adjunct, it should know its place. Both Hustvedt (2016) and Bolacki (2016) 
reflect on such tensions, including the problems of interdisciplinarity, the con-
cepts underpinning the aim of interdisciplinary works within and between disci-
                                                          
84
 Global Disability Watch (2017; accessed 20/09/17 1330) reported in February 2017 that 94 
psychiatric patients had been decanted to private ‘healthcare’ providers in South Africa and 
subsequently died from the conditions. The article itself refers to ‘concentration camp style cen-
tres’ which echoes the neglect of 40,000 psychiatric patients who died in French institutions dur-
ing the second world war of neglect (Read & Masson, 2004). Local South African commenters 
are referring to this as a genocide. 
 
 
209 
 
plines, and the relative status of interdisciplinary enquiry in both the originating 
field (for instance, cultural studies), and the field it is ‘visiting’ (like medicine). 
Bolacki adopts the term ‘critical interloper’ to typify how the humanities re-
searcher/thinker might interact with medicine, which is the notion that however 
welcome the enquiry is or is not, it may have something to offer the discipline in 
which it interlopes. Her tone, however, is collegial, and this is where ‘critical in-
terloper’ might not quite characterise what I am suggesting here. Given the 
stakes I have outlined in earlier chapters, and the concerns of activists, a critical 
interloper may need to be more strident.  Like Hustvedt, Bolacki and others, I 
have attempted to close the disciplinary gap somewhat by exploring the possi-
bility that a literary source like a novel, understood to be engaging with mad-
ness, is (and can be more than) a cultural studies window into a social sciences 
domain. Literary and cultural sources, I argue, allow a symptomatic assessment 
of cultural phenomena. Such assessments might lend themselves to some de-
gree of generalizability. I see this as following a triangulation along the following 
lines: firstly, that credible critics and thinkers suggest that psy-science is colo-
nising broadly. Secondly, critical international research problematizes the global 
spread of Western psychiatry within a capitalist, neo-liberal frame of reference.  
Finally, these two areas are supplemented by a highly localised assessment of 
cultural transmission through novels using a postcolonial schema of assess-
ment (such as in this study); there begins to be sufficient grounds to suggest 
that these concerns are real. If such concerns are placed alongside the disquiet 
and worry about neo-colonisation of Western culture and the Global North 
broadly, of which psy-science is a facet, then this problematic swells further still. 
What I have done here is develop a thematic schematic for assessing colonis-
ing processes arising out of the activist decolonisation movements. This is nec-
essary because to assess psychiatry on its own terms would be to accept its 
premises and its questions without taking a broader socio-cultural reading of 
colonisation. In addition, and what my analysis of Faulks’ work suggests, is that 
literary theory also needs to take account of mad thinking, and accept less easi-
ly the tropes of psychiatry. Hall (2016) in discussing disability theory in literary 
contexts, presents such work as a relatively new critical venture and further-
more reflects on the possibilities opened by intersectional studies with postcolo-
nial (and other) theoretical and activist positions. 
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The contribution is therefore bi-directional. The mad studies, critical psy- 
perspectives discussed here, can, and should contribute to how novelists and 
literary theorists conceptualise psychological otherness. That bi-directionality 
leads me to recommend that someone wanting to find out about the status and 
thinking of psychiatry in the twentieth century should read Human Traces be-
cause of its slavish adherence to orthodox thinking. That Faulks (2011) can 
publish, with the BBC, a book that characterises Doris Lessing’s The Golden 
Notebook as not being so much about feminism and madness, but rather a cau-
tionary tale about promiscuity, and follow it in the next chapter on the ‘gay novel’ 
about how Alan Hollinghurst’s characters are problematically sexually hyperac-
tive, shows how easily traditional orthodoxies find themselves in mainstream 
print. Both perspectives would have fit neatly within a psy-complex for mad 
women and homosexuality within psychiatry/mental health even thirty years 
ago. Despite his commercial success, and some critical acclaim for Birdsong 
(1993), Faulks is relatively absent in the critical literature. This is not just a prob-
lem for Faulks, Salman Rushdie writes within a similarly psy-orthodoxy in The 
Satanic Verses (1988). Gibreel, one of the two main characters of the novel, 
goes mad and this is presented mostly as a traditional psychiatric encounter. 
Bearing in mind the way in which The Satanic Verses is a canonical postcoloni-
al text, his critical discourse on British identity, Islam and difference, does not 
extend to the mad. As Hall (2016) argues with disability discourse and literary 
criticism, this criticism, I believe, can be extended into a mad perspective on lit-
eratures that questions psychiatric orthodoxy and sanism, and which can ap-
propriate works, like those of Morrison (and Lessing) into a mad canon. What I 
offer in this thesis is a rationale for taking a certain methodological approach, I 
employ a postcolonial frame of reference towards developing a framework for 
assessing coloniality, and I juxtapose, with this framework in mind, two exam-
ples; one colonising, one less or not so, of madness. 
The humanities and cultural studies, broadly speaking, have different re-
search aims than those of the social sciences. That is, to value repetition that 
arrives at regularities as a means to uncovering a truth (social scientific aim), is 
not the same as developing a perspective that is plausible, but understood to be 
one amongst many. However, without wishing to invoke grand humanistic nar-
ratives, both are arguably amenable to being employed to the betterment of life. 
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If interdisciplinary studies can become more ‘mainstream’ than peripheral, then 
the possibilities of cross fertilization increase. The problems of applying a criti-
cally, interloping literary or cultural studies frame of reference to madness, only 
lasts as long as the endeavour is that of trying to understand madness as 
something to be treated, contained and eradicated. Once the focus moves from 
generalizability in diagnostic activities towards highly localised, contextualised 
(and contextualising) helping responses to alleviate distress, misery and confu-
sion, the novel (film, poem, play) becomes a vehicle for shared understanding. 
Likewise, when treatments shift from attempts at treating poorly evidenced and 
presumed disease states, towards relief from distress and solving the problems 
of living, thus entertaining political solutions, then the wishes that psychiatry es-
pouses for ethical practice and relevance are achievable85. Decolonisation, 
therefore, is not just concerned with the activities of psy-science but with the 
epistemological practices that undergird it, and thus the methodologies that are 
employed to investigate madness. 
 
5.3  The contribution of this thesis  
 
 Before going on to suggest where this thesis may extend into other re-
search, or indeed, questions that remain unanswered, I will outline what I have 
accomplished here. This thesis demonstrates the kind of critical activity that is 
possible, and could be adopted within a postcolonial positionality. While not the 
first study to take such positionality, some of the points I mention in the follow-
ing paragraphs do expand on what is original in my work. As I mention above, 
by the end of chapter 2 I developed a schematic for assessing coloniality, which 
I then go on to use as a way to situate and critique Human Traces. My coloniali-
ty schematic would allow others the same means to assessment although their 
emphasis may be different. For instance, a geopolitically orientated study may 
notice more the civilising mission, the inferiority/superiority complex, over a judi-
cial study that is concerned with the power to arrest, and the aims of supposed-
                                                          
85
 The Citizens Commission on Human Rights (US) has published such a manifesto in the Men-
tal Health Declaration of Human Rights. Besides being a document worth working to, the war of 
attrition is evident as a subtext. For instance, point A1 that requires a medical test to confirm 
diagnosis and the “right to refuse diagnoses of “mental illness” that cannot be medically con-
firmed” (http://www.cchr.org/about-us/mental-health-declaration-of-human-rights.html ac-
cessed11/12/17, 10:11) means that most of psychiatric diagnostic practice would fall at this first 
point if it was adopted, while conversely, this is not an unreasonable demand of medicine. 
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ly reparative containment and re-education. It is likely however, that while the 
emphasis may differ, all the themes will be either evident to some degree, even 
if it is at the level of discourse about the concern. 
 Despite being a bestselling author with claims to literary merit, Faulks’ 
work remains mostly unexplored and with little critique in the scholarly literature. 
Even if this is not surprising, maybe that scholars do not see Faulks as having 
literary merit, or indeed that he is not innovative or questioning, from a cultural 
studies perspective, his work bears more scrutiny. His first world war novels 
have been cultural carriers in how readers have related to world war one narra-
tives, his novels have been televised and filmed and he has been given a plat-
form to appraise literature in the style of grand narratives on behalf of the BBC. 
My assessment of Human Traces, and some of his other novels, situates psy-
chiatric discourse within popular literature, and one that has an authentic worth 
in the eyes of a considerable number of readers, even within the psy-
professions. As a major cultural carrier of the meaning of madness, and a figure 
who is seen to bridge the science, history and literary arenas, I have begun 
work on Faulks’ which requires further critical consideration and alongside him, 
other popular mad discourses. 
 Furthermore, I have demonstrated how Human Traces holds, and re-
flects, dominant views of madness. In the disability literature, and more critical-
thinking health or medical humanities work, cultural works perpetuate, and re-
sist, bio-medical understandings of disability, disease and madness. Writing 
back to such accounts, which I characterise as colonising, goes, I believe, be-
yond an intellectual exercise, but is also a mode of resistance. Part of that re-
sistance is methodological in nature. The first part of chapter 2 is firmly within 
the social sciences domain, and the concerns of critical voices seem to speak 
beyond science, and into cultural and social space. Likewise, the intertexual re-
lationships I describe in chapter 3 between Faulks, Shorter and Lieberman defy 
a straight forward characterisation as literary criticism. To play between sup-
posed non-fiction and fictional sources and to explore their connections, further 
degrades the disciplinary purification that I discuss in Latour’s work in chapter 1. 
Once the process begins, there is almost an ease in how the genres, domains 
and fields show permeability and hybrid possibilities. My concern is that a health 
or medical humanities placement might, unintentionally, be a subtle move to-
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wards disciplinary purification, a further category within the broad polar relation-
ship of nature and culture. I understand but resist the placing of work such as 
mine in the medical humanities because I have yet to see the merit of the con-
cerns of psycho-colonisation being a medical one, rather than social-political, 
cultural and literary. For instance, to argue that treatment needs to be more 
humane, would be to accept that treatment is the most appropriate way to frame 
contact between two people who are concerned with madness – I will have 
conceded treatment as the primary lens for the conversation and also, hidden 
behind it, the necessity of clinical frames of reference (treatment implies diag-
nosis, prognosis, care etc). Some such concessions are almost inevitable given 
the prominence of psy-language in the area. If, however, the identification is 
with mad studies, a project such as mine needs not to be placed in a discipli-
nary matrix, but rather in one that is already highly mobile. The area of concern 
(madness) as a means to triangulation, rather than the disciplinary conventions, 
may allow for greater mutuality and interdisciplinarity. Put a different way, this 
thesis is entirely concerned with madness, but where does it start or stop being 
social science, or literary criticism, or philosophy or history? 
 Toni Morrison’s work is discussed here as a partial remedy to the psy-
cho-colonising of Faulks and psychiatric texts. Her work is already broadly con-
nected to madness, though most often this is from the angle of trauma and in-
tergenerational trauma – two increasingly important perspectives in mental 
health care and support. However, I have also approached her work with an 
outlook firmly anchored in the world of critical psy-discourse that is interested in 
madness, trauma informed or otherwise. By reading her work primarily from the 
position of a mad experience, that of psychological alterity, and as an intersec-
tion of racism, gender, poverty, I claim her work for critical mad perspectives 
that disavow and resist orthodox, medical psychiatric approaches.  
 
5.4 Future directions. 
 
The most urgent issue of ‘what next?’ is to do with the implications that 
identifying psycho-colonisation has for mental health practice. Given that a U.N 
special rapporteur can submit the view that non-consensual treatment meets 
international criteria for torture, without any evident soul searching on behalf of 
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services, would indicate this is truly a ‘war of attrition’. Because what I have laid 
out here implicates the whole of the psychiatric process and imperium, the nec-
essary moves to decolonisation are unlikely and vast. A war of attrition though, 
does not simply require patients to resist but also can draw practitioners, activ-
ists and thinkers into the resistance. That is already the case, and prominent 
figures in the psychiatric landscape are critiquing, creating position statements 
that push towards a more humane system, and continue to write exposés. The 
dividing practices of psychiatry are so powerful, and the inferiority/superiority 
dynamic so established, that mobilising collective outrage and resistance re-
mains a challenge, not least because the mad lack credibility in the eyes of oth-
ers. The Soteria Project (Mosher, 2004) and many crisis, survivor led services 
speak to the possibility of viable alternatives, were they not to be undercut. The 
care and support of the mad in distress should not suffer due to the poverty of 
vision of a few powerful interests. 
Theoretically there is still some work to be undertaken to explore the so-
cial model of disability as an activist model that may travel well into mental 
health contexts not least because of its activist track record, the opportunities of 
affiliation with other similar groups and its pragmatic outlook. However, as I ar-
gue in a chapter mentioned previously (Penson, 2015), there is a hidden cost. 
The social model of disability and the medical model both rely on the idea of 
impairment, although the latter sees that as a reason to accept one’s limitations, 
and the former sees impairment as a call to drive issues of access to the fore. 
By adopting the social model as it is, there is a possibility that the idea of im-
pairment is also adopted into mental health usage, but below the waterline. 
Even metaphorically conflating madness and distress with illness, impairment 
and disease, I believe, leads to conceptual and evidential slippage. Just be-
cause people with mental health problems happen to receive health services 
(as the only real option available), ‘feel ill’ and are treated poorly in society be-
cause they have a presumed illness, should not allow the presumption of said 
illness to go unquestioned. The reality is a more complex Catch-22 in that if 
there is no, or very little, evidence for illness processes in mental illness then it 
calls into question the necessity for care and adaptation. Conversely, assuming 
illness is correctly the case because the welfare and care system is accustomed 
to it, will bolster the need for psychiatric and health professional endorsement. I 
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offer the double social model as a ‘holding position’ and in doing so keep both 
the idea of illness and the social response that is prejudicial ‘in play’ – both, I 
argue, are as much socially construed as medically provable, and thus both are 
socially and culturally negotiated.   Put another way – until 1992 homosexuality 
was a bona fide mental illness, there was never any evidence that it was, and it 
changed because enough people with influence said it was not any longer an 
illness. Without a mental illness fall-back, responses to the lived experience and 
activism of LGBTQ people have been more generally framed as juridical, ethical 
and moral with a steady shift towards a human rights based progressive political 
view. 
Another research strand beyond my thesis is in the application of the co-
lonial schematic both in activism and in critical discourse. It offers a clear shape 
and scaffold for the articulation of discontent, and the possibility of connecting 
what appears to be disparate psycho-colonising activities into a more coherent 
and relational picture. As mentioned above, depending on the study, the em-
phasis might shift, but it is likely that by implication other parts of the scheme 
are evident. For example, in section 1.7 I refer to the WHO’s millennial goals for 
mental health and how this is viewed in international mental health develop-
ment. The tone is strikingly similar to the idea that the U.S. model of democracy 
is one that should be replicated in other countries. Gilley (2017), in Third World 
Quarterly, in fact argues that colonisation was actually a boon to the countries 
colonised and their positive futures under colonial rule declined once the decol-
onisation was achieved. He advocates a return to colonial style of relationships 
between post-industrial Western societies and ‘developing’ states, even going 
as far as to suggest this may need imposing on some states for their own good. 
Gilley mistakes the possibilities of mutuality and cooperation for contemporary 
colonisation and erases the fact that colonial help was never requested in the 
first instance, but imposed, he overlooks the millions who died directly, the polit-
ical destabilisation of states during and post-decolonisation, and the neo-
colonial processes that are current. If Gilley’s argument holds true for at least 
some people, then problematizing colonisation is not even a relevant activity.  
The coloniality schematic, therefore, should continue to be developed 
especially with neo-colonial concerns in mind. Hardt & Negri (2000) describe 
neo-colonialism in many of the ways that I have typified colonialism, but they 
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have supplemented this with a few differences. One of the most significant addi-
tions is that they present the state of empire as being ubiquitous. They put it in 
this way:  
 
We should be done once and for all with the search for an outside, a standpoint 
that imagines a purity for our politics. It is better both theoretically and practical-
ly to enter the terrain of Empire and confront its homogenizing and heterogeniz-
ing flows in all their complexity, grounding our analysis in the power of the glob-
al multitude (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p.46) 
 
Taking this view into the psycho-colonisation frame would suggest that 
there is no ‘outside’ of/to the psychiatric imperium, and in the way that Burstow 
(2014) suggests, resistance is from within and is piece-by-piece. Scientific chal-
lengers to psy-science like Mary Boyle, Anne Cooke, Richard Bentall and Jo 
Moncrieff take on an even more important stature as people who find moments 
of resistance and leverage within the psy-imperium. However, in the interest of 
rigour, a further research task would be to extend the literature review of post-
colonial activism to account for neo-colonial resistance. My review was most 
interested in the decolonisation activists to avoid accusations of using a post-
modern literature that has its greatest presence in the academy not ‘the world’. 
While I do not subscribe to the view that there are postmodern drivers of post-
colonial resistance that lose their territorialism and grip in the world, this thesis 
needed to remain with the former. I think further research should explore most 
thoroughly the postcolonial theorists not covered here, and especially those in-
forming understandings of neo-colonialism. However, neocolonialism remains a 
term of some debate. It has been used to demarcate new strategies of colonisa-
tion following the decolonisation movements from the 1950s onwards. Such us-
age refers to cultural, epistemological, technological and economic domination 
rather than the former geographic colonisation (although there remain examples 
of this too such as the critical accounts of the US invasion of Iraq framed in 
terms of American imperialism). As such it is arguable whether there is a post or 
neo colonial as opposed to simply a continuation of colonisation (Appiah, 1991). 
To retain a tight intellectual rigor I have, in this thesis, aligned closely 
with the terminology of the psycho-colonial critical literature, hence my focus on 
colonialism and coloniality. Earlier I noted the problem and limitations of this, 
not least in the way in which the mental health critical literature has mostly, 
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poorly, developed a critique. Such a focus has, both here and in the literature I 
reviewed in chapters 1 and 2, prevented a full discussion of the possibilities 
opened by reconceptualising psycho-colonialism as neo-colonialism. Mignolo & 
Walsh (2018) offer yet another possibility, arising out of various South and Cen-
tral American activist movements, which they term decoloniality. Rather than a 
formula, the authors offer principles and premises that, when present, offer the 
possibilities of decolonising or ‘delinking’ from coloniality. While decoloniality 
need not start as an individual act, Mignolo & Walsh advocate a decolonising of 
the self as well as, or besides, a community of delinking/decolonising practice. 
To some degree such ideas have been articulated in the postcolonial literatures 
concerned with concerns of how to remedy alienation, self and other, and also 
in Foucault’s preface to Deleuze & Guattari’s (1972) Anti-Oedopus, in which he 
notes that non-fascism begins with addressing the fascism in ourselves. In fact, 
much of Foucault’s preface pre-empts decoloniality (for instance, the call to “de-
velop action, thought, and desires by proliferation, juxtaposition, and disjunc-
tion”, to “not think one has to be sad to be militant”, to “not use thought to 
ground a political practice in Truth”, (Foucault, 1972, p.xv) and so on). Decolo-
niality articulates a concern about the link between coloniality and modernity to 
the extent that the authors argue that the two are synonymous – one cannot ex-
ist without the other. For me, that locates psy-science firmly within the modern-
ist period and trope, and therefore, the colonial project. This is especially so 
when they typify coloniality/modernism as being constituted in a conceptual tri-
ad of “a field of representation” (Mignolo & Walters, 2018, p.139) where power 
is grounded in the idea that “signs represent something existing”; “a set of rhe-
torical discourses” to persuade people that the world is as the field of represen-
tation gives it (that it is a truthful picture); and the third part which is “a set of 
global designs” (ibid), which is the civilising mission; the application of the mod-
ernist agenda; the dominance over, and hewing of, nature at its joints etc. All 
three are evident in my account of psycho-colonisation from the empowered 
description of distress, phenomena and misery that reforms experience as so-
called mental illness symptoms; how such proxies become material, biological 
facts of psychopathology; and the extensive drive to liberate the whole of hu-
mankind from mental illnesses, utterly disaggregated from the material causes 
of misery, through various means to effect a global reach. In addition, Mignolo & 
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Walters, describe delinking and decoloniality as being a project of being for. To 
achieve this, liberation and delinking has to get beyond resistance and the anti-, 
rather, it involves living the life that is desired without reference or dependence 
on the colonial/modernist frame of reference. Hence their invitation to decolo-
nise the self, where the introjection of the modernist project is to be most power-
fully found. This brief account fails to do justice to Decoloniality, its possibilities 
for localised, grassroots liberation from modernist/coloniality within the psycho-
colonising problematic, and the way in which thought, intellectual activity and 
action correspond in praxis.  
Mignolo (2009) develops the concept of ‘epistemic disobedience’, a term 
that refers to the problematic ways that knowledge production is privileged 
through the elevation of certain cultural and historical traditions, those associat-
ed with Western modernity and Enlightenment. What this raises is not just the 
necessity to counter problematic knowing, like the way more radical or critical 
psychologists might question the scientificity of psy-science. Also it requires a 
different paradigmatic orientation away from such modern traditions, towards 
knowledge practices that are local and relevant. As Mignolo puts it: “it is not 
enough to change the content of the conversation,that it is of the essence to 
change the terms of the conversation” (Mignolo, 2009, p.4, emphasis in the 
original). Thus, appealing to psy-science to rehabilitate is to change the content 
but not the terms. The act of articulating decolonial thought, that is, highlighting 
the effect of colonisation/modernity, is in itself an act of disobedience. To draw 
attention to the rise of capitalism and its enveloping effect on all area of Euro-
American thought and activity, in treating lives as not for living but for the ex-
traction of surplus, is to make that connection also (Mignolo, 2011). As such, re-
contextualising and placing back in history the activities and growth of psy-
science is essential to understanding its relationship to colonisation, subordinat-
ing distress and difference, ring-fencing normality and surveying the borders of 
these domains.  
Crucially, the activist Mad Studies network already understand the po-
tency of working within the domineering frame of reference, and likewise I sug-
gest in my own writing (Penson, 2011, 2015) how the social model of disability 
has become appropriated into professional discourses with the effect of subvert-
ing it. Bereford & Russo (2016) highlight a number of concerns including the 
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way in which the academy might itself undervalue mad thinking and activism 
where a “deep divide […] can grow between activism and theory building” 
(p.272). They go on to suggest the need to “transcend the methods that have 
been institutionalised in services and the academy” (Bereford & Russo, 2016, 
p.273). Likewise, Pousanidou (2013) outlines the very nature of expertise being 
both worthy of scrutiny and open to development. It seems that decolonial 
thought, epistemic disobedience and mad studies have some things in common 
and alliances to make. 
 Grech (2015) outlines some of the tensions and possible directions for 
disability activism regarding colonisation, some of which I have discussed 
above. He notes that “The absence of the colonial from Eurocentric disability 
studies is perhaps unsurprising because the coloniser does not want to recollect 
colonialism as it challenges his/her own ‘civility’” (Grech, 2015, p.7). He goes on 
to describe how the coloniser goes on to destroy the records of colonisation, 
suppresses counter-narratives and does not want to apologise for colonisation. 
Grech highlights the importance of evidence that exposes the colonial and as 
part of this, the importance of counter-narratives from the colonised. Like Hardt 
& Negri (2000) suggest above, this will come from the heart of the neo-colonial 
situation. Grech is suggesting, through their actions, that the coloniser knows of 
their true intentions and their motives, sufficient to cover their crimes. This is a 
damning point of departure. If the APA has been challenged repeatedly on the 
nature and closeness of its relationship to Big Pharma; if the UN have reported 
that psychiatric seclusion and forced treatment is torture; if the people most like-
ly to go mad are people of colour, sexual minorities, women and those in pov-
erty; if the scientific claims of psychiatric practice have been cast into serious 
doubt; if the largest mental institutions in the world are prisons; if the recent and 
contemporary history of psychiatry has within it extensive eugenics programs, 
including being some of the eugenicist innovators; if that recent history includes 
programmes of human experimentation and sterilisation … If all this is true, and 
yet still remain a peripheral concern, not central to the espoused concerns of 
the psychiatric imperium or the societies in which it resides, if in fact it is ob-
scured, overlooked or minimised, then the decolonisation of psy-science and 
madness is most urgent. 
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